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Traditional studies in economics assume that decision makers are homogeneous.
Although this assumption simplifies analysis, modeling decision maker
heterogeneity yields insights about consumer or producer behavior that provide
policy makers with efficient policy designs. In my dissertation, I analyze how
decision maker heterogeneity influences the efficiency of instrument choice in
environmental and energy policies. In my first chapter, I consider the efficacy of
different policies for increasing fuel economy when households are heterogeneous
in how they value gasoline costs when buying a new vehicle. I find that
designing policies to target households that undervalue fuel costs can reduce
compliance costs of energy efficiency programs in the transportation sector. In
my second and third chapters, I evaluate the efficacy of alternative instruments
for alleviating adverse selection in markets for carbon offsets when potential
projects have heterogeneous characteristics. In these essays, I find that the
most efficient policies directly attack the adverse selection problem by lowering
baselines to all projects. This is because conservative baselines lead to fewer
projects being over-credited and to more projects being under-credited. Taken
together, my essays push forward the literature on instrument choice in the face
of decision maker heterogeneity and yield general insights for designing sound
environmental and energy policy.
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This dissertation is composed of four chapters. The first chapter provides an
overview of my dissertation and summarizes the key results of the proceeding
chapters. The remaining chapters are united with the goal of evaluating public
policies in the face of decision maker heterogeneity. The first chapter, which I title
“Consumer Heterogeneity and the Energy Paradox,” analyzes how households
value energy efficiency when they buy a new car. The second chapter, titled
“Designing Efficient Markets for Carbon Offsets With Distributional Constraints,”
studies the relative efficacy of three policies – baselines, trade ratios and limits
– for alleviating the problem of adverse selection in markets for carbon offsets.
The third chapter, currently titled “On the Importance of Baseline Setting in
Markets for Carbon Offsets,” evaluates the relative magnitudes of over-credited,
non-additional offsets and under-credited emissions reductions.
1.1 Summary of “Consumer Heterogeneity and the Energy
Paradox”
This paper presents an analysis of the energy paradox – the idea that consumers
undervalue cost savings from investments in energy efficiency – with a focus on
how consumers vary in their preferences for energy cost savings. By formulating
1
a mixed logit discrete choice model of new vehicle demand that accounts for
unobserved product characteristics, I estimate the distribution of household
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing gasoline costs by one dollar. While I find
that the average household puts equal weight on vehicle price and fuel cost, I
find significant heterogeneity in WTP where a non-trivial fraction of households
appear to be inattentive to fuel cost differences. Encouraging these households
to fully value fuel costs generates welfare gains that are on the same order of
magnitude as the cost of increasing fuel economy standards. By calibrating a
simple model of the new vehicle market, I find, however, that existing policies
for increasing fuel economy fall short of realizing these gains because the policies
influence the purchase decisions of all households, including those that fully or
overvalue fuel costs. I also find tremendous variation in the ability of existing
policies to preferentially encourage households that undervalue fuel costs to buy
more fuel efficient vehicles, which highlights the importance of understanding
and evaluating how energy efficiency programs target different consumer types.
1.2 Summary of “Designing Efficient Markets for Carbon
Offsets With Distributional Constraints”
This paper presents an assessment of the relative efficacy of three key instruments
- baselines, trade ratios and limits - which are under policy discussion in
the design of carbon offset programs. We rank the instruments by their
2
implications for total emissions, economic efficiency, and efficiency gain relative
to a distributional transfer from capped to uncapped sectors. We find that the
baseline is the best instrument for maximizing welfare as it directly reduces
the share of offsets that are non-additional and that second-best policies do not
sacrifice much welfare relative to the standard first-best policy prescription.
1.3 Summary of “On the Importance of Baseline Setting in
Markets for Carbon Offsets”
Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains
a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions.
At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions.
Projects can be correctly, over- or under-credited for their actual emissions
reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets
within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare of the relative impact
of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions on overall
emissions under different levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices. In
the context of the 2009 Waxman-Markey legislation, we find that the emissions
impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited
emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall
supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. Under a
medium-run reduction target of two billion tons of CO2 equivalent, to maintain
3
the environmental integrity of the program, baselines need to be set to 70
percent of predicted business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Moreover, as the carbon
market achieves higher equilibrium prices, less stringent baselines can balance




CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY AND THE ENERGY PARADOX
2.1 Introduction
Climate change and energy security are two key public policy issues facing the
United States today. These issues have focused the attention of policy makers on
designing and evaluating programs that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
energy consumption. Some examples in the transportation sector include hybrid
vehicle subsidies, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and gas
guzzler taxes. These policies are designed to encourage the sale of energy efficient,
high miles-per-gallon (MPG) vehicles with the dual goal of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions and gasoline consumption.
Understanding how consumers value energy efficiency is crucial for
evaluating the costs and benefits of these policies and determining which policies
have the lowest welfare costs for reducing energy use and internalizing the
externalities associated with energy consumption. For example, Sallee [100]
compares the costs and benefits of reformed Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards under two scenarios: one where consumers fully value fuel
cost savings from buying high MPG cars, and one where they do not internalize
these savings. He finds that the new CAFE standards fail to pass a cost-benefit test
in the former case but pass the test in the latter case.1 In other words, quantifying
1This result appears in Table 1 in [100]. For the time frame between 2012-2016, CAFE standards
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the private fuel cost savings created by the program as an external benefit of the
program is necessary for the policy to pass a cost-benefit test. If consumers fully
value fuel cost savings, then the program fails the test.
In this paper I estimate how households in the United States value fuel
cost savings when they make a new vehicle purchase. In contrast to most
existing literature in this area, I estimate the entire distribution of household
preferences for fuel economy. This allows me to investigate whether households
are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of fuel costs. Whether
some consumers undervalue fuel cost savings while others do not has crucial
implications for designing efficient energy policy. An efficient policy will be
able to preferentially encourage the consumers that undervalue to buy more
efficient vehicles. A policy that primarily encourages households that already
fully value energy costs can be thought of as attracting the wrong sub-group of
the population. This targeting problem is common in many other climate and
energy related policies, including carbon offset programs [15], electricity rebate
programs [68] and flexibility mechanisms in cap-and-trade programs [90].
I use two datasets to estimate the distribution of household preferences for fuel
economy. The first dataset comes from R.L. Polk and comprises new vehicle shares
at the Metropolitan Statistical Area Level. I merge these share data with detailed
household demographics and vehicle holdings data from the two most recent
waves of the National Household Transportation Surveys. These data allow me
cost 346 billion dollars and bring external benefits of 312 billion dollars. Fuel savings benefits,
however, are 1, 546 billion dollars.
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accurately estimate household consumer preferences for fuel economy and other
vehicle characteristics that are relevant to the consumer purchase decision.
I estimate a mixed logit new vehicle demand model that includes a separate
parameter for present value lifetime vehicle fuel costs and vehicle price. I model
the parameter for the present value of lifetime vehicle fuel costs as random,
allowing households to have different valuations of fuel costs. To account for
unobserved vehicle characteristics, I estimate vehicle model fixed effects using a
modified version of the contraction mapping approach described in [19]. I show
that including these fixed effects is crucial for obtaining unbiased estimates for
WTP since they control for vehicle price endogeneity.
To estimate the distribution of willingness-to-pay for reducing fuel costs by
one dollar, I take estimated parameters for the random utility model and compute
the ratio of the marginal utility of fuel costs and the marginal utility of price. I find
that on average, households fully value fuel cost savings as they are willing to pay
about 98 cents to reduce the present value of fuel costs by one dollar. Importantly,
however, I find that there is substantial heterogeneity in how the sample of
households value fuel costs. The estimation results suggest that about 31 percent
of households ignore fuel costs when they make a new vehicle purchase.
To evaluate the implications of this heterogeneity, I calibrate an equilibrium
model of the new vehicle market with the estimated econometric parameters
of consumer preferences. I find that a policy that only targets households that
undervalue fuel costs to buy more fuel efficient vehicles creates private welfare
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gains that can be as large as or exceed the costs of increasing fuel economy
standards. I then simulate how well three existing policies for increasing fleet fuel
economy – a gas guzzler tax, a feebate and a fuel efficient vehicle subsidy – are able
to target these consumers. The simulation results suggest that none of the policies
are effective at primarily influencing the purchase decisions of households with
WTP less than one. Furthermore, I find that the ability to target households that
undervalue fuel costs substantially differs across policies. The gas guzzler tax
is best at preferentially encouraging households that undervalue to buy more
fuel efficient cars. This is because the tax only applies to vehicles that are likely
to be bought by households that undervalue fuel costs. The subsidy policy, on
the other hand, is poor at targeting. For a common increase in fuel economy, a
subsidy to efficient vehicles increases private welfare internality benefits by about
one-third of the increase from an equivalent gas guzzler tax. The subsidy is poor
at targeting because it only applies to vehicles that are already likely to be bought
by households that fully value fuel economy. With these results in hand, I argue
that the consumer heterogeneity in fuel cost valuation has significant implications
for evaluating several other policies in the transportation sector, including vehicle
scrappage programs and reformed footprint-based standards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I review relevant
research in the areas of consumer valuation of fuel economy and policy analysis
of energy efficiency programs. In Section 2.3, I set out the ingredients of the
empirical model that I use to estimate WTP for reducing fuel costs by one dollar.
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I discuss the data and estimation results of the empirical
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model, respectively. I then present a policy analysis in Section 2.6 that includes
a simulation model that is calibrated to the econometric parameters. I make
concluding remarks in Section 2.7.
2.2 Literature Review
My paper contributes to two related areas of energy and environmental
economics. The first area involves estimating how consumers trade off higher
up-front purchase prices for lower lifetime energy costs of durable goods. This
trade-off is usually presented as a measure of willingness to pay. The literature
on estimating consumer willingness to pay for lower energy costs from observed
purchase decisions of durable goods begins with [63]. In this paper, the author
estimates a model of consumer choice for air conditioners. Hausman includes
variables for the product’s upfront purchase price and the present value of
operating costs. He keeps as a free variable the consumer discount rate and
uses this variable to rationalize estimated consumer preferences for price and
operating costs.2 Hausman finds an implied discount rate of 26.4 percent, which
lies well above private interest rates on loans for air conditioners. This finding
initially suggested that consumers undervalue energy costs when making durable
good purchase decisions.
Since Hausman’s seminal work, dozens of papers have estimated how
2[63] calculates the implied discount rate by adjusting this value until the change in utility from
a change in operating costs is constant for a one dollar change in the purchase price.
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consumers value energy costs in other sectors of the economy, including
transportation. Greene [58] reviews and summarizes 25 studies that estimate
how consumers value miles per gallon fuel economy, which is the standard
expression for energy efficiency in automobiles.3 He finds that estimates for WTP
for reducing fuel costs by one dollar are all over the place: they range from less
than one penny ([19] e.g. consumers on average ignore fuel costs when buying a
car), to about one dollar ([35], [41], e.g. consumers fully value fuel cost savings), to
over one thousand dollars ([117], e.g. consumers put a very high value of energy
savings). Out of the 25 there are more studies, however, that imply that consumers
undervalue than there are that imply that consumers overvalue.4
Recent studies, however, appear to agree that households either fully value or
modestly undervalue energy costs when making car purchase decisions. Sallee et
al. [102] use micro data on used vehicle prices, odometer readings and gasoline
prices to estimate the relationship between fuel costs and vehicle prices. They
find that consumers value one dollar of fuel savings at 79 cents. This valuation,
however, is not statistically different from full valuation.
Allcott and Wozny [5] and Busse et al. [28] use the large variation in gasoline
prices between 1999 and 2008 to estimate the relationship between gasoline prices
and car prices. They find that when gasoline prices rise, the relative prices of high
3Some believe that energy efficiency in automobiles should be reported in gallons per mile
which is the inverse of miles per gallon. Doing so would allow consumers to better gauge fuel
cost savings from buying more fuel efficient vehicles [79, 3].
4Green groups the studies by econometric methodology to show that studies using hedonic
methods find that households either undervalue or fully value fuel cost savings. In contrast,
studies using discrete choice methods are evenly distributed among under, full and overvaluation.
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MPG cars rise, suggesting that consumers (at least somewhat) value fuel economy.
Busse et al. [28] do not directly estimate the WTP for reducing fuel costs by a
dollar. Instead they allow the consumer discount rate to be a free variable and
solve for it in a similar manner as seen in [63]. For a wide range of assumed
demand elasticities, they find that implied consumer discount rates fall within
the range of observed interest rates for auto loans. The authors claim that this
suggest there is little evidence that consumers are myopic when they buy a car.
Allcott and Wozny [5] derive a simple linear regression model based on a
structural discrete choice model that allows them to directly estimate WTP. Using
used car auction prices, they find that consumers moderately undervalue fuel
economy when they make purchase decisions. They find that consumers are
willing to pay 76 cents to reduce the present value of fuel costs by one dollar.
Although 76 cents appears close to full valuation, the authors conclude that if this
undervaluation stems from a market failure, correcting the failure could generate
welfare gains that exceed the gains from internalizing climate change externalities
generated from automobile gasoline consumption.
What these studies lack is a detailed treatment of the potential heterogeneity
of consumer preferences for fuel economy. This is relevant for policy because if
some consumers undervalue fuel economy while others fully value, then targeting
may play a key role in designing efficient energy policy in the transportation
sector. To the best of my knowledge the only other paper that attempts to estimate
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consumer heterogeneity for fuel economy is by [104].5 Sawhill estimates a mixed
logit discrete choice model of vehicle demand using aggregate data from 1971 to
1990 to test whether consumers fully value the gasoline cost savings from fuel
efficient vehicles. He finds that consumers on average moderately overvalue fuel
economy for new vehicles. More relevant to my paper, however, is that his results
suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in how consumers value energy
efficiency.
My analysis has several key differences relative to [104]. First, I use newer data
that includes several new vehicle types, including SUVs and hybrids. Including
these vehicle types in consumer choice sets is likely to have a major impact on the
perceived valuation of fuel economy since these vehicles locate in the extremes
of the fuel economy distribution for new cars. Second, I estimate my model
with household level data linked to aggregate data, which is a more appropriate
approach to obtaining accurate estimates for household preference parameters.6
Third, I estimate parameters for a truncated normal distribution for WTP, which is
more suitable for behavioral parameters that should have a non-negative range.7
5[5] and [102] hint that there is heterogeneity across vehicles. For example, [5] estimate
their model for different vehicle ages and find that WTP is typically lower for older vehicles.
It is not clear, however, how this relationship translates into heterogeneity across households.
Furthermore, they do not attempt to estimate the entire distribution of WTP across their sample,
which is a necessary input for policy simulation.
6Using household level data also allows me to exploit substantial variation in gasoline prices
across households and across time, which helps reduce standard error estimates. Another benefit
of household level data is that it makes it possible to estimate WTP for sub-groups of the
population to identify whether observed household demographics are correlated with consumer
valuations of fuel economy.
7Allowing WTP for fuel costs to be unbounded, as in the case of a normal distribution, implies
that a fraction of the population prefers higher fuel costs. One common method to deal with this
issue is to estimate a fixed parameter for WTP. Alternatively I estimate the entire distribution of
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A fourth difference is that I take the estimated distribution for WTP and run
several simulation exercises to assess its policy implications.
In addition to estimating the distribution of WTP for fuel cost reductions,
I evaluate the implications of the estimated distribution for the efficiency of
alternative energy efficiency policies. Previous work has traditionally focused
on comparing CAFE standards (or an equivalent fuel efficiency subsidy) to
gasoline taxes. Using a calibrated numerical general equilibrium model [46]
shows that gasoline taxes are a much more efficient method of reducing gasoline
consumption since they encourage the reduction of gasoline consumption on
several channels of adjustment, including purchasing more fuel efficient cars and
reducing vehicle miles traveled. CAFE standards are generally inefficient because
they encourage households to drive more.8 Jacobsen [70] arrives at a similar
conclusion after simulating a multi-market equilibrium model that is calibrated
based on a sophisticated discrete choice model of vehicle demand. Fischer et al.
[46] finds, however, that if consumers dramatically undervalue fuel economy, then
CAFE standards are a more efficient method of reducing gasoline use.9
Allcott et al. [4] evaluate the optimal simultaneous choice of gasoline taxes
and fuel efficient vehicle subsidies when consumers undervalue fuel costs. They
find that there is a rationale for including fuel efficient vehicle subsidies in
WTP by assuming that WTP is bounded from below at zero so that no households obtain positive
utility from higher fuel costs (while holding other vehicle characteristics fixed).
8This is because CAFE standards increase fleet fuel economy, which reduces average vehicle
per mile operating costs.
9If the entire population ignores fuel costs, increasing the price of gasoline will not influence
new vehicle purchase decisions.
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the optimal policy mix when consumers privately mis-optimize their vehicle
purchase decisions. The rationale is simple: The gasoline tax is primarily used
to internalize gasoline use externalities, while the fuel efficient vehicle subsidy
is used to correct the private mis-optimization.10 Allcott et al. [4] also consider
the optimal combination of gasoline taxes and fuel efficient vehicle subsidies
when consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of energy costs. As
consumers become more heterogeneous, the optimal combination of instruments
performs worse. This is because neither policy is well equipped to target
consumers that undervalue fuel costs. I extend these results in my analysis
by comparing existing policies in the transportation sector that potentially have
different abilities to encourage the different types of consumers to buy more
fuel efficient cars. Furthermore, I calibrate my simulation exercise based on my
econometric estimates of the consumer heterogeneity. This proves to be important
for contrasting the policies as the econometric estimates imply different demand
elasticities for different groups of households.
Other policies have focused primarily on evaluating programs that directly
encourage greater energy efficiency. Hausman and Joskow [64] evaluates
the efficacy of energy efficiency standards for appliances when consumers
are heterogeneous in usage but not valuation of energy efficiency. They
find that standards are inefficient for reducing energy use since they do not
differentiate between high- and low-utilization consumers. Ito [68] evaluates the
cost-effectiveness of California’s 20/20 electricity rebate program. He finds that
10A related result is derived by Heutel [66] in a model of hyperbolic discounting.
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treatment effects of the program are very heterogeneous across the state. The
reason for the heterogeneity is that some consumers are so far from the rebate
threshold that the policy has little effect on their behavior. Only those that are
close or already over the threshold earn the subsidy, implying that many of the
rebate payments flow to consumers that are “non-additional.”11 In a sense, Ito
[68] finds that the California subsidy is generally poor at targeting consumers
that use the most electricity. In contrast to these studies, I evaluate and compare
three policies for encouraging energy efficiency. This comparison provides policy
makers with some direction for designing more efficient future policies.
A paper that compares multiple policy instruments for increasing energy
efficiency is [59]. In this paper, the authors simulate the market effects of feebates,
rebates and gas-guzzler taxes. They find that a feebate is the most efficient
method of increasing fleet fuel economy because it applies to all vehicles. This
result is consistent with my simulation results. I extend these results by allowing
households to have different valuations for fuel economies based on an empirical
model that I specify in the next section.
11“Non-additionality” is a term most commonly associated with markets for carbon offsets,
where the meaning is for offset projects that would have happened without a carbon payment.
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2.3 Empirical Model
In this section I present the empirical specification for estimating the distribution
of household willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing the present value fuel costs. I
adopt a mixed logit discrete choice framework for obtaining WTP estimates across
the sample of households considered. A primary reason for using a discrete choice
framework – opposed to alternative methods such as hedonic pricing – is that I
can directly substitute the parameter estimates into a simulation model of the U.S.
automobile sector that I can then use to run counter-factual policy simulations.
Adopting a mixed logit framework comes with several features that are crucial
for my analysis. The most obvious is that I can estimate the distribution of
WTP for several variables including reducing the present value of fuel costs.
Another well-known benefit is that mixed logit models allow for more realistic
substitution patterns across alternatives [113]. As a consequence, estimated own
price elasticities of demand are likely to be more accurately estimated with a
mixed logit model. Since WTP is a function of price sensitivity – as the price
coefficient enters in the denominator of the WTP expression – a more accurate
price elasticity of demand translates into a more accurate estimate for WTP. A
third benefit of adopting a mixed logit framework that is germane to estimating
how consumers value fuel economy stems from sorting bias. Bento et al. [13]
document that sorting is likely to lead to biased estimates for fuel economy
valuation in models that do not allow for preference heterogeneity. If consumers
are heterogeneous in how they value fuel economy, then those that undervalue
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fuel economy will sort into vehicles with relatively low MPG and those that
correctly (or overvalue) fuel economy will sort into vehicles with relatively high
MPG. As a consequence vehicle purchase data will suggest that consumers do
not respond much to changes in fuel economy even if they do, leading to a
downward bias (in magnitude) for the average valuation of fuel cost savings.
Hedonic price models and fixed coefficient logit models will suffer from this bias
if in fact consumers are different with respect to how they value fuel efficiency.
Bento et al. [13] show, however, that a mixed logit model can correctly recover the
average valuation.
I assume that household demand for new vehicles is derived from utility
maximization. Formally, each household i derives utility from purchasing new
vehicle j in market t according to the utility function
Ui jt = Vi jt + εi jt. (2.1)










+ θ′iXi jt + δ jt. (2.2)
The first term is the inverse of household income (Incit), which allows households
with low income to have a larger marginal utility of income. The second term has
a fixed coefficient γ for vehicle price (p jt) as a fraction of household income. This
term measures how consumers of different income classes have different price
sensitivities. The third term has a random coefficient βi for household i’s present
value of vehicle j fuel costs as a fraction of household income. The fourth term has
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random and fixed coefficients for several other vehicle characteristics interacted
with household demographics. The second-to-last term, δ jt, is a fixed effect for
vehicle j in market t that absorbs effects that any vehicle characteristic has on
utility that is invariant across households.
Households can buy one of J new vehicles or they can opt for the outside
option, j = 0. A household opting for the outside option (also known as the
outside good) can be thought of as the household buying a used car or not
making a vehicle purchase during the sample year. This outside option serves
two purposes. First, it allows me to directly use the estimated parameters for
computing welfare effects of automobile policies. Second, it allows me to estimate
the distribution of consumer valuation of fuel economy for a more representative
sample of households.12 In line with common practice, I normalize the utility of
the outside good to be zero [113].
I assume that households choose the alternative that yields the highest utility.
That is household i chooses car j in vehicle t if
Ui jt > Uikt for all k , j. (2.3)
12Restricting the model to be conditional on buying a new car would provide estimates for WTP
for consumers that bought a new car in the sample period, which is not representative of the entire
U.S. population. In fact, in the sample that I use from the 2009 NHTS data, the average income of
households that bought a new car was about $ 76, 000 while the average income of households in
the entire sample was about $ 58, 000.
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The probability that household i chooses vehicle j in market t is then
Pi jt = Prob(Ui jt > Uikt for all k , j)
= Prob(Vi jt + εi jt > Vikt + εikt for all k , j) (2.4)
= Prob(εikt − εi jt < Vi jt − Vikt + for all k , j).
I assume that the error components are drawn from a type 1 extreme value
distribution. Conditional on preference parameters Ω =
{
α, γ, βi, θi, δ jt
}
, the choice





To obtain unconditional probabilities, we must integrate out Ω. Since some of
the coefficients in Ω are random, there does not exist a closed-form solution for








The function f (·) is the mixing distribution for the parameters in Ω.13 Since there
is no closed form solution for (2.6), I must simulate the probabilities.
I include a fixed effect for car j in market t (δ jt) to deal with the standard
problem of vehicle price endogeneity. The problem stems from the fact that there
may be several vehicle attributes valued by consumers that are not observed by
the researcher, such as sportiness or smoothness of ride. These attributes are
13For the parameters that do not vary randomly across households, the marginal mixing
distribution is degenerate.
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likely to command a price premium. If the researcher leaves these attributes
out of the observed portion of utility, they will be subsumed into the error term
εi jt. As a consequence, the error term will be correlated with price. Since most
unobserved attributes are likely to be desirable, leaving them out of the observed
portion of utility will depress the magnitude of the price coefficient, suggesting
that consumers are not very sensitive to price changes. This problem is of first
order concern in the context of estimating willingness-to-pay for an attribute.14
Including fixed effects in the model can alleviate the problem of price
endogeniety. The fixed effect (also commonly called mean utility) of car j in
market t will absorb any vehicle characteristics valued by households that are
invariant across households. Once the fixed effects are estimated, they can be
used in an instrumental variables framework where instruments for price are
used. This step is generally called the second stage and was first introduced in
[18] and [19]. Formally, the fixed effects are regressed on several observed vehicle
characteristics, including price:
δi jt = λ + ηp jt + φxit + it. (2.7)
The endogeneity of vehicle price p jt is dealt with by instrumental variables.
14This is the case when there is a separate coefficient for price and other included attributes.
20
2.4 Data
I gather data from several sources to carry out the estimation of the model.
For data on household demographics and vehicle purchases I use the National
Household Transportation Survey (NHTS). This is a nationally representative
survey that is run every five to eight years, with the most recent being completed
in 2009.15 The NHTS asks several dozen questions about household backgrounds,
including annual income, the number of individuals currently residing the the
household and the highest level of education achieved. It also asks detailed
questions about household vehicle holdings and trip behavior, including the
purchase month of each vehicle currently owned by the household and the make
and model of each vehicle.
I estimate my model from a balanced sample drawn from the two most recent
waves of the NHTS, 2001 and 2009. These waves include household information
surveyed approximately one year prior to the publish date, so that the 2001 survey
includes information from the year 2000 and the 2009 survey includes information
from the year 2008. I use these waves for two reasons. First, current consumer
preferences are likely to be similar to those from these points in time relative to
older waves. Second, average gasoline prices during these points in time are quite
different.16 Large differences in gasoline prices provides substantial variation in
the present value of fuel costs, which helps accurately pin down how consumers
15Previous NHTS surveys were conducted in 1969, 1977, 1983, 1990, 1995 and 2001.
16The average national gasoline price in 2000 was $ 1.46 per gallon. By 2006 the average gasoline
price had topped 2.50 per gallon and by 2008 the price had reached $3.26 per gallon.
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value fuel economy.
I lack data on MSA vehicle shares for 2008. Instead, I have data for 2006 shares.
For this reason I use data from the 2009 survey for vehicle purchases in 2006. This
can be done since survey respondents are asked to report the month and year of
purchase for all of the vehicles that they currently own. To use the household
data from the 2009 wave, however, I need to make an assumption. I assume that
consumer demographics do not change from 2006 to 2008. This assumption may
not be valid for some households, but for the average household it is probably
accurate.
The NHTS does not directly inquire about household vehicle purchases but
instead requests that respondents state when they purchased and the make and
model of the vehicles that they own. With these data I can assign new vehicle
purchase decisions to each household. For example for the 2009 survey, if the
household reports having acquired a model-year 2006 vehicle in 2006, then I
assign that household as buying the vehicle new.17
I link the household level data with market level data from R.L. Polk Company.
These data include total vehicle sales of new vehicles purchased in years 2000 and
2008 for nine Metropolitan Statistical Areas, which are regions of the country that
have relatively large populations and economic ties. In particular the geographic
region for each MSA is based on the 1999 definition by the Office of Management
17This is a reasonable assumption since very few vehicles that are bought new are sold within
one year of purchase.
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and Budget.
There are several reasons for combining the NHTS data with the market share
data. The first reason is that doing so allows me to more accurately estimate
the second stage household invariant coefficients, including vehicle price. This
is because every vehicle in each MSA is assigned a unique mean utility, which is
then used to estimated the second stage.18 The second reason is that incorporating
the MSA data reduces sample variance. This is because the MSA data provides
actual new vehicle shares, while the NHTS only provides sample shares.
In Table 2.1, I provide key statistics of the two datasets. There are 18 MSA
(Year) pairs that I use for estimation. In Table 2.1, I report average and standard
deviation of income, fraction of households purchasing a new vehicle, the average
and standard deviation number of children and the proportion of the sample that
has a college degree. There is substantial household demographics heterogeneity
both across and within the MSAs. For example, 17 percent of households in
Albany, NY from the 2000 survey are retired, while almost 30 percent are retired
in Madison, WI. This variation is utiliized to accurately estimate the first stage of
the model.
18An alternative would be to define markets as years instead of year-MSA pairs. This, however,
would dramatically lower the number of observations in the second stage, which would lead to
inaccurate estimation results.
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Table 2.1: Household Demographics
MSA Year Pct. w/ Children Pct. Retired Pct. w/ Collegea Sizeb
Albany, NY 2000 43 17 34 2.62
De Moines, IA 2000 37 21 34 2.43
Houston, TX 2000 30 23 38 2.42
Lancaster, PA 2000 33 21 34 2.37
Madison, WI 2000 34 29 45 2.47
Miami, FL 2000 40 23 44 2.52
Milwaukee, WI 2000 42 17 43 2.68
Nashville, TN 2000 34 23 31 2.44
Phoenix, AZ 2000 38 23 46 2.48
Albany, NY 2006 26 39 54 2.29
De Moines, IA 2006 31 31 54 2.45
Houston, TX 2006 26 41 57 2.46
Lancaster, PA 2006 30 34 48 2.42
Madison, WI 2006 24 43 49 2.26
Miami, FL 2006 31 41 54 2.37
Milwaukee, WI 2006 26 39 54 2.29
Nashville, TN 2006 31 31 54 2.45
Phoenix, AZ 2006 26 41 57 2.46
a Pct. w/ College denotes the percentage of households that have at least one
individual with a college degree.
b Size denotes the average total number of individuals living in the surveyed
household.
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Another source of data that I use are annual issues of Automotive News
Market Data Book, which include vehicle characteristics. The characteristics are
price (measured in the manufacturer’s suggested retail price, MSRP), footprint,
miles per gallon (MPG), vehicle class (car, van, SUV, truck), and vehicle segment.19
2.4.1 The Present Value of Fuel Costs
An important variable that I must construct for each vehicle is a measure of
fuel costs over the lifetime of the vehicle. Formally this variable for household
i owning vehicle j in market t is given by




(1 + δi)Y j
 , (2.8)
In the summation bounds of (2.8) y denotes a future year and Y is vehicle lifetime
of car j. The term VMTi jty is vehicle miles traveled by household i in vehicle j in
market t in year y. Gasoline prices faced by household i in future year y are gpity
and the inverse measure of fuel efficiency gallons per mile for car j in market t is
denoted byGPM jt. Finally household i’s private discount rate is δi. The numerator
of the fraction within the summation measures the expected gasoline cost of one
year of travel by household i owning vehicle j in market t. This term is divided by
a discount factor 1
(1+δi)
Y j
to convert the cost to present value. The yearly costs are
then summed across the expected lifetime of the vehicle. The expectation operator
19Ideally I would use transaction prices in the estimation. These data, however, are not available
through the NHTS. Furthermore, I would need hypothetical transaction prices for vehicles that
each household did not buy, which would be difficult (if not impossible) to construct.
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in the front of the summation is present because these costs come after the vehicle
is bought during use in future years.
Vehicle miles traveled and vehicle lifetimes
To estimate vehicle miles traveled and vehicle lifetimes, I use a meta-analysis
by [83].20 The data reported in this report are used by the NHTSA to assess
the effects of proposed fuel economy and safety standards. The file reports
average yearly weighted VMT separately for cars and light trucks. Weighted
average yearly travel is the product of vehicle survivability and VMT schedules.
For example, for a 10-year-old passenger car, the estimated survivability of the
car is 79 percent and the estimated VMT is 11,193 (Table 7 in [83]). Therefore
the weighted average travel miles during the 10th year of the car’s lifetime is
0.79 ∗ 11, 193 = 8, 804. Data on estimated VMT is derived from the 2001 NHTS
while survivability is obtained from a 1977 to 2002 window of data from the
National Vehicle Population Profile.21
I assume that expectations for VMT of cars and light trucks follow separate
20This is an updated version of an older 1995 report that uses similar methodology.
21In using these values to calculate annual VMT, I am implicitly assuming that VMT is
exogenous and independent of fuel costs. This may appear as an unrealistic assumption since the
choice of vehicle and annual VMT are typically considered to be jointly chosen by households [12].
[51] finds, however, that estimating elasticity of new vehicle fuel economy with respect to gasoline
prices is not sensitive to the independence assumption. (He finds that the average elasticity of
new vehicle fuel economy is 0.09 both with and without the assumption.) [5] is another paper that
suggests that the independence assumption will not have a significant impact on household WTP.
They find that find that making VMT endogenous in the vehicle purchase decision has little impact
on the mean WTP for reducing fuel costs. Moreover, since I am using household demographics
data, I am able to capture household heterogeneity in expected VMT through demographics and
vehicle characteristics interaction terms.
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schedules since these vehicle types are generally have different purposes.22 In line
with [83] I assume that passenger cars last 25 years and that trucks last 36 years
(Tables 7 and 8 in [83]). The schedules show that both passenger cars and light
trucks are driven heavily during their early years of life. During the first year of
operation, the average car is driven 14, 231 miles. By the 15th year, estimated VMT
drops to 9, 249. Vehicle survivability follows a similar pattern. The probability
that a car or light truck remains on the road after the initial years of life is near 100
percent. Light truck survivability remains above 90 percent for the first four years,
while passenger car survivability remains above 90 percent for the first six years.
As cars age their survivability rapidly drops. By the 20th year of life, a passenger
car’s probability of remaining on the road has dropped to below 10 percent.
Expected Gasoline Prices
I assume that households form expectations of gasoline prices based on current
prices of their MSA. More specifically I assume that households expect that future
gasoline prices equal current gasoline prices, which is consistent with recent
survey evidence [6].
I collect annual average gasoline price data from the American Chamber of
Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) database. For the two time periods I
use for estimation there is substantial variation in gasoline prices across MSAs.
Table 2.2 displays gasoline prices across the 18 MSA-year pairs. In general,
gasoline prices are about one dollar higher in the MSAs for the 2006 data. This
22The exact schedules that I use appear in Tables 7 and 8 in [83].
27
increase is attributed to increased demand for crude oil and gasoline and steady
supply.23 Even within the same year, however, there is substantial variation across
MSAs. For example, the gasoline price in Albany, New York in 2000 is $ 1.58 per
gallon. The price per gallon of gas in the same year in Nashville, Tennessee is $
2.11.
23The increase in demand for oil comes primarily from surging economies during the time
period, including China and India.
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Table 2.2: Household Fuel Costs
MSA Year Average Gasoline Price Present Value Fuel Cost
a
Mean Std.
Albany, NY 2000 1.58 9,028.75 2,294.72
De Moines, IA 2000 1.69 9,671.74 2,458.15
Houston, TX 2000 1.79 9,671.37 2,601.14
Lancaster, PA 2000 1.70 9,718.63 2,470.06
Madison, WI 2000 1.72 9,819.10 2,495.60
Miami, FL 2000 1.63 9,343.55 2,374.73
Milwaukee, WI 2000 2.02 11,573.94 2,941.60
Nashville, TN 2000 2.11 12,089.68 3,072.68
Phoenix, AZ 2000 1.82 10,401.81 2,643.70
Albany, NY 2006 2.52 14,605.23 3,659.45
De Moines, IA 2006 2.49 14,443.02 3,618.81
Houston, TX 2006 2.64 15,288.86 3,830.74
Lancaster, PA 2006 2.59 15,022.36 3,763.97
Madison, WI 2006 2.51 14,524.13 3,639.13
Miami, FL 2006 2.40 13,910.02 3,485.26
Milwaukee, WI 2006 2.85 16,511.27 4,137.03
Nashville, TN 2006 2.87 16,603.97 4,160.25
Phoenix, AZ 2006 2.70 15,642.26 3,919.29
a A 5 percent discount rate is used to discount future annual costs to the
present period. The present value of fuel cost is reported in 2006 dollars.
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Gallons per mile
I collect miles per gallon (MPG) data for each vehicle from the fuel economy
database organized by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I combine
city and highway fuel efficiency following the weighted harmonic mean formula
given by the EPA to measure MPG of a car: MPG jt = 1/[(0.55/city MPG jt) + (0.45/
highway MPG jt)].24 Among the 2006 new vehicles, the average MPG is 23.5. The
vehicle with the lowest MPG in 2006 is Dodge Ram which can drive 14.63 miles
on a single gallon of gas. At the other extreme the most fuel efficient new 2006
vehicle is the Honda Insight which gets 56.54 miles per gallon. I convert MPG of
each vehicle into gallons per mile by taking the inverse: GPM jt = 1/MPG jt.
Discount rate
The final term to calibrate in (2.8) is household i’s discount rate. This rate
represents household i’s intertemporal opportunity cost of money. In the context
of this paper, this rate represents the rate at which future gasoline costs are
discounted to the present. For households whose marginal dollar comes from
an auto loan, this rate is equal to the lowest interest rate that the household can
get. For households whose marginal dollar comes from investment, this rate is
equal to the market rate of return on equity.
I assume that households have a discount rate of five percent. This assumption
is slightly lower than the 6 percent discount rate assumed in [5] who base their
24The EPA adjusts their test measures down by about 15 percent to reflect road conditions. I use
the adjusted EPA adjusted values.
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calibration on two sources: 2001, 2004 and 2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances
(SCF) and the average real return on the S&P 500 between 1945 and 2008. Allcott
and Wozny [5] assign a rate based on the average real interest rate for used
vehicle loans, which is 6.9 percent. On average the real interest rate for new
vehicle loans is about one percent lower than the rate for used cars. Therefore
I assume that the average household discounts future fuel costs by 5 percent.
The assumption of a 5 percent discount rate is within the range of rates used in
analyses of major transportation sector policies by the NHTSA, including the most
recent adjustment of CAFE standards [96].25
Summary
Table 2.3 summarizes the key assumptions made to construct the present value
of fuel costs for each household in each market.
25The NHTSA Final Regulatory Impact Analysis of CAFE reports cost estimates with a 3 percent
and 7 percent discount rate.
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Table 2.3: Assumptions for Computing the Present Value of Fuel Costs
Variable Value Sources
Vehicle miles traveled Age and class dependenta [83]
Vehicle lifetime 25 years for cars [83]36 years for light trucks
Gallons per mile Model and year dependentb Environmental Protection Agencyc
Gasoline price MSA and year dependentd ACCRA Database
Discount rate 5 % [5]2001 and 2007 ACF Survey
a Passenger cars and light trucks have separate lifetime vehicle miles traveled schedules. Each
schedule is calculated by taking the product of the expected vehicle miles traveled of the
vehicle at a given age and the probability of the vehicle remaining in the fleet at a given age.
Both expected vehicle miles traveled and the survival probability drop as the vehicle ages.
b Both waves of data that I use contain many of the same vehicle models, such as the
Honda Accord. The vehicle attributes, including gallons per mile, of vehicle models may be
different between the two waves since manufacturers make modifications across generations
of vehicles (which generally last about five years). For example, the 2000 version of the Honda
Accord gets 27.03 MPG while the 2006 version gets 27.66 MPG.
c The EPA adjusts their recorded laboratory fuel efficiency down by about 15 percent to reflect
road conditions. I use the adjusted EPA adjusted values.
d See Table 2.2 to view the substantial variation in gasoline prices across MSAs and across
year.
32
One potential criticism of my approach is that consumers may be
heterogeneous in the values that I have chosen. For example, some consumers
may have different expected driving habits over the course of the vehicle’s life.26
My behavioral model is robust to this possibility because I allow household
preferences for fuel cost reductions to vary randomly across the population.
Therefore, if there are differences in driving habits, this will be reflected in some
as heterogeneity the in the valuation of fuel cost reductions.27
Table 2.2 summarizes mean and standard deviations of lifetime fuel costs for
vehicles available in each of the 18 MSA-years. The statistics illustrate that there is
substantial variation in fuel costs across vehicles within the same year and across
years. This is primarily due to the large variation in gasoline prices.
The overall magnitude of lifetime fuel costs are nontrivial relative to vehicle
purchase prices. As Table 2.2 illustrates, lifetime fuel costs are around 10, 000
dollars, which is between one-half and one-third of a typical new vehicle bought
in 2006. This implies that there is a large incentive for households to correctly
value fuel economy when making a vehicle purchase decision. It also implies
that there is potential for large welfare losses from market failures related to how
households value energy efficiency.
26Two additional criticisms of my approach include endogenous usage decisions and resale
decision. Consumers buying a more fuel efficient vehicle are likely to drive their purchased car
more. Furthermore some consumers may decide that they want to sell their vehicle before the
vehicle is scrapped. In his appendix [5] show analytically that my assumptions should be robust
to these possibilities.




I estimate the parameters of the random utility model in two stages. In the
first stage I estimate parameters of the model that vary across households. This
stage requires simulating the probabilities specified in (2.6) since mixed logit does
not have closed form solutions for choice probabilities. In the second stage I
estimate preference parameters for vehicle characteristics that are invariant across
households. In this stage I instrument for vehicle prices using instrumental
variables.
2.5.1 Estimation Details: First Stage
In the first stage I estimate parameters that vary across households using






ln Pi j∗t, (2.9)
where Pi j∗t represents the predicted probability that household i buys car j∗ in
market t. Vehicle j∗ represents the vehicle actually chosen by household i.
I allow three parameters to vary randomly across households: the present
value of vehicle fuel cost relative to income (βi), vehicle footprint and a constant.
I assume that the mixing distribution for vehicle footprint and the constant are
normal since there is no apriori reason to believe that the signs of these parameters
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should be restricted. The sign for vehicle fuel cost, however, should be negative,
holding other vehicle attributes constant. For this reason I assume that the mixing
distribution for the present value of vehicle fuel cost is truncated normal, censored
at zero and restricted to be negative. This allows the distribution for the present
value of fuel cost to have a point mass at zero, representing a share of the
population that ignores or is inattentive to fuel costs. This assumption turns out
to be especially crucial when evaluating the distribution of willingness-to-pay for
reducing fuel costs.
I must simulate the probabilities in (2.6) to evaluate the simulated log
likelihood. To speed up the estimation routine I use Halton sequences to simulate
the probabilities [113]. For each household I use 200 Halton draws.28
One difficulty in the first stage estimation is obtaining the mean utilities δ jt.
The difficulty arises because in each wave of the data there are over 200 new
vehicles available for purchase. As a result I must estimate at least 200 fixed
effects (one per vehicle). Adding 200 parameters to the model makes estimation
computationally infeasible. Before describing how I estimate these fixed effects, I
describe an alternative. One alternative is to aggregate the vehicles into groups,
such as vehicle classes as in [12]. This alternative is undesirable in my context
because there is substantial variation in fuel efficiency within class. Aggregating
masks this variation, which would lead to biased estimates for willingness-to-pay.
28[113] suggests that Halton draws are much more efficient at simulating probabilities of mixed
logit models. An alternative to Halton draws are quadrature methods [20].
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To estimate the mean utilities I follow [19]. This approach provides a method
for obtaining by using a moment condition that predicted vehicle shares in a given




as the set of mean
utilities and S jt and Sˆ jt as observed market share and predicted market share for
alternative j in market t, respectively, the moment conditions are
S jt = Sˆ jt(Ω, δh) for all j, t, (2.10)
where Ω is a vector of first stage parameters. [18] shows that there exists a unique
set of mean utilities that satisfy (2.10). Since (2.10) is non-linear in δ, the mean
utilities cannot be obtained analytically. Barry et al. suggest using a difference
equation, known as “the contraction,” which maps an initial value for the vehicle
j market t fixed effect to a new value:
δh+1jt = δ
h
jt + ln(S jt) − ln(Sˆ jt(Ω, δh(Ω))) for all j, t. (2.11)
Berry et al. proved that (2.11) is a contraction mapping, which implies that for any
initial delta δh, the mapping will converge to a unique delta that satisfies (2.10). In
all estimation routines that invoke the BLP method, the iteration of the difference
equation (2.11) occurs within the overall optimization. More specifically, at each
search value for the parameter vector Ω, the mapping (2.11) is iterated until the
difference between δh+1jt and δ
h
jt are sufficiently close.
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A standard concern with this approach is that it is computationally expensive
and therefore takes a substantial amount of time to perform the estimation. I
29The concensus on the tolerance level for the maximum difference between successive
iterations of δ is that it should be set to be no larger than 1e − 14.
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adopt an alternative form of the contraction mapping that is based on Newton’s
method to speed up the estimation routine [80].30
In the first stage I include several household demographics and vehicle
characteristics interaction terms to model additional observed household
heterogeneity.31 The household demographics variables include income, whether
the household has children (modeled with a dummy variable), household size,
whether the head of the household is retired (modeled with a dummy variable),
whether the head of the household has a college degree (modeled with a dummy
variable), and annual trip miles for all vehicles owned by the household. The
vehicle attributes include price, a set of dummy variables for type (car, van, SUV
or pick up), footprint, weight, and origin (US or Asian).




∂ ln(Sˆ jt(θ, δh(θ)))
∂δh
−1 [ln(S jt) − ln(Sˆ jt(θ, δh(θ)))] for all j, t.
Notice that this difference equation is almost identical to the original contraction mapping in [19].
My method multiplies the difference in log shares by the Jacobian of the log moment conditions
(2.10), which (put simply) provides the mapping with a more direct search path. This alternative
method converges to the same set of fixed effects as (2.11) but typically takes about one-fourth as
long to estimate. See [80] for more details.
31Incorporating consumer heterogeneity has two benefits. First, it allows the researcher to
provide a more realistic model of household decision making in contexts where households are
likely to have substantially different tastes, which is expected in the case of automobiles. Second,
it allows the researcher to explore welfare effects for different groups of consumers, which can be
relevant for policy analysis. For example, Jacobsen (2013) finds that CAFE standards significantly
affect low-income households and that this effect changes across time.
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2.5.2 Estimation Details: Second Stage
With the mean utilities estimated from the first stage I can identify the effect of
vehicle characteristics that are invariant across households on household utility.
I regress the mean utilities on several vehicle characteristics, including vehicle
price (deflated to year 2000 dollars), the log of horsepower, the log of weight, the
log of footprint, an indicator variable for hybrids, segment dummy variables (e.g.
mid-size, compact, etc.) and vehicle type dummy variables (e.g. car, truck etc.).
I use several instruments for vehicle price. Before I discuss each instrument, it
is useful to note the criteria for an instrument to be valid in the context of this
model. A valid instrument should not be correlated with unobserved vehicle
characteristics that are correlated with price, should be correlated with price and
should only influence mean utility indirectly through price. The three instruments
that I use that intuitively satisfy these conditions include the price of aluminum
interacted with vehicle type, the price of steel interacted with vehicle type and the
sum of gasoline taxes and crude oil prices.
There is little reason to believe that aluminum and steel prices are correlated
with how consumers value unobserved characteristics like smoothness of ride.
Furthermore, consumers do not directly value aluminum and steel prices, but
instead value the price of a vehicle. Finally, aluminum and steel prices are likely to
be correlated with vehicle prices since these metals constitute a significant fraction
of the total mass of a vehicle.
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Gasoline taxes and crude oil prices are also likely to satisfy the three valid
instrument conditions. As long as some consumers value fuel economy, higher
gasoline taxes and crude oil prices will cause the equilibrium relative price of
high MPG vehicles to rise [28]. Moreover, consumers are unlikely to directly value
taxes or crude oil prices, and these components are unlikely to be correlated with
unobserved product attributes.
2.5.3 Estimation Details: Implied Distribution of WTP for
Reducing Fuel Costs
The WTP for reducing one dollar of the present value of fuel costs can be
calculated based on the estimation results from the first and second stages. In
discrete choice models, WTP for an attribute is equal to the division of two values:
the marginal utility of the attribute divided by the marginal utility of price.32
Since I specify fuel cost as a random coefficient, the marginal utility of fuel costs
will be a distribution. As such, I need to simulate the distribution for WTP for
32The intuition for this calculation is best understood with an example. Suppose a household
has preferences for fuel costs and price such that their marginal utility for fuel costs is −10 utils
per dollar and their marginal utility for price is −15 utils per dollar. This means that the household
experiences 10 more utils whenever fuel costs are one dollar lower. In other words, if a household
buys a fuel efficient car that saves them one dollar of fuel costs, they experience 10 more utils.
How much more would the household be willing to pay for this fuel efficient car? They will
not be willing to pay one dollar more in the up-front purchase price, since that would cause the
household to experience losing 15 utils. Instead the household would be willing to pay up to
10/15 = 0.67 dollars as this is the value that would make the household indifferent. In other
words, if the household had to pay 0.67 more in the up-front price to save one dollar of fuel costs,
their change in utility would be +10 utils/dollar*(one dollar) -15 utils/dollar*(0.67 dollars) = 10
utils - 10 utils = 0 utils.
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reducing fuel costs. I do so by calculating WTP at each draw that is assigned to a
household, computing the distribution for WTP across all households and saving
this distribution. I then average the distributions across the 200 draws.
2.5.4 Estimation Results: First Stage
In Tables 2.4 and 2.5, I present the estimation results for the first stage.
Table 2.4: First Stage Estimation Results –
Random Coefficients
Parameter Estimate
Fuel Cost/Income mean -3.13**(1.32)
Fuel Cost/Income standard deviation 6.42**(2.85)
Log(footprint) standard deviation 5.33**(2.53)
Constant standard deviation 9.78***(2.92)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. **
denotes significance at the 5 percent level. ***
denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2.5: First Stage Estimation Results – Fixed Coefficients
(a) Household Characteristics (b) Interactions
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
1/Income -18.56*** Price/Income -0.52**(6.74) (0.21)
Children Dummy -0.49 Children Dummy*Car Dummy -6.17**(0.75) (3.08)
Children Dummy*Van Dummy -4.97**(2.05)
Children Dummy*SUV Dummy -5.35**(2.22)
Children Dummy*Pickup Dummy -6.18*(3.16)
Household size -4.30 Household Size*Footprint 0.84**(3.96) (0.42)
Retirement Dummy -4.80 Retired Dummy*Weight 0.08(5.51) (0.60)
College Degree 2.38 College Degree*Domestica 0.16(3.01) (0.32)
College Degree*Asian 0.67**(0.33)
Trip Miles 3.15 Trip Miles*Footprint 0.23(4.13) (0.52)
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 percent
level. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. *** denotes significance at the 1
percent level.
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Table 2.4 shows mean and standard deviation for the fuel cost as a fraction of
income parameter and standard deviation estimates for the remaining random
parameters. The parameters are significant at the 5 percent level and have
expected signs. The fuel cost relative to income mean and standard deviation
provide a glimpse of the underlying distribution for willingness-to-pay for
reducing fuel costs. The mean has a negative sign, which intuitively suggests
that the average consumer dislikes fuel cost. The standard deviation, however, is
more than twice as large as the mean. This suggests that there exists substantial
heterogeneity in how consumers value fuel costs. This suggests that there may be
large differences in how households value fuel economy. Without the second stage
parameters, however, we cannot conclude whether this significant dispersion
leads to significant heterogeneity in WTP since WTP is a function of the marginal
utility of price as well as the marginal utility of fuel cost.
Table 2.5 shows the coefficient estimates for household demographics and
interaction terms. The significance of these effects is not as strong as the random
coefficients as several parameters are not significantly different from zero. The
signs of the most of the coefficients, however, follow common intuition. The
inverse of income enters with a negative sign, suggesting that consumers with
high income are more likely to buy a new car. The coefficient on price as a fraction
of income is negative and significant, implying that consumers with the same
income dislike higher priced vehicles, holding other vehicle attributes constant.
Households that drive more are more likely to purchase a new car, although this
effect is not statistically significant.
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2.5.5 Estimation Results: Second Stage
In Table 2.6, I report the coefficient estimates from the second stage. I report two
sets of estimates. The first column “OLS Estimates” includes estimates for a model
where I do not instrument for vehicle price. The second column “IV Estimates”
includes results from instrumental variables estimation where I instrument for
price. The dependent variable in both sets of estimates is the mean utility for
vehicle j in market t.
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Table 2.6: Second Stage Estimation
Results
Parameter OLS Estimate IV Estimate
Price -0.26*** -0.57***(0.03) (0.06)
Log(Horsepower) 0.84*** 1.34***(0.14) (0.18)
Log(Weight) -1.94*** -0.98**(0.35) (0.43)
Log(Footprint) -7.26*** -7.36***(0.44) (0.46)
Hybrid Dummy -1.62*** -1.57***(0.14) (0.17)
Constant -1.30 -9.73***(2.96) (3.50)
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *
denotes significance at the 10 percent level. **
denotes significance at the 5 percent level. ***
denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
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I estimate both models with 3, 951 observations.33 Focusing on the OLS
estimates, we find that the signs of the vehicle attribute coefficients make intuitive
sense. Price has a negative and highly significant coefficient, suggesting that
consumers favor vehicles that cost less to buy. The natural logarithm of vehicle
horsepower is positive and significant at the one percent level, implying that
consumers desire vehicles with more power and acceleration. Consumers dislike
vehicles that are larger but have the same horsepower as the log of weight and
footprint (which is defined as the product of the distance between a vehicle’s tires
and the vehicle’s length) have negative coefficients.
When I instrument for vehicle price, coefficient signs and significance levels
remain stable. The coefficient for price, however, becomes much larger in
magnitude. This is an intuitive and common result in the discrete choice
transportation literature beginning with the seminal article [19]. Unobserved
vehicle characteristics, such as smoothness of ride, are likely to be positively
correlated with vehicle price. When these characteristics are left out of the model,
the coefficient on vehicle price will be biased up toward zero. This is exactly the
effect we see when comparing the OLS results to the IV results. When I instrument
for price, the coefficient doubles in magnitude, suggesting that consumers are
much more sensitive to price than what is indicated by the OLS model. This
is an important result because getting the correct magnitude for price is crucial
33In the 2000 wave, there are 203 unique vehicles across nine MSAs for a total of 1, 827 unique
vehicle-market observations. In the 2009 wave, there are 236 unique vehicles across nine MSAs for
a total of 2, 124 unique vehicle-market observations. Together, this gives a total of 3, 951 unique
vehicle-market observations.
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for obtaining an accurate estimate of WTP which is a function of the marginal
utility of price. For this reason, I use the estimates from the instrumental variables
estimation to derive the WTP for reducing fuel costs.
2.5.6 Implied Distribution of WTP for Reducing Fuel Costs
The implied distribution of WTP for reducing fuel costs by one dollar is obtained
by dividing the marginal utility of fuel cost by the marginal utility of price. Since
fuel cost enters as a random coefficient, I must simulate the marginal utility of fuel
cost. A histogram of the resulting distribution for WTP appears in Figure 2.1. The
vertical red line denotes the mean of the distribution, which is at 0.98. The mean
implies that the average willingness-to-pay to reduce fuel costs by one dollar is
98 cents. This suggests that the average household equally weighs the up-front
purchase price of a car and the present value of fuel costs over the lifetime of the
vehicle. This is consistent with several recent estimates of the WTP for reduced
gasoline costs. Busse et al. [28] find that 100 percent of gasoline price changes
between 1999 and 2008 are reflected in new and use car prices, suggesting that
consumers correctly value the fuel cost savings of more efficient vehicles. On the
other hand, Allcott and Wozny [5] find that over the same time period consumers
appear to value one dollar of reduced fuel costs at only 76 cents, implying that
consumers on average undervalue energy savings. They find, however, that
this undervaluation almost disappears for newer vehicles. The authors provide
separate WTP estimates for different age classes and find that fuel efficiency is
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valued more in newer vehicles.34 For used vehicles that are less than three years
old, the authors find that consumers value one dollar of reduced fuel costs at 93
cents, an estimate that is not statistically different than full valuation.
Figure 2.1 also reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity in how
households value fuel efficiency. About 31 percent of households appear to be
inattentive to or ignoring fuel costs, represented by a point mass of WTP at
zero. Furthermore, many households appear to be over-valuing fuel costs as the
histogram shows a significant mass above one. For convenience I summarize
the distribution in Table 2.7. These results are broadly consistent with the
heterogeneity estimated in [104]. In each of our studies we find that households
appear to be very different with respect to how they value fuel costs when making
new vehicle purchases. In contrast to [104], however, I find that a large fraction
of households appear to ignore fuel cost as a vehicle attribute when buying a
new car. This result will prove to be exceptionally relevant when discussing the
potential explanations of the consumer heterogeneity.
34For very old vehicles (11+ years), WTP is only 26 cents. WTP monotonically rises as vehicle
age declines.
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Figure 2.1: Implied Distribution of Willingness-to-pay for Reducing
Fuel Costs by One Dollar
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Percent = 0 31
Percent Between 0 and 0.75 25
Percent Between 0.75 and 1.5 18
Percent Above 1.5 26
The resulting distribution for the
WTP to reduce fuel costs by one
dollar is a truncated normal that
is censored at zero so that no




What market failures or behavioral biases can explain the distribution for WTP
in Figure 2.1? Several recent studies provide a host of possible explanations.
One reason why households may appear to undervalue energy efficiency is time
inconsistency. A household that is time inconsistent under-weights future periods
when making a decision in the present. This distorts a household’s decision to
buy a durable good like a car since vehicles have operating costs at are incurred
over the lifetime of the vehicle. Heutel [66] argues that time-inconsistency in the
form of quasi-hyperbolic discounting can cause consumers to undervalue energy
savings from fuel efficient vehicles.35 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is generally
associated with beta-delta preferences, where a household’s present view of the




of utility include instantaneous utility in period t, ut, a discount factor, δ < 1, and a
measure of present bias, β < 1.36 Although there does not exist empirical evidence
supporting the notion that consumers are time-consistent when they make vehicle
purchases, evidence does exist in other settings. For example, Laibson et al. [78]
estimate parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with data on US
household savings and consumption choices. They find that β = 0.7 and δ = 0.96,
which is analogous to moderate undervaluation.37
35[66] finds that if consumers are hyperbolic discounters, it is efficient to provide a fuel efficient
vehicle subsidy (or an equivalent instrument) to correct the present bias.
36When β = 1 there is no present bias and preferences have the standard exponential discounting
form.
37Laboratory evidence suggests a similar magnitude for present bias where β has been found to
range between 0.6 and 0.7 [25].
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Another related reason for undervaluation is temptation and self control.
Tsvetanov and Segerson [115] argue that temptation may explain some of the
energy efficiency gap. Their argument rests on the notion that consumers feel a
real welfare cost when they must exercise self-control when making a purchase
decision. If a consumer chooses between two alternatives where one of the
options requires a high level of self-control, the consumer may be tempted
and find it optimal to avoid the self-control cost and splurge. Energy efficient
alternatives usually have higher purchase prices, so that consumers may be need
to exert self-control to buy these goods instead of their cheaper energy inefficient
counterparts.38 If self control costs are high for some of the consumers, these
consumers may find it to be privately optimal to undervalue or completely ignore
the energy cost characteristic when making a purchase decision.
Credit constraints may explain the mass of consumers that appear to ignore
energy costs. Since vehicles with higher fuel economy command higher prices
(after controlling for other relevant vehicle characteristics), this would suggest
that some low income households cannot afford to buy high MPG cars when they
want to. This would bias down their valuation of WTP for reducing fuel costs.
Although credit constraints may have an impact on household WTP for fuel
costs, I argue that this impact is small or non-existent in my model. One
38[115] consider a model of self control where an energy inefficient alternative has no self-control
cost and where an energy efficient alternative has a positive self-control cost. Their focus is not
on arguing how their model can explain recent estimates of the energy efficiency gap but instead
works through a detailed instrument choice analysis where they compare the efficiency of usage
taxes, efficiency standards and price taxes/subsidies.
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reason that credit constraints may not be relevant in my context is because I
am estimating WTP on new vehicle data. Households that purchase new cars
generally have higher incomes and are less financially constrained.39 A second
reason is that I have estimated the model on a sub-sample of households that
have annual incomes above 100, 000 dollars and I find that while the mass of
households that appear to be inattentive to fuel costs falls, it only slightly falls.40
Testing which of the explanations is most likely to explain the distribution
for WTP is out of the scope of this paper. Instead, I argue that there exists a
simple and intuitive model that can rationalize the preferences that I estimate.
A model of rational inattention can explain why a significant portion of the sample
appear to ignore fuel costs. Sallee [101] formulates a model of rational inattention
in the context of a consumer making a discrete choice among several energy
intensive durable goods. The basic idea of the model is that consumers may face a
decision to first gather and process information relating to the energy costs of each
alternative before making a purchase choice. This information acquisition allows
the consumer to make an ex-post optimal decision. For some, however, gathering
and processing information may be exceptionally costly. As a consequence, some
may find it ex-ante optimal to forego this step and ignore the energy cost attribute
when buying a good. In the context of the estimation results presented in the
39The average annual income of households that purchase a new vehicle is about 88, 000 dollars.
A related reason is that I am estimating an unconditional vehicle choice model, so that households
have the choice of not purchasing a vehicle. In the sample that I use for estimation, about 87
percent of households do not buy a new car. Most households that are credit constrained are
unlikely to receive a loan to buy any new vehicle. These households are unlikely to influence the
estimated distribution for WTP.
40With this sub-sample 25 percent of households have a WTP to reduce fuel costs of zero.
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previous section, around 31 percent of households appear to avoid gathering and
processing information about energy costs while the remaining 69 percent make
some effort and have a non-zero value on fuel costs.
A key appeal of this explanation is that is does not require the application
of behavioral anomalies that are inconsistent with welfare maximization.41 All
the households in my sample – including the 31 percent of households ignoring
fuel costs – make an ex-ante privately optimal decision. Moreover, rational
inattention is exceptionally applicable to the choice setting of this paper which
has many alternatives and many valuable characteristics for each alternative.
This is the case because information gathering and processing is likely increasing
in the number of alternatives and characteristics. In each year of my data the
new vehicle choice set is over 200 cars, and each vehicle has at least a dozen
relevant characteristics. This suggests that information gathering and processing
are non-trivial for consumers looking to make a car purchase. This hypothesis is
consistent with recent survey evidence presented in [2], which suggests that about
40 percent of households do not think at all about fuel costs when deciding to buy
a car.42
41The model of temptation presented by [115] also does not require a new framework for
evaluating welfare. Ultimately, the results that I present in the simulation portion of the paper,
however, do not depend on which explanation I stand behind. All that is required is that the
model can predict that some consumers choose to ignore future fuel costs when making a vehicle
purchase decision but benefit if they are swayed to buy a more fuel efficient vehicle.
42The survey consisted of a representative sample of about 2,000 US households. The exact
question asked to households was the following: “In this survey, we asked you to calculate fuel
costs fairly mathematically and precisely. Think back to the time when you were deciding whether
to purchase your vehicle. At that time, how precisely did you calculate the potential fuel costs for
your vehicle and other vehicles you could have bought?” 40 percent of households responded
with “I did not think about fuel costs at all when making my decision.”
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Thus far I have discussed likely candidate theories that explain the left side
of the distribution in Figure 2.1. What about the right side, which includes
consumers that appear to be overvaluing fuel economy? Overvaluation can
emerge from two distinct sources that have different policy implications. The
first source is that some households are green. Green households derive utility
when buying a fuel efficient car that is independent of fuel cost savings. These
consumers, then, appear to be willing to pay more than one dollar to reduce a fuel
costs by a dollar.43
Another potential source is the MPG illusion. Several studies have
documented that consumers systematically undervalue fuel cost savings when
comparing two very low MPG cars (for example 14 MPG vs. 15 MPG) and
systematically overvalue fuel cost savings when comparing two very high low
MPG cars (for example 49 MPG vs. 50 MPG) [3, 79].44 However, Allcott [3]
shows that the MPG Illusion has a minimal impact on equilibrium market shares
and a small effect on consumer welfare. Therefore, when I analyze the welfare
effects of alternative policies, I assume that consumers with a WTP above one
fully internalize any welfare changes from fuel cost savings.
43To the best of my knowledge there does not exist an empirical study asking whether
environmentally conscious households have a WTP above a dollar. Since rigorously answering
this question is out of the scope of the current paper I leave this specific question for future work.
44The MPG illusion to a slight extent can explain why some consumers undervalue fuel




The degree of heterogeneity in how households value fuel costs has relevant
policy implications. If consumers are different in their degree of undervaluation,
then policies aimed at reducing energy use are most efficient when they
preferentially influence the purchase decisions of the share of the population that
undervalues the most. An effective policy will primarily target households that
are under-investing in energy efficiency while having little or no effect on the
choices of households that fully value the cost savings from energy intensive
durable goods. In the next section I simulate the welfare effects of three existing
policies and distill the different channels of adjustment that interact with the
heterogeneity in fuel cost valuation.
Thus far we have seen that while the average household values equally the
upfront purchase price and the present value of fuel costs, there appear to be
a significant fraction of potential buyers that are inattentive to fuel costs. As a
consequence, for a policy to be efficient, it must be able to primarily target the
subset of the population that is inattentive. This result begs for an answer to the
following question: Which existing policies in the transportation sector effectively
target these consumers?45 To answer this question, I simulate the welfare effects
of three current policies given my estimated distribution of WTP for reducing
fuel costs. I evaluate the welfare effects of a gas guzzler tax, a feebate and
45An equally important pursuit is determining the optimal combination of policy instruments
when faced with household undervaluation of fuel economy. I refer the reader to [4] for an
analytical and simulation-based analysis of the optimal policy response to undervaluation.
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a fuel efficient vehicle subsidy. These three policies represent a broad portion
of the many initiatives in the transportation sector that are aimed at increasing
fleet-wide fuel economy.
Another major policy in the transportation sector that increases fleet fuel
economy is a gasoline tax. I do not evaluate the welfare effects of a gasoline tax
for two reasons. First, doing so would require a detailed simulation model that
would include several adjustments of household behavior that I do not estimate in
my empirical model.46 Including these important margins of adjustment would be
computationally expensive and is out of the scope of this paper. Second, adjusting
gasoline taxes is currently a politically infeasible instrument for increasing fuel
economy. Third, the primary objective of a gasoline tax is to raise revenue,
whereas the instruments that I consider have a primary objective of encouraging
consumers to buy more fuel efficient cars.47
2.6.1 Assumptions
Since the simulation requires some notion on the supply of new vehicles and
calculations of welfare, in this section I lay out assumptions of the simulation
46An important margin of adjustment is yearly vehicle miles traveled, which has been shown to
play a pivotal role in evaluating the relative efficiency of gasoline taxes to fuel economy standards
[70].
47A fourth reason is also revenue related. [12] demonstrate that the efficiency effects of gasoline
taxes greatly depend on how the revenue generated from a gasoline tax is returned to households.
To properly evaluate the effects of a gasoline tax would require following the steps taken in this
paper, which would distract the analysis from comparing the relative effects are separate policies
in the transportation sector. I leave this pursuit for future work.
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model. I assume that supply of new vehicles is perfectly competitive. This is
clearly a simplifying assumption of the new vehicle market, as many existing
studies suggest that the supply side is imperfectly competitive [53, 54, 12]. I
choose to make this assumption for three reasons. First, assuming perfect
competition dramatically simplifies the analysis and focuses the effects on the
consumer side of the market. Second, relaxing this assumption requires taking
a stance on the information about consumer valuation of fuel economy that
suppliers use to set prices and vehicle attributes. There exists limited empirical
evidence regarding this issue.48 Third, the policies that I consider are more easily
comparable with the perfect competition assumption. This is because a fee or
subsidy levied on a vehicle directly translates into an equilibrium price change
for the vehicle that is exactly equal to the fee or subsidy.
Demand for new vehicles comes directly from the estimated preference
parameters. I evaluate the policies based on household preferences from the 2006
survey to focus on the most recent year of data available. This allows me to
interpret the simulation results as the effect of a policy change on welfare in a
given year (as opposed to welfare changes in multiple years). As already noted,
the three policies that I consider directly adjust prices faced by consumers. The
price changes are fed directly into the logit probabilities computed based on the
estimation results to obtain new demands for each vehicle.
48Anecdotal evidence suggests that vehicle manufacturers assume that consumers need a three
year payback to be willing to buy a more fuel efficient vehicle. To the best of my knowledge there
does not exist any evidence on how manufacturers perceive the distribution of consumer valuation
of fuel costs.
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I do not model the used vehicle market or scrappage market for two reasons.
First, the policies that I consider only apply to new vehicles, implying that the
largest welfare effects will be through the new vehicle market.49 Second, my
estimation model only applies to new vehicles.50 And since there is no empirical
basis for assuming that household preferences for used vehicles are identical to
those for new vehicles, it seems most reasonable to avoid this assumption by
leaving the used vehicle market out of the model.
To compute welfare effects of the policies, I broadly follow [17] and [3]
by defining utility as the difference between two components: decision utility
and internality utility. I define the internality utility as the difference between
experienced utility and decision utility, which I assume is
Vi jt =

η(1 −WTPi) f ci jt if WTPi < 1
0 otherwise
(2.12)
This equation defines internality utility as a fraction of the utility value of the
present value of fuel costs for vehicle j ( f ci jt) for households that are inattentive
to fuel costs, where η is the marginal utility of income. The fraction is equal to one
minus household i’s WTP for reducing fuel costs by one dollar. The smaller the
household’s WTP, the larger the internality utility for the household. Internality
utility is positive for households that undervalue fuel costs. This expression is
intuitive because households with WTPi value ηWTPi f ci jt at the time of purchase
49In theory, the policies that I consider could be applied to the entire vehicle fleet. They have
historically not applied to used vehicles, however, because doing so would likely involve a major
administrative burden and would likely be politically infeasible.
50Extending the model to include used vehicles would make estimation computationally
infeasible since doing so would increase the vehicle choice set to the thousands.
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but experience η f ci jt while they own it.51 This drives a wedge (equal to Vi jt)
between their decision and experienced utility. To aggregate internality utility
across consumers, I take the product of Vi jt with choice probabilities Pi jt and sum
these products across households and markets. I then divide by the marginal












(1 −WTPi) f ci jt if WTPi < 1
0 otherwise
(2.14)
I compute the change in decision consumer surplus, ∆CS d = CS d1 − CS d0, with
the formula derived in [110]. This form is a simple closed-form expression for
consumer surplus when utility is linear in income. When utility is non-linear in
income as it is in my model, it serves as an approximation to consumer surplus.
McFadden [86] and Herriges and Kling [65] provide a simulation-based approach
to compute consumer surplus for discrete choice models that have utility modeled
as a non-linear function of income. I find that the simulation-based approach is
computationally expensive to perform in my model and results in large margins
of error.52 Moreover, Herriges and Kling [65] find that the closed-form solution
in Small and Rosen [110] serves as an accurate approximation of simulated
51This is true even if the household expects to sell the car before it reaches its lifetime since the
re-sale value will include the existing present value of fuel costs.
52Herriges and Kling[65] claim that the computational burden of the simulation-based approach
is the method’s primary drawback. The computational burden in my model is especially
pronounced because I model utility with random parameters. This requires an additional 200
iterations (equal to the number of Halton draws I use) of the simulation-based approach.
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consumer surplus while involving little computational burden to compute. More
importantly, the computed consumer surplus change that I find for the policies
considered lie well within the range of recent estimates from the literature,
suggesting that the approximation is sound.
Realized consumer surplus is total decision consumer surplus minus
aggregate internality surplus:
CS ∗ = CS d −CS n. (2.15)
The policies that I consider are not necessarily revenue neutral. I assume that any
revenue raised by a policy, denoted by R, is returned lump-sum to consumers.
Furthermore I assume that the revenue raised that is used as a subsidy, denoted
by S , is raised with a non-distortionary head tax.53 The cost of a policy is directly
reduced by the amount of revenue generated by the policy, while the cost of a
policy is directly raised by the amount of subsidy paid. The cost of a policy,
denoted by C, is equal to the amount of net revenue raised negative of the change
in decision consumer surplus minus the change in internality surplus plus the
amount of revenue raised:
Cost = S − R − (CS d1 −CS d0) − (CS n1 −CS n0) = S − R − ∆CS d − ∆CS n. (2.16)
Here the subscripts 0 and 1 denote the pre- and post-policy surpluses.
53The fundamental results of my analysis do not change when I assume that the subsidy
payments are raised through a distortionary tax.
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2.6.2 Evaluating Policies for Increasing Fleet Fuel Economy
I evaluate policies for increasing fuel efficiency relative to an “ideal” setting where
a hypothetical policy can encourage all the households that have WTP < 1 to
fully value fuel costs. I call this policy “Perfect Targeting” as it only influences
the decisions of households that undervalue fuel costs. I simulate the internality
benefits of this policy by taking the difference in internality consumer surplus
between two settings: one where household preferences are modeled with the
estimated preference parameters and one where all households have WTPi ≥ 1.
To estimate fleet characteristics and internality consumer surplus for the latter
setting, I assign preference parameters to households originally with WTPi < 1 a
value of βi such that WTPi = 1.54 What we can expect from the Perfect Targeting
Policy is an increase in fleet fuel economy as the households with an estimated
WTPi < 1 that would have bought low MPG cars instead by more fuel efficient
vehicles when they have WTPi = 1.
I evaluate the welfare effects of three policies: a gas guzzler tax, a feebate
that is equivalent to a CAFE standard and a fuel efficient vehicle subsidy. A gas
guzzler tax assigns a fixed tax rate on vehicles that have low fuel economy. The
rate is usually applied to the manufacturer. There are two components of a gas
guzzler tax: the rate and the threshold. The threshold determines which vehicles
are affected by the tax. Vehicles with fuel economy below the threshold are taxed,
54This change intuitively represents a policy that provides households with information on fuel
costs at zero cost. It also assumes that households optimally utilize this information without cost.
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while those above are unaffected. The rate defines how much tax is paid per
MPG below the threshold. Generally the tax is higher on vehicles well below the
threshold. In the United States, the gas guzzler tax threshold is 22.5 MPG. The
rate is an increasing function of the difference between the vehicle’s fuel economy
and the threshold.55
A fuel efficient vehicle subsidy is the mirror image of a gas guzzler tax:
It assigns a subsidy rate on vehicles that have high fuel economy. A subtle
difference that I do not analyze in my model is that the subsidy is usually available
to the consumer and not the manufacturer.56 Vehicles above a threshold level
are subsidized. In the United States, most vehicle subsidies do not establish
a threshold but instead are limited to vehicle classes.57 For example, several
state and federal initiatives have subsidized the purchase of hybrid vehicles
while others currently subsidize electric vehicles [16].58 To make the policies
comparable, however, I model the subsidy as a rate-threshold policy.59
A feebate is essentially a gas guzzler tax alongside a fuel efficient vehicle
55A vehicle that has a fuel economy between 21.5 and 22.5 MPG is taxed at $ 1,000 while a
vehicle that has a fuel economy less than 12.5 MPG is taxed at $ 1,000. See [40] for the complete
gas guzzler tax schedule.
56In a model of perfect competition, the results of the model are invariant to where the tax or
subsidy is applied. This is because the effect of each instrument is fully passed on to equilibrium
vehicle prices.
57One exception is vehicle rebate programs which subsidize vehicles above a minimum fuel
economy when the buyer of the new vehicle trades in an old, low MPG car to be scrapped. The
largest such program in the United States was the 2009 Cash for Clunkers program, which had a
MPG dependent subsidy rate and a class dependent threshold. See [82] for more details.
58These vehicle classes have average fuel economy well above the fleet-wide average.
59Modeling the subsidy as it is commonly seen in practice – that is, how subsidies apply to a
small subset of fuel efficient vehicles like hybrids and electric cars – would artificially raise its
efficiency costs since the scope of the policy would be sharply limited.
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subsidy when the two policies share the same rate and threshold. A tax is levied
on vehicles below the threshold and a rebate is assigned to vehicles that lie about
the threshold. Like a gas guzzler tax, the taxes and rebates are usually assigned
to manufacturers.60 Several studies have documented that a feebate system can
mimic any existing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard, which
is the most comprehensive existing transportation policy for improving fleet
fuel economy [98, 52].61 Since 2007, CAFE Standards in the United States had
been fixed at 27.5 MPG for passenger cars and 20.5 MPG for light trucks but
are scheduled to dramatically increase over the next decade.62 Therefore, in
simulating the effects of a feebate I am also indirectly simulating the effects of an
equivalent CAFE standard, so that my simulation results have a direct application
to an existing U.S. policy.
To keep the policies comparable I assume that they each share the same
threshold that I set equal to the fleet average fuel economy of 23.5 MPG. This
threshold is represented in Figure 2.2 by the vertical red line. The density of fleet
fuel economy is also plotted, showing that the distribution has a long right tail.63
60Several counterexamples exist in practice. For example, in 2008 California proposed a clean
car discount program that would have made buyers of low MPG vehicles pay an additional fee of
up to $ 2,500 [29]. The revenue generated from the program would then be rebated back to buyers
of high MPG vehicles.
61A CAFE standard only requires setting a threshold at which a manufacturer’s average fleet
fuel economy must meet. The resulting shadow prices from a profit maximization problem of a
manufacturer are analogous to the fees and rebates of a feebate program. See [98] for more details.
62[85] provides an excellent summary and discussion of the new CAFE standards.
63This is primarily due to the presence of hybrid vehicles.
63
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Fuel Economy for the 2006 sample
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Simulation results for the Perfect Targeting policy appears in the first column
of Table 2.8. The first panel of the table reports changes to key fleet characteristics.
Fleet fuel economy increases by 1.06 MPG and vehicle weight and horsepower
fall. The change in internality consumer surplus is substantial. With perfect
targeting, households can expect to benefit by about 125 dollars. To put this
number in context, Jaconbsen (2013) finds that the welfare cost of increasing CAFE
standards by one mile per gallon is at most 264 dollars.64 Anderson and Sallee [7]
find, however, that the welfare cost of increasing CAFE standards is substantially
lower and lies between 8 dollars and 27 dollars per vehicle sold.65 These estimates
suggest, then, that perfect targeting can achieve private welfare benefits that can
be as large as or even exceed the cost of existing fuel economy standards.66
I simulate the effect of one policy at a time relative to a setting where none of
the policies are in place. I adjust the rate of each policy until the sales-weighted
fleet fuel economy increases by the same MPG relative to the no policy baseline
from the Perfect Targeting Policy. The simulation results for each policy appear in
Table 2.8. The columns represent the simulation results for three policies relative
to a benchmark that does not include any of the policies.
64This value includes the change in producer and consumer surplus and represents the welfare
effects of a one-MPG increase 10 years after the change has been made. The change in producer
surplus is equal to the change in manufacturer profits. The change in new car consumer surplus
is 94 dollars after 10 years.
65Aggregating over the entire U.S. population yields a cost estimate of between 1− 2 dollars per
household.
66It is worth mentioning that these potential gains exist even when the average household fully
values fuel cost savings.
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Table 2.8: Simulation Results
Output Perfect Tax Subsidy FeebateTargeting
Fleet MPG Change 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06
Hybrid Share Change 0.007 0.003 0.020 0.011
Fleet Horsepower Change -8.302 -10.205 -4.758 -6.407
Fleet Footprint Change -257.891 -310.008 -119.594 -176.357
Change in Internality 293.460 143.429 41.636 76.492Consumer Surplus
Change in Internality
125 61 18 33Consumer Surplus per household ($)
Change in Decision Consumer Surplus – -936.028 143.299 -71.848
Revenuea – 662.720 0 209.066
Expenditure – 0 406.883 324.079
Cost without internalities – 273.308 263.584 186.861
Cost without internalities per household ($) – 116 112 79
Cost with internalities – 129.879 221.948 110.369
Cost with internalities per household ($) – 55 94 46
a Revenue, expenditure and costs are reported in thousands of dollars.
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Sales-weighted fuel economy increases by 1.06 miles per gallon in response to
the three policies. The share of hybrids bought increases after each policy is put in
place. This is because fuel efficient vehicles, including hybrids, become relatively
cheaper than gas guzzlers. The hybrid share change is the most pronounced under
the subsidy policy as hybrid buyers are offered very large price reductions.67
Across all three policies, average horsepower and footprint falls. This is because
fuel efficient vehicles are generally smaller and less powerful.68 The inverse
relationship between fuel economy, horsepower and size is strongest at the lower
end of the fuel economy distribution. As a consequence, we see that the change
in horsepower is about twice as large under the gas guzzler tax policy.
The second panel of Table 2.8 shows the change in internality consumer
surplus.69 The results reveal that internality consumer surplus is greatest under
the tax policy and lowest under the subsidy policy. A gas guzzler tax achieves
about one-half of internality consumer surplus increases relative to the Perfect
Targeting policy, while the subsidy policy achieves only one-sixth. A feebate is
substantially better at targeting than a subsidy but still falls far short of achieving
67This is because hybrids have a fuel economy rating well above the sales-weighted average of
23.5 MPG.
68[73] estimates the trade-off between size, power and fuel efficiency in the United States and
documents how it has evolved over time. He finds that increases in fuel economy standards will
require significant reductions in vehicle size and power.
69Since my model does not condition household decisions on buying a new car, the change
in internality consumer surplus can be decomposed into two components: substitution and
purchase. The substitution component represents the welfare effect of household substitution
away from low MPG vehicles to high MPG vehicles. The purchase component represents the
welfare effect of households being encouraged to buy or discouraged from buying a new car. I
find, however, that the purchase component is very small (less than five percent) relative to the
substitution component. Therefore, I do not report the components separately.
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the gains from perfect targeting. Two results can be summarized as the following.
First, gas guzzler taxes are the most effective policy for targeting households that
ignore fuel costs to buy more fuel efficient vehicles. Second, all of the policies
are unlikely to achieve the potential internality consumer surplus gains since they
influence the decisions of all households.
Decision consumer surplus change, revenue and expenditure are reported in
the third panel of Table 2.8. The values are reported in thousands of dollars. Under
the gas guzzler tax policy, the change in decision consumer surplus is negative
because consumer surplus falls as households face higher prices for gas guzzlers.
The tax, however, brings in over 680 thousand dollars. The cost of the tax policy,
without considering welfare effects from internalities, is just over 250 thousand
dollars. Moving to the subsidy policy, we see that consumer surplus increases by
143 thousand dollars as consumers face lower prices for fuel efficient vehicles. The
subsidy costs the government over 406 thousand dollars, implying a net cost of the
policy of 263 thousand dollars. The feebate policy on overall reduces consumer
surplus by 71 thousand dollars as the consumer surplus lost from higher prices
for gas guzzlers dominates the consumer surplus gained from lower prices for
fuel efficient cars. Furthermore the policy requires a net expenditure of about 115
thousand dollars, bringing to the total cost of the feebate policy to 186 thousand
dollars.
Are these values reasonable? To determine the plausibility of the cost
estimates, I compute the cost of each policy per household. I find that the
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costs of raising fleet fuel economy by one mile per gallon with a feebate (or an
equivalent CAFE standard) is 79 dollars per household. Jacobsen (2013) finds that
the consumer surplus cost of a 1 MPG increase to the CAFE Standard is between
99 and 215 dollars per household.70 Anderson and Sallee [7] use a loophole
in the design of CAFE standards to provide empirical evidence suggesting that
Jacobsen’s estimates significantly overestimate the cost of CAFE standards. My
estimate, while based on a highly stylized model, is located in the same ballpark
as the estimates from these studies.
The cost of the feebate policy is significantly lower than the cost of the other
two policies because it has broader coverage. It either taxes or subsidies every
vehicle in the fleet, while the remaining policies only do one to a limited portion
of the fleet. This suggests that a feebate (or an equivalent CAFE standard) is the
most cost-effective instrument among the three policies.
There are two reasons why gas guzzler taxes are best at targeting. First,
households that are inattentive to fuel costs will be more likely to buy fuel
inefficient vehicles. An average household that is inattentive to fuel costs will
tend to sort into vehicles with low MPG while a household that fully values fuel
costs will tend to sort into vehicles with high MPG. I demonstrate this sorting by
plotting the predicted choice probabilities of four different vehicles for a randomly
selected household in my sample. I plot the predicted choice probabilities as a
function of the household’s WTP for reducing fuel costs by one dollar, which I
70These values represent the consumer surplus cost after one and 10 years of the program,
respectively.
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vary between zero and 1.50. Figure 2.3 shows the predicted choice probabilities
for two gas guzzlers (Jeep Grand Cherokee, 19 MPG and Chevrolet Tahoe, 15
MPG) and two gas sippers (Nissan Altima, 25 MPG and Ford Focus, 28 MPG).
Households that are inattentive to fuel costs are more likely to purchase one of
the gas guzzlers as each of the low MPG vehicle choice probabilities exceeds the
choice probabilities of the high MPG cars. On the other hand, households that
fully value fuel cost savings are more likely to purchase one of the fuel efficient
vehicles. In fact, the choice probability for the Ford Focus is almost three times
as large as the choice probability for the Chevrolet Tahoe when the household is
willing to pay one dollar.
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Figure 2.3: Sorting by Fuel Economy for Different Valuations of Fuel
Costs
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Second, the marginal effect of a price change of a household’s probability to
purchase a vehicle will be relatively large for either a household that is inattentive
to fuel costs that is considering buying a gas guzzler or for a household that fully
values fuel costs that is considering buying a fuel efficient car. Said differently,
households that are inattentive to fuel costs will be most responsive to price
changes to gas guzzlers, while households that fully value fuel costs will be
most responsive to price changes to high MPG vehicles. This effect stems from
the intuitive feature of logit probability models where the marginal effect of an
attribute change is the largest for decision makers that have logit probabilities
closer to 50 percent. This effect is illustrated in Figure 2.4 for two vehicles:
a Ford Focus (high MPG) and a Chevrolet Tahoe (low MPG). Panel (a) shows
the marginal effect of lowering the price of a high MPG vehicle on the choice
probability for that vehicle of a randomly selected household. If the household
has a low WTP for reducing fuel costs, they will be less responsive to the price
change. A household that fully values fuel costs has a marginal effect that is more
than twice as large as the marginal effect of the same household that ignores fuel
costs. Panel (b) shows the marginal effect of raising the price of a low MPG vehicle
on the choice probability for that vehicle of a randomly selected househod. If the
household has a low WTP for reducing fuel costs, they will be more responsive to
the price change. A household that is inattentive to fuel costs has a marginal effect
that is about twice as large as the marginal effect of the same household that fully
values fuel costs.
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(a) Logit Probability Marginal Effect of a $1 Subsidy to a High MPG Car (Ford Focus, 28 MPG)
(b) Logit Probability Marginal Effect of a $1 Tax on Low MPG Car (Chevrolet Tahoe, 16 MPG)
Figure 2.4: Logit Probability Marginal Effects of Price Changes to
High and Low MPG Cars
73
Together, these effects explain why a gas guzzler tax achieves greater
internality benefits than a fuel efficient car subsidy or a feebate. Households that
are inattentive to fuel costs are most responsive to a gas guzzler tax and are least
responsive to a subsidy or rebate to fuel efficient vehicles. On the other hand,
households that fully value (or overvalue) fuel cost savings are most responsive
to a subsidy and are least responsive to a gas guzzler tax. A gas guzzler tax
effectively targets the households that bring about internality welfare benefits (e.g.
those that are inattentive to fuel costs).
2.6.3 Additional Policy Implications
Four implications for evaluating other transportation policies emerge from my
analysis. First, my analysis suggests that certain types of vehicle scrappage
programs might be excellent at targeting households that undervalue fuel
economy. The largest vehicle scrappage program, known as “Cash for Clunkers”,
paid households new vehicle subsidies for retiring low MPG vehicles.71 The
only households that were eligible for the program were those that owned fuel
inefficient cars relative to the fuel economy of the new car purchased. As
a consequence, the program likely screened out many households that fully
value fuel economy, since these households are more likely to own high MPG
71Vehicles eligible for retired were required to be at least 4 MPG lower than the MPG of the new
vehicle bought. The largest subsidy payment of $ was eligible only to households that scrapped
a gas guzzler that had a fuel economy of 10 MPG lower than the new vehicle. See [82] for more
details.
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cars. Other retirement programs, including the Bay Area Air Quality District’s
(BAAQD) Vehicle Quality Program or the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
Consumer Assistance Program, do not place requirements on the fuel efficiency
of vehicles scrapped.72 The efficiency of these programs may be improved if they
add an upper limit to the fuel economy of eligible vehicles.
Second, my results have implications for overlapping policies in the
transportation sector. In practice, more than one of the three policies that I
consider are in effect at one time.73 Recent literature on the economics of fuel
economy standards identifies unintended consequences of overlapping or nested
policy instruments [56, 98]. These studies find that adding policies on top of
existing CAFE standards are ineffective at reducing gasoline consumption. The
key mechanism at play here is that the new policies essentially relax the CAFE
constraint faced by firms, which allow manufacturers to increase the sale of gas
guzzlers. In the extreme case, the equilibrium effect of an additional policy in the
presence of CAFE is that there is an increase in gasoline consumption.74 From
the results of my own work, we can be confident that this is indeed likely for
fuel efficient vehicle subsidies. This is because these subsidies are relatively poor
at targeting households that are inattentive to fuel costs. In contrast, adding a
72See [103] for an excellent summary of the BAAQD program. CARB’s website http://www.
arb.ca.gov/msprog/avrp/avrp.htm has detailed information on eligibility requirements for
the Consumer Assistance Program.
73For example, in 2012, vehicle manufacturers were regulated by both and gas guzzler tax of
22.5 MPG and a CAFE standard of 32.8 MPG for passenger cars. In the same year, various state
and federal incentives gave rebates to consumers who bought electric vehicles.
74[98] finds that this is the case when a hybrid subsidy is put in place with an existing CAFE
standard. The hybrid subsidy has no effect on the equilibrium fleet average fuel economy but
increases vehicle ownership as the average vehicle price falls.
75
gas guzzler tax on top of a CAFE standard may be justified based on efficiency
grounds. Adding a gas guzzler tax effectively increases the shadow cost on
fuel efficient vehicles while keeping the shadow cost on fuel efficient vehicles
constant.75 As a consequence, the two policies together should be more effective
at targeting inattentive consumers than a CAFE standard alone.
Third, Congress recently passed new CAFE standards that are planned to
dramatically increase over the next decade. The 2013 standard for passenger cars
is 34 MPG [95]. By 2025 the standard is scheduled to increase to 56 MPG [96].76 As
CAFE standards increase over time, they become more like a broad gas guzzler
tax in the sense that a majority of vehicles will have a positive shadow cost. This
feature will likely increase the efficiency of CAFE standards as they will make the
most inefficient vehicles much more expensive in equilibrium.
Forth, in addition to becoming more stringent over time, CAFE standards
have been reformed to depend on vehicle footprint. Each manufacturer is
assigned a separate CAFE standard depending on the average footprint of
the vehicles each manufacturer sells. Manufacturers that sell heavier cars are
assigned a lower standard.77 Footprint-based standards are likely to be worse
at encouraging households that undervalue fuel economy to buy fuel efficient
75This result, of course, is incomplete without considering the general equilibrium effects of
these policies. Although these effects can be large, it is difficult to deduce their size or direction
without an analytical model that is not present in the current analysls. I therefore leave this
exercise for future work.
76These values do not include the array of exclusions and bonuses written in the final ruling.
77The reported purpose for this reformulation is to avoid down weighting, which occurs when
manufactures reduce vehicle weight to improve fuel economy. Prior to this reformulation each
manufacturer was assigned the same standard.
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vehicles. Households that undervalue base their purchase decisions on other
vehicle attributes, such as vehicle weight and safety. Since vehicle footprint is
highly and positively correlated with weight, households ignoring fuel costs will
sort into heavier vehicles with larger footprints and lower fuel economy.78 Under
the original standard, these vehicles would become more expensive as CAFE
standards are tightened, which would encourage households to buy other, more
fuel efficient cars. Under the modified standards, however, these vehicles have a
smaller shadow cost of CAFE and therefore become less expensive (holding the
overall stringency of CAFE constant). As a result, the footprint-based standards
actually encourage households that are inattentive to fuel costs to buy heavier,
less fuel efficient cars. Even as the overall level of strigency of CAFE standards
increase over time, the footprint-based reformulation may eliminate the incentive
for households that undervalue fuel economy to buy high MPG vehicles.
2.7 Conclusion
The caveats mentioned above may have significant welfare effects that should
be included in future analysis of policies with the goal of reducing gasoline
consumption and its associated externalities. I abstain from exploring these
effects because my estimation and simulation frameworks do not include
necessary modeling details to carry out a careful analysis. To better understand
78Among new 2006 vehicles, the correlation coefficient between vehicle footprint and weight is
0.80. The correlation coefficient between vehicle footprint and fuel economy is −0.59.
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how consumer heterogeneity influences the welfare effects of footprint-based
CAFE standards, I require a model of imperfect competition among vehicle
manufacturers. This competition is likely to lead to large welfare effects on the
producer side as well as the consumer side. It would also be a fruitful pursuit
to consider how car manufacturers respond to footprint-based standards with
different levels of knowledge about the distribution of consumer preferences for
fuel economy.79
Another limitation of my work is that my model is static. Dynamic effects,
such as how different types of consumers make vehicle purchase decisions as
CAFE standards become more stringent, are likely to be extremely important for
evaluating CAFE standards over the next decade.
Even without these additional modeling details, however, my estimation
and analysis reveals four key findings. First, I find that there is substantial
heterogeneity in how households value fuel economy. By estimating a mixed logit
discrete choice model of new vehicle demand, I find that households on average
fully value the gasoline cost savings from better fuel economy. Furthermore
the estimation results suggest that about 31 percent of households appear to be
inattentive to vehicle fuel costs, leaving room for some types of fuel efficiency
policies to increase private welfare. These estimates suggest that there is potential
for substantial welfare gains from encouraging households that undervalue fuel
79[67] finds that in the context of the Energy Star Program, firms can price discriminate to
exploit the heterogeneity in energy cost valuation, which reduces consumer surplus and increases
producer surplus.
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costs to buy more fuel efficient vehicles.
Second, I show that the estimated distribution for fuel economy valuation has
key policy implications that I explore with a simple simulation model of the new
vehicle market. With the simulation I find that a gas guzzler tax is relatively good
at encouraging households that are inattentive to fuel costs to purchase more fuel
efficient vehicles. I also find, however, that a feebate (or an equivalent CAFE
standard) is more cost-effective at increasing fleet fuel economy because it has
a much more broad coverage.
Third, I show that subsidies or rebates to fuel efficient vehicles, like hybrid
car rebates or more recently electric vehicle subsidies, are poor at targeting.
These policies have the largest influence on households that already fully value
fuel economy to buy high MPG cars. As a result, for a given increase in fleet
fuel economy, relatively few households that are inattentive to fuel costs are
encouraged to buy a fuel efficient vehicle when offered a subsidy.
Fourth, these policies do not come close to achieving the potential welfare
gains from a policy that only influences the decisions of households that
undervalue fuel economy. This seems reasonable since none of the policies are
designed to only influence the decisions of this subset of the population. One
potential avenue for future work in this area may be to identify household
demographics characteristics that are correlated with WTP for fuel cost savings
so that future policies can be engineered to provide incentives to households with
WTPi < 1.
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Together, these results suggest that heterogeneity in consumer valuation of fuel
costs has critical implications for designing energy policy in the transportation
sector. Moreover, the results have policy implications for policies in other
sectors as well. [67] finds that there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer
valuation of energy costs of durable household goods, including refrigerators.
He finds that there is a substantial fraction of households that do not value
energy cost savings when making a durable goods purchase. As a result,
minimum standards, such as those for light bulbs and household appliances,
should be efficient policies for targeting households that undervalue or ignore
fuel costs. This is because a minimum standard shares a similar property to a
gas guzzler tax in that it only directly influences equilibrium prices of products
that are the least energy efficient. The efficient design of other subsidy policies,
including carbon offset mechanisms that are linked with cap-and-trade programs
for reducing greenhouse gases, depends on the heterogeneity of business-as-usual
emissions among offset projects [14]. Obtaining estimates of this heterogeneity
and evaluating how different instruments encourage desirable projects to opt in
are necessary for designing cost-effective policies for limiting global warming.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR CARBON OFFSETS WITH
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
3.1 Introduction
The design of markets for carbon offsets from unregulated sectors, to complement
cap-and-trade programs in regulated sectors, is a central issue in environmental
and climate policy. Such markets could, if designed appropriately, reduce the
overall economic costs of climate change mitigation programs [42, 74]. Allowing
capped sectors to use offsets essentially broadens the affected sources that are able
to reduce emissions. When capped and uncapped sources of emissions are open
to trade emissions credits in the form of carbon offsets, a reduction target can be
achieved at a lower cost relative to a program that does not let the uncapped sector
opt in [94, 27].
This form of cost containment, however, may break the cap established for
regulated sources if the mitigation from uncapped sources would have happened
in the absence of the program. The problem of non-additionality, or the awarding
of carbon offsets to uncapped sources that do not perform mitigation, is a central
source of criticism because of its adverse emissions consequences [94, 27]. The
problem stems from the fact that programs cannot fully observe business-as-usual
(BAU) emissions from uncapped sources, since these emissions are a hypothetical
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what if that never takes place if the source opts in. If the source would have
reduced emissions anyway, then it is awarded non-additional offsets that are
then sold to capped sources. The non-additional offsets contribute toward an
increase in overall emissions, even if economic efficiency improves because of the
additional offsets. This non-additionality, often discussed in terms of the integrity
of the cap, is a major worry for key stakeholders, and thus for policy makers.
There is a well-known solution to this problem of cap integrity. Programs
can deal with non-additionality by tightening the cap on the regulated sector
sufficiently that total emissions remain unchanged [91]. However, this policy
involves a transfer of rents from the capped sector (if permits are grandfathered)
to the uncapped sector. As we will see later on in this paper, this transfer can be
very large for the proposed federal cap-and-trade program in the United States.
Our numerical calibrations suggest a transfer of the order of 30 percent of the
pre-offsets market rent in the capped sector. Not surprisingly, these transfers will
be resisted strongly by firms in the regulated sector.
There are three key alternative methods being discussed in the offsets policy
area for handling the problem of additionality, including (i) more stringent
emissions baselines for sources in the uncapped sector; (ii) trade ratios for offsets
relative to allowances, where a unit of offset supplied from the uncapped sector
translates into less than one unit of emissions permitted in the capped sector; and
(iii) a limit on the use of offsets for compliance in the capped sector [27, 74]. It
should be obvious that each of these three instruments reduces the total supply of
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offsets, and hence the rent transfer from the capped sector. But the impact of each
of these on the additional versus non-additional composition of offsets is not at
all clear and requires careful analysis. Further, the compositional effect relative to
the distributional effect for each of these instruments needs to be quantified. This
leads then to the question addressed in this paper – which instrument is best, for
which objective?
Recent studies have taken some first steps in analyzing the welfare and
distributional implications of opt in programs. [91] studies this problem in the
context of the SO2 opt-in provision where uncapped units were allowed to opt in
and receive a quantity of allowances based on historical emissions. In a setting
where units have private information on business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, the
first best can be achieved by raising the allocation to uncapped units so that all
of them opt in and lowering the permit allocation to capped units. Van Benthem
and Kerr [116] compare the efficacy of alternative methods for alleviating adverse
selection in avoided deforestation programs. They find that increasing the scale of
opt in projects alleviates (and, in the limit, can eliminate) the problem of adverse
selection. They also compare the efficacy of imposing trade ratios and adjusting
offset project baselines. They find that an optimal policy includes a combination
of a trade ratio and stringent baselines, a result that is consistent with our own
findings. This study, however, does not evaluate the welfare implications of
limiting the use of offsets and focuses its simulations on an international offsets
scheme. Our study compliments Von Benthem and Kerr by focusing on the
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efficiency and distributional implications of a domestic offset program.1. Like Van
Benthem and Kerr, we document an important trade-off between efficiency gain
and rent transfer. We evaluate this trade-off, however, for distinct domestic sectors
(e.g. capped sectors like electricity generation, petroleum refining and cement
manufacturing and uncapped sectors like agriculture and forestry). We find that
different offsets policies lead to substantially different rent transfers between these
sectors, making some offsets policies more politically feasible than others.
[89] evaluates the effectiveness of sectoral crediting mechanisms using a
similar model of adverse selection. He shows that there exists a significant
trade-off between efficiency and rent transfers, and that uncertainty in BAU
emissions makes these mechanisms very poor methods for reducing emissions.
This study, however, focuses on national transportation sectors and does not
consider the relative efficiency of alternative instruments for dealing with
additionality among individual offsets projects.
Our paper extends the literature in several ways. First, we extend
prior analyses of adverse selection in opt-in emissions trading programs by
deriving analytical welfare formulas for instruments currently being adopted in
cap-and-trade programs. Our formulas allow us to make general statements
about the differences between the instruments and to provide clear policy
recommendations based on these differences.
1While there exist cap-and-trade programs that allow international offsets, there are several
examples that only allow domestic sources to opt in, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative and the program under the California AB 32 Global Warming Solutions Act.
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Second, we provide an assessment of three instruments for the level and
composition of offsets, holding constant the cap on the regulated sector. We then
use this to conduct an analysis of the efficiency and distributional implications of
each instrument. Furthermore, we compare policies based on efficiency and on
rent transfers, which lead to critical trade-offs that we explore analytically and
numerically. This exercise contrasts with existing literature that focuses solely on
the efficiency aspect of different offset policies.2
Third, we numerically calibrate the analytical model to analyze federal
U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade legislation as described in the 2009
Waxman-Markey bill. With our numerical model we are able to compute the
welfare and emissions impacts of alternative second-best policies. We are also able
to compute the welfare cost associated with avoiding rents from being transferred
across sectors to implement the first-best solution.
Our major findings are fourfold. Our first result suggests that coupling the
instruments can achieve greater efficiency than using them individually. We
find that the second-best policy couples a trade ratio less than one with a very
stringent baseline. While a very stringent baseline eliminates most of the supply
of non-additional offsets, it crowds out the supply of additional offsets. The trade
ratio is set below one to increase the price of offsets and boost up the supply of
2Comparing the efficiency gains to the distributional implications is especially important for
designing markets for carbon offsets. In particular, the key concern with the first-best mechanism
presented in [91] is that there may be a significant transfer of rents across sectors of the economy.
If this rent transfer turns out to be small, then it may be feasible to implement in practice, which
would make the discussion of second-best policies irrelevant.
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additional offsets.
This mechanism may not be politically feasible as trade ratios less than
one appear, independent of the other instrument choices, to increase aggregate
emissions, as capped firms need less than one offset to account for one of its own
emissions. Our second result addresses the question of how the policy maker
should set the three instruments when it cannot select a ratio less than one. In
this setting, the baseline is the best instrument for maximizing welfare. When
the baseline is set at its optimum level, the trade ratio should be set at one and
the offsets limit should be non-binding. The reason for this is that adjusting the
baseline attacks the problem of non-additionality directly, while the other two
instruments can only approach the issue indirectly.
Third, comparing the three instruments, our numerical calculations show that
the welfare cost per unit of avoided redistribution from the capped sector is the
lowest for the baseline. However, the numerical value of this ratio is below
standard estimates for the marginal excess burden of public funds. This result
suggests that if the policy maker chooses among the policy options of sacrificing
welfare to avoid one dollar of transfers or allowing the rent transfer to take place
but compensate capped firms through revenues generated from a labor tax, they
should choose the former as it is less costly per dollar of transfers.
Fourth, when the baseline instrument is not fully reliable, as in the case of
international offsets, then the other two instruments come into their own. In this
case we show that the trade ratio instrument is superior to the limits instrument
86
and that the efficient trade ratio is above one.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic analytical model
and derives analytical results as the basis for the numerical model. Section 3
develops the calibration of the numerical model for the US and presents the main
results. Section 4 provides further analysis and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Analytical Model
In this section we develop an analytical model to isolate the channels exploited by
various instruments that regulate carbon offsets markets.
3.2.1 Model Assumptions
The model has two sectors: A capped or unregulated sector and an uncapped
or unregulated sector. Each sector includes a unit mass of firms that are
capable of reducing emissions.3 A regulator controls emissions by establishing
a cap-and-trade program requiring firms in the capped sector to hold a permit
or an equivalent quantity of offsets for every unit of pollution they emit. The
regulator encourages uncapped firms to opt into the program by allowing them
to sell offsets to capped firms.4
3Emissions reductions either occur through abatement or sequestration. Reductions from
abatement result from actions that lower the release of emissions into the atmosphere. Carbon
sequestration is the process of capturing and storing emissions.
4There are several reasons why some sources are capped while others are not. The most
prominent reason is because monitoring and verification costs for some sectors are substantially
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In our notation, the subscript j = {r, u} denotes the regulated and unregulated
sector, respectively, while the superscript i denotes firm i. Pre-intervention levels
of variables are further subscripted by 0. Emissions are denoted by the variable e.
Thus eij0 is the emission level of firm i in sector j in the pre-intervention scenario.
This is also the business-as-usual (BAU) level of emissions. Firm i in sector j has
a marginal cost of emission reduction cij. This is assumed to be the same pre and
post intervention. Thus the subscript 0 is suppressed. The values of eij0 and c
i
j are
firm i′s private information. The regulator does not observe eij0 or c
i
j but observes
density functions for each variable.
The policy intervention has two components. The the regulator establishes a
cap-and-trade program by grandfathering A tradable permits to capped firms.5
At the same time, the regulator sets emissions baselines for uncapped firms, bi.
Baselines attempt to measure BAU emissions of uncapped firms and are used
to reward these firms for sequestration or emissions reductions.6 Capped firms
observe their permit allocation and make abatement decisions and uncapped
firms observe their emissions baseline and make offset supply decisions. Firms
higher than they are in other sectors [108]. Other reasons include legal and political constraints
and property rights issues [62]. Governing bodies generally have power to prevent harms (by
preventing carbon emissions through abatement) but they cannot force the private production
of benefits (by forcing emissions sequestration). The property rights issue involves international
participation. While the United States, Europe and other developed countries may be willing to
develop an emissions target, other countries may not. The US cannot force the participation of
other countries, but it can encourage them to participate through an offsets program.
5We do not consider the possibility that permits are auctioned. In the most recent U.S. climate
bill and in many existing cap-and-trade programs including Caifornia’s program within the Global
Warming Solutions Act, a large fraction of permits are freely allocated at the beginning of the
programs.
6Setting a baseline is required for any opt-in policy. The credited reductions are determined by
the agent’s behavior in relation to the baseline. See [11] for a formal theoretical treatment.
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make decisions based one their own BAU emissions, marginal costs of emission
reductions and market prices for permits and offsets.7
We assume that BAU emissions are drawn from a sector-specific probability
density function with support eij0 ∈ [e j0, e j0] where each eij0 is independently
and identically distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Y j(e j0) with mean E(e j0). Marginal costs are constant and satisfy cij ∈ [c j, c j]
and are independently and identically distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function Z j(c j).8 To keep the model analytically tractable, we assume
that the distributions are independent.9 In addition to lowering emissions,
uncapped firms can sequester emissions. We assume that each uncapped firm
has the same sequestration potential of α ≤ 0.10
Capped Firm Problem
7These assumptions are consistent with [91]. An alternative assumption would be that firms
form expectations of market prices which would likely change capped and uncapped firm
decisions depending on how the expectations are formed. To the best of our knowledge there
does not exist evidence on how offset suppliers form price expectations. We adopt the simplest
approach by assuming all firms observe all relevant market variables.
8Although individual firms have constant marginal costs, because marginal costs vary across
firms, the aggregate marginal cost curves for each sector are not constant. Furthermore, in
the analytical model and welfare formulas that we present below, we do not assume a specific
distribution for marginal abatement costs. In our simulation we assume that the distribution for
marginal costs of uncapped firms is uniform. This implies that the marginal cost curve for the
uncapped sector is linear.
9[42] demonstrate that correlations between marginal abatement costs between capped and
uncapped sectors lead to small increase in compliance costs. Under the most extreme correlation
considered, [42] find that compliance costs are about nine percent higher than the case without
correlation.
10We represent sequestration of emissions as a negative quantity so that net emissions equals
the sum of emissions and sequestration.
89
We assume that capped firm i is grandfathered permits ai0.
11 We define the rent
generated by the establishment of the cap-and-trade program as the equilibrium
value of all of the permits allocated to capped firms. The rent generated from
the grandfathering equals peai0, where pe is the equilibrium permit price.
12 Firm i
uses permits to comply with the cap-and-trade program or the firm sells them to
other firms.13 In addition, the firm can buy offsets, f , or abate its emissions. Firm
i minimizes compliance costs by choosing emission level eir, permit sales ai and











ai + ai0 + f
i ≥ eir. (3.2)
If ai < 0, the firm is a net seller of permits, and if a > 0, it is a net buyer.14 Permits
are bought and sold at the equilibrium permit price, pa, while offsets are bought




12If all of the permits were to be auctioned, then capped sector rents would simply become
government revenue. In this setting, government revenue adjusts under a policy prescription by
the same amount that capped sector rents adjusts in the case that all permits are grandfathered.
13We abstract from dynamic aspects of cap-and-trade programs by considering a single
compliance period. These aspects include permit banking and borrowing across compliance
periods. Allowance banking and borrowing allow capped firms to smooth abatement costs over
time by shifting emissions reduction responsibilities from one year to another. This mechanism
has the effect of flattening the time path of emissions reductions and permit prices. See [99] for
a theoretical treatment of banking and borrowing. [43] estimate the cost-savings from allowing
firms to bank and borrow permits.
14Firm i’s solution is to abate its emissions if it has a marginal cost of abatement that is less than
the equilibrium permit price. In the absence of market power and transaction costs, the program
will minimize compliance costs among capped firms [92]. Furthermore, the initial allocation of
permits, ai0, will not influence the equilibrium, a manifestation of Coase’s theorem [31]. For studies
that consider market power and transaction costs, see [61] and [112].
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at the equilibrium price p f . The first-order conditions imply that the prices are
equal in equilibrium:15
pa = p f . (3.3)
Only firms with marginal cost of abatement less than ci will reduce emissions
below their BAU emission levels. These firms will reduce their emissions down














Note from these expressions that Cr can be written as a function of qr, Cr(qr), by
substituting out pa.
Uncapped Firm Problem
Uncapped firms can opt into the cap-and-trade program by voluntarily selling
offsets to capped firms.16 For an uncapped firm to generate an offset, the
regulator sets an emissions baseline for the firm. As the regulator cannot observe
15In Section 3.2, we will show that this equilibrium condition is distorted when the regulator
introduces alternative instruments to regulate the supply of offsets.
16We do not distinguish between domestic and international offsets in our analytical model. We
consider the case of international offsets in our sensitivity analysis when we expand the supply
of offsets by adjusting down the upper bound of the uncapped sector marginal abatement cost
distribution. We leave for a future exercise the joint determination of separate instruments for
domestic and international offsets.
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firm-specific BAU emissions, assigning baselines collapses to the decision of
setting a common baseline for all uncapped firms.17 We denote the common
baseline by b.18
Uncapped firm i makes two decisions. First, the firm decides whether to opt





p f (b − eiu) − ci(eiu0 − eiu)
}
. (3.6)
Firm i opts in if pii ≥ 0. If pii < 0, then firm i does not opt in and chooses eiu = eiu0.
The general behavior of uncapped firms is illustrated in Figure 3.1.19
17We adopt this assumption for simplicity. Our results are insensitive to this assumption since
the regulator only observes the aggregate distribution of BAU emissions. In practice the regulator
can assign baselines at various scales, including assigning a baseline for an entire sector. See [74]
for more details.
18In practice, baselines are assigned on a project-by-project basis and usually follow project-type
protocols. (In the California AB 32 cap-and-trade program, there is a different protocol for the four
project types that are currently allowed, including separate protocols for non-urban afforestation,
urban afforestation, livestock and ozone depleting substances.) Our assumption of a common
baseline is equivalent to a model where project-specific baselines are assigned as in [116], [89] and
[14]. In each of these models, the policy maker observes a noisy measurement of BAU emissions
for each project and assigns a baseline as a function of this measurement. As a consequence,
projects with a measurement that is higher than their BAU emissions may be assigned a baseline
that lies above its BAU emissions, as is the case for firms in areas A4 and A5 in our model. Projects
with a measurement that is lower than their BAU emissions may be assigned a baseline that
lies below its BAU emissions, represented by firms in areas A1, A2 and A3 in our model. We
represent the magnitude of the measurement noise in the models of [116], [89] and [14] by the
heterogeneity in uncapped firm BAU emissions. In both model types, the greater the measurement
noise or heterogeneity in uncapped firm BAU emissions, the greater the supply of non-additional
offsets, the lower the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions and the lower the supply of
additional offsets.
19Uncapped firms have three possible actions: do not opt in, opt in and reduce their emissions,
or opt in and do not reduce their emissions. Firms located in areas A1 and A2 do not opt in and
perform no abatement; firms located in areas A3 and A4 decide to opt in and abate the maximum
amount eiu0 − α; Firms located in A5 opt in and perform no abatement.
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Figure 3.1: Decisions of Uncapped Firms
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The horizontal axis measures marginal abatement costs of uncapped firms.
The vertical axis measures BAU emissions of uncapped firms. The horizontal
dashed line where BAU emissions equal α represents sequestration potential for
all uncapped firms. Firms in area A2 do not supply offsets because they have
marginal costs of abatement that exceed the marginal return from supplying an
offset, p f . For firms with abatement cost less than p f , the decision to supply offsets
or not depends on how much larger than the baseline b are the BAU emissions
eiu0, since this gap will have to be bridged and those abatement costs paid before
offsets can be claimed when emissions go below b. The curve separating areas A1
and A3, denoted by pi = 0, represents firms that are just indifferent to supplying
offsets. The curve is obtained by substituting eiu = α, setting the objective function
in (3.6) equal to zero and isolating eiu0:
eiu0 =
p f (b − α) + ciuα
ciu
. (3.7)






. Firms in areas A1
and A2 do not supply offsets. Firms in areas A3, A4 and A5 do supply offsets, but
these have different implications for emissions reductions. An offset is additional
if it corresponds to actual reductions in emissions. Additional offsets are sold by
firms in regions A3 and A4, as the firms in these regions sell offsets that are created
by reducing emissions. We denote the total amount of these as qu. An offset is
non-additional if it does not correspond to emissions reductions. These types of
offsets are sold by suppliers with BAU emissions below the baseline that are able
to claim offsets up to the baseline without actually reducing emissions. We denote
the total amount of non-additional offsets by ENA. Non-additional offsets are sold
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by firms in regions A4 and A5.20 A firm that is characterized by the point (c′′u , e′′u0)
opts in and earns additional and non-additional offsets since its BAU emissions
fall below b and because it chooses to reduce its emissions further to e′′u = α. But
there also exists a quantity of emissions reductions that does not create offsets.
Firms in area A3 contribute to this type of reduction, which we call under-credited
emissions reductions and denote by EUC.21 The quantity of under-credited emissions
reductions by a firm in region A3 is given by the difference between the firm’s
BAU emissions and its baseline, eiu0 − b > 0.22 A firm that is characterized by the
point (c′u, e′u0) opts in, is under-credited and earns additional offsets since its BAU
emissions lie above b and because it chooses to reduce its emissions to e′u = α. The


















(eu0 − b)dYudZu. (3.10)
20Firms in area A4 sell both additional and non-additional offsets. These are firms that are
over-credited with non-additional offsets as the baseline is above their BAU emissions. These
firms, however, also mitigate emissions because their marginal cost of mitigation is less than the
equilibrium offsets price. The firms earn additional offsets from these mitigated emissions.
21The existence of these reductions has the effect of lowering aggregate emissions. In
a companion paper, [14] use a simulation analysis to investigate the relative magnitude of
under-credited emissions reductions to non-additional offsets for different levels of offset prices
and baseline stringencies.
22[107] discusses how various policy instruments, including adjusting baselines below BAU, can
be used to achieve emissions reductions beyond those credited as offsets.
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cu(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (3.11)
3.2.2 Welfare
We define welfare as the difference between the benefits and costs of emissions
reductions. Benefits of emissions reductions are defined by the function B(·)
and satisfy B′(·) > 0. Let er0 be the pre-intervention level of emissions in the
capped sector and A be the grandfathered permits. Then q = er0 − A is the
reduction target for the regulated sector. To calculate total emissions reductions,
we need to subtract non-additional offsets, ENA, and add under-credited emissions
reductions, EUC. To get the total abatement in the capped sector, qr, we further
subtract additional offset supply from the uncapped sector, qu. With these
specifications, we write welfare W as
W = B(q − ENA + EUC) −Cr(q − ENA + EUC − qu) −Cu. (3.12)
The first-best solution equalizes marginal benefits and marginal costs of emissions
reductions across sectors. [91] studies a similar problem in the context of phase
in emissions trading programs such as Phase 1 of the Acid Rain Program where
some sources of emissions can opt in and become regulated.23 He demonstrates
that the first-best solution can be achieved by adjusting the opt-in allocation to the
23In a related paper Montero estimates the welfare effects of the opt in provision of the Acid
Rain Program. He finds that a majority of opt in units were over-allocated permits, leading to a
small increase in the aggregate emissions cap [90].
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point where all unregulated units opt in and by adjusting the capped unit permit
allocation to account for the supply of over-allocated permits. In our model, the
first best can be achieved with a similar strategy, where the baseline is set to the
point where all uncapped firms opt in and where the permit allocation is adjusted
to account for the supply of non-additional offsets. The baseline is set at the upper
bound of the uncapped sector BAU emissions distribution (b = eu0) so that every
uncapped firm opts in. The high baseline generates a supply of non-additional
offsets, ENA, that reduces aggregate emissions reductions from the program.24 To
account for this quantity, the regulator increases the reduction target q from q = q∗
to q = q∗ + ENA,where q∗ would have been the reduction target had all offsets been
additional.25
Distributional Consequences of the First-Best Solution
The mechanism for achieving the first-best solution outlined above leads to a
significant transfer of rents from the capped to the uncapped sector. The larger
reduction target for capped firms is analogous to a smaller permit allocation. The
value of the permit allocation to capped firms, V = paA, is reduced by paENA to
achieve the first best.
Therefore one should be concerned that the regulator may not be able to adjust
24This baseline choice eliminates any quantity of under-credited emissions reductions so that
EUC = 0. This is because no uncapped firm has BAU emissions above the assigned baseline.
25This is shown in the appendix. The result that the first-best solution can be achieved in the
presence of asymmetric information has been established in previous work [111, 77]. Similar to
the setting described in [91], the regulator requires two instruments to achieve the first-best, or one
instrument per market failure.
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the permit allocation to capped firms because of distributional constraints.26 In
fact, no policy to date has attempted to implement a program that would account
for non-additional offsets by transferring rents across sectors. Instead of adjusting
the initial permit allocation to account for non-additional offsets, the regulator
can regulate the market for carbon offsets directly through a variety of alternative
instruments. The use of these instruments will not be as efficient as the first-best
prescription. In other words, the inability of the regulator to adjust the permit
allocation puts us in a second-best setting.
We define the cost of this distributional constraint as the welfare cost per dollar





VS B − VFB . (3.13)
The term ∆W is defined as the non-marginal difference in welfare between
first-best setting (WFB) and a second-best setting (WS B, when the permit allocation
is fixed). The term ∆V is defined as the difference in rents to the capped sector
between first- and second-best settings (VFB and VS B, respectively).
Moving to the second-best setting by restricting the permit allocation may lead
to combinations of alternative instruments being chosen to maximize welfare. In
the next sections, we provide formulae that decompose the channels of efficiency
26Distributional concerns have traditionally played a major role in the design of cap-and-trade
programs and more generally the choice between policy instruments. As an example,
distributional concerns are the primary reason that pollution permits are typically grandfathered
instead of auctioned. Studies have explored how distributional constraints influence the cost
effectiveness of alternative instruments [21, 22] and how grandfathered permits are necessary to
keep capped firm profits unchanged [55].
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by three alternative instruments: more stringent baselines, a trade ratio and a
limit on the use of offsets. We refer the reader to appendix section A.2 for formal
derivations.
3.2.3 The Choice of Instruments in a Second-Best Setting
The Baseline
Consider a marginal reduction of the baseline assigned to uncapped firms. The
welfare effects of an incremental adjustment of the baseline are given by
∂W
∂b
= −[B′(·) − pa]∂ENA
∂b︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
dWNA
+ [B′(·) − pa]∂EUC









(pa − cu)(eu0 − α)dYudZu




Equation (3.14) comprises three sources of welfare change associated with a
marginal reduction of the baseline. First, dWNA is the non-additional offsets effect.
This is the efficiency cost of non-additional offsets. It is equal to the product of
the marginal change in non-additional offsets and the wedge between marginal
benefits and marginal costs of emissions reductions of capped firms. A lower
baseline implies a smaller mass of firms supplying non-additional offsets and a
lower quantity of non-additional offsets awarded to uncapped firms. The lower
supply of non-additional offsets can be illustrated with Figure 3.1. Areas A4 and
A5 shrink as the baseline is adjusted down. The combined effect is a reduction in
the supply of non-additional offsets. This increases capped firm compliance costs
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as the cap is effectively tightened when there are fewer non-additional offsets
supplied. Emissions benefits are higher as a consequence of the tighter cap. These
two effects are represented by the wedge between capped firm marginal benefits
and marginal costs of emissions reductions.
The second component, dWUC, is the under-credited emissions reductions effect.
This is the efficiency cost of uncapped firms providing under-credited emissions
reductions. It is equal to the product of the change in under-credited emissions
reductions and the wedge between marginal benefits and marginal costs of
emissions reductions of capped firms. A lower baseline may increase or decrease
the mass of firms contributing to under-credited emissions reductions. Based on
Figure 3.1, the top of area A1 shrinks as the profit indifference line (3.7) pivots
down. Simultaneously the bottom of area A1 expands as the baseline is pushed
down. An increase in under-credited emissions reductions lowers the supply
of additional offsets and increases total emissions reductions. A lower supply
of additional offsets increases compliance costs as fewer cheap reductions are
purchased from the uncapped sector. Emissions benefits are higher as a result
of greater emissions reductions. These two effects are represented by the wedge
between capped firm marginal benefits and costs of emissions reductions.
The non-additional offsets effect and the under-credited emissions baseline
effect influence emissions and the supply of offsets to capped firms, but do not
influence the efficiency gain from allowing capped firms to pay uncapped firms to
reduce emissions. This efficiency effect is captured in the last term, dWA, denoted
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as the additional offsets effect. It is equal to the change in the difference between
marginal costs of emissions reductions of capped and uncapped firms for the mass
of uncapped firms reducing emissions. Reducing the baseline discourages the
production of additional offsets as it lowers the compensation that all uncapped
firms receive.
The Trade Ratio
Next consider the impact of imposing an offset trade ratio between offsets and
permits, denoted by t. The trade ratio converts one offset into 1t fungible pollution
permits. A ratio greater than one implies that a capped firm must hold more
than one offset to cover one unit of emissions. A major difference between a
more stringent baseline and the trade ratio is that the latter cannot discourage
the supply of non-additional offsets because these are defined as the difference
between the baseline and BAU emissions. To decompose the welfare effects of a
trade ratio, we first explore how it impacts the problem of capped firms. A trade
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Unlike the baseline, the trade ratio creates a wedge between the prices of offsets
and permits. Holding the permit price constant, a ratio greater than one depresses
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Comparing (3.17) to (3.14) reveals three key differences between the trade ratio
and the baseline. First, the trade ratio fails to exploit the non-additional offsets
effect used by the baseline policy. That is, the trade ratio fails to directly
discourage the production of non-additional offsets. In place of the non-additional
offsets effect is the discounted offsets effect, denoted by dWD.27 This is the efficiency
cost of requiring capped firms to hold more than one offset per unit of emissions.
Raising the trade ratio above one reduces aggregate emissions as one unit of
emissions reductions from the uncapped sector converts to less than one unit
of fungible pollution permits in the capped sector.28 Second, while adjusting
the baseline has an ambiguous effect on under-credited emissions reductions,
in contrast a larger trade ratio reduces under-credited emissions reductions.
As a consequence, fewer under-credited emissions reductions increases overall
emissions. This is captured in the second term in Equation (3.17), dWUC. Third,
the trade ratio discourages the opt-in decision of uncapped firms. This can be
27In the offsets literature, discounting offsets is equivalent to establishing a trade ratio greater
than one. A discount factor of δ < 1 converts one offset into δ fungible offsets. This implies an
identity between an offset discount factor and an offset trade ratio: δ = 1t . See [75] for more details.
28This holds true whenever there is a positive supply of additional offsets. If all offsets are
non-addiitonal, then discounting will have no effect on aggregate emissions.
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seen in the additional offsets effect, dWA. A trade ratio larger than one reduces the
offsets price below the permit price, reducing the incentive for uncapped firms
to opt in, represented by the first term in dWA. The second term is similar to
the additional offsets effect in (3.14). It is equal to the change in the difference
between marginal costs of emissions reductions of capped and uncapped firms
for the mass of uncapped firms reducing emissions. Increasing the trade ratio
discourages the production of additional offsets as it lowers the offset production
revenue to uncapped firms.
The Offsets Limit
Finally consider a limit of L on the use of offsets by capped firms. An offsets
limit adds a constraint to the capped firm problem:
f ≤ L. (3.18)
With this additional constraint, the capped firm first-order conditions imply a
relationship between the prices:
p f = pa − β. (3.19)
The term β is the multiplier on the limit constraint. A binding limit (β > 0) drives
a wedge between the permit price and the offsets price.29 For a fixed permit price,
a binding limit reduces the offsets price. The offsets price is reduced until the total
29The Waxman-Markey bill did not provide details on the mechanism to distribute the offsets
if the cap is binding. What would have most likely happened would be that each firm under the
cap would be given an individual cap, similar to the way the EU-ETS has assigned separate offset
limits for each country [74]. In this case if the individual caps are binding then offsets will sell at a
discount relative to permits.
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supply of offsets equals the limit. Like the trade ratio, this feature of the limit has
the effect of reducing the supply of additional offsets while not discouraging the
supply of non-addiitonal offsets.30 This is because the supply of non-additional
offsets is independent of the offsets price. The welfare effects of adjusting a
binding limit are given by
∂W
∂L
= [B′(·) − pa]∂EUC
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A comparison of (3.20) to (3.14) reveals that the limit, similar to the trade ratio,
does not influence welfare through discouraging the supply of non-additional
offsets as the non-additional offsets effect is missing. As it is the case with
the previous two instruments, however, the limit influences welfare through
adjusting the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions, dWUC. The limit
discourages uncapped firms from participating, which lowers the quantity of
under-credited emissions reductions.
The second welfare effect seen in (3.20) is denoted by dWA. A comparison
of (3.20) to (3.17) demonstrates that the limit and the trade ratio discourage the
production of additional offsets through the same two channels. In contrast to
30The limit can influence the supply of non-additional offsets in a setting where 100 percent of
the offset supply is non-additional. In this unusual case, lowering the limit would be equivalent (in
terms of total emissions) to lowering the allocation of permits to capped firms. An optimal limit
will then be set to equate the marginal benefits and marginal costs of abatement in the capped
sector (since no abatement will be happening in the uncapped sector).
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the trade ratio, establishing a binding limit on offsets, however, unambiguously
does not reduce emissions, but instead raises emissions relative to a policy with
a non-binding limit. The under-credited emissions reductions effect is the only
component in (3.20) that has welfare adjustments from emissions changes. A more
stringent limit raises emissions because it lowers the quantity of under-credited
emissions reductions and does not require capped firms to hold more offsets per
unit of emissions.
3.2.6 Summary
In Table 3.1, we summarize how adjusting the instruments influences
emissions and offset supply. We compare how the instruments influence the
supply of non-additional offsets, the supply of additional offsets, the supply
of under-credited emissions reductions and total emissions. From the welfare
formulas, we see that the baseline is the only instrument that reduces the supply
of non-additional offsets.31 The trade ratio can reduce emissions if the discounted
offsets effect dominates the under-credited emissions reductions effect. A more
stringent offsets limit raises emissions. As the offsets limit depresses the offsets
price, the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions falls, inducing an
increase in total emissions.
31This is true unless the limit or trade ratio are selected so that there is no supply offsets, which
would occur if t = 0 or L = 0.
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Table 3.1: Marginal Emissions and Offset Supply Effects of the Offsets
Instruments
Instrumenta Non-Additional Additional Under-Credited Total EmissionsbOffsets Offsets Emissions Reductions
Baseline Decreases Decreases Ambiguous Decreases
Trade ratio No effect Decreases Decreases Ambiguous
Limit No effect Decreases Decreases Increases
a The marginal effects represent more stringent instrument choices. We consider the
marginal effect of reducing the baseline, increasing the trade ratio and reducing the limit.
b For the Baseline and Limit, the change in emissions is equal to the change in
non-additional offset supply plus the change in under-credited emissions reductions.
For the Trade Ratio, the change in emissions equals the change in non-additional offset
supply, the change in under-credited emissions reductions and the change in capped firm
emissions.
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In Table 3.2, we sign the four effects appearing in the welfare formulas. In
the first panel we consider a relaxed pre-existing cap so that marginal abatement
benefits exceed marginal abatement costs. In this case, the non-additional offsets
effect and the under-credited emissions reduction effect are both positive so
that lowering the baseline raises social welfare through these two effects.32 In
the second panel we consider a stringent pre-existing cap so that the marginal
abatement benefits are exceeded by marginal abatement costs. In this case, the
three welfare effects for adjusting the baseline down are all negative, implying
that the baseline should be increased at least until marginal abatement benefits
equal marginal abatement costs.33
32Overall welfare may decline, however, if the welfare loss from fewer additional offsets
entering the market dominates the two welfare-improving effects.
33This scenario is much less likely to occur in the beginning stages of cap-and-trade programs.
This is because virtually all proposed and existing programs start with a relaxed cap that becomes
more stringent over time.
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Table 3.2: Marginal Welfare Effects of the Offsets Instruments
(a) Relaxed Pre-existing cap (B′(·) > pa)
Instrument Non-Additional Additional Under-Credited Emissions DiscountedOffsets Effect Offsets Effect Reductions Effect Offsets Effect
Baseline Positive Negative Positive Non-existent
Trade ratio Non-existent Negative Ambiguous Positive
Limit Non-existent Negative Negative Non-existent
(b) Stringent Pre-existing cap (B′(·) < pa)
Instrument Non-Additional Additional Under-Credited Emissions DiscountedOffsets Effect Offsets Effect Reductions Effect Offsets Effect
Baseline Negative Negative Negative Non-existent
Trade ratio Non-existent Negative Ambiguous Negative
Limit Non-existent Negative Positive Non-existent
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Since the the welfare cost per dollar of avoided transfer equation (3.13) is
non-marginal, we cannot assess the magnitude of welfare losses from restricting
the use of the emissions cap by comparing the welfare formulas above.
Therefore we rely on numerical simulations to rank the instruments along several
dimensions, including the composition of offsets, total emissions, and welfare.
3.3 The Numerical Model
We now supplement the analytical model with a numerical model calibrated to
represent a United States cap-and-trade program with carbon offsets. The purpose
of the numerical model is to quantify exact welfare assessments in contrast
with the marginal effects presented above. This is relevant for comparing the
efficacy of the three instruments, providing magnitudes of the trade-offs between
efficiency and rent transfers and evaluating optimal instrument choices under the
second-best setting. We now provide a brief description of the model calibration
procedure. A complete description of the model is available in appendix sections
A.2 and A.3.
3.3.1 Model Calibration
The purpose of the numerical model is to yield generic insights that are
applicable to a range of climate mitigation programs. Even though our objective is
to quantify general relationships, we choose a specific set of parameter values to
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calibrate the model. Our central values represent abatement costs and benefits
from a federal cap-and-trade program in the United States. In particular, we
calibrate the analytical model with short-run (2015-2020) estimates of emission
reduction costs, BAU emissions and marginal benefits of emissions reductions
obtained from the literature.34 We use short-run estimates for two reasons.
First, short-run forecasts less likely to suffer from forecasting error. Second, the
problem of non-additionality is most pronounced in the short run because the
price of offsets is expected to be lowest in the short run.35 To illustrate how
alternative assumptions on costs and benefits may effect efficient policy decisions,
we consider significant departures from these central case values in the sensitivity
analysis.
The capped sector represents industries likely to be covered under a federal
greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade program. We base our representation on
the industries that would have been covered under the H.R. 2454 American Clean
Energy and Security Act, henceforth the Waxman-Markey bill, which include
coal-fired power plants, petroleum refineries, natural gas refineries, iron and steel
production, cement manufacture, among others. The capped sector is regulated
by a cap-and-trade program. We model the capped sector as a representative firm
that takes equilibrium prices as given. This is a standard assumption used to
34Alternatively we can calibrate the model with medium- or long-run estimates to quantify the
effects of the model for a longer time span. We leave this exercise for future work that incorporates
dynamics.
35What we mean by the problem of non-additionality is the ratio of non-additional to additional
offsets. When the price of offsets is low, the supply of additional offsets is low, making the ratio of
non-additional to additional offsets large.
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evaluate compliance costs of cap-and-trade programs [43]. The capped sector is
allocated a fixed quantity of emissions permits that are equal to capped sector
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions minus a reduction target. The uncapped
sector represents major sources of mitigation that will likely not be capped in a
federal climate policy. These sources include forestry and agriculture.
Data
We use estimates from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) analysis
of Waxman-Markey of BAU emissions for the capped and uncapped sectors
[36]. Capped sector marginal costs of emissions reductions are calibrated
to match extrapolated values from the EPA’s simulation of the Intertemporal
General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) for the year 2016, while uncapped sector
marginal costs of abatement are selected based on the EPA Updated Forestry and
Agriculture marginal abatement cost curves [37].
Parameters
The distributions of BAU emissions and marginal costs of emissions
reductions are assumed to be uniform. We calibrate the heterogeneity of
BAU emissions in the uncapped sector so that the percentage of offsets that
are non-additional at a carbon price of 25 dollars is 40 percent. This value
approximately matches evidence from the largest carbon offsets program in the
world, the Clean Development Mechanism. The marginal benefits of emissions
reductions, known as the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), is set at 25 dollars per
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ton of CO2 equivalent, representing estimated damages between 2015-2020 [39].
Table 3.3 summarizes the values used to calibrate the model and Table 3.4 shows
implied parameter values. The calibrated model approximately matches the
predicted compliance cost savings from including offsets in the Waxman-Markey
cap-and-trade program. Section A.3 provides more details on the calibration
procedure and data used to identify the parameters of the model.
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Table 3.3: Benchmark Data
Description Value Source
Capped sector BAU emissionsa 5,071 EPA Data Annex (2009)
Uncapped sector BAU emissions 365 EPA MAC Curves (2009)
Capped sector emissions reductions 864 EPA Data Annex (2010)
Uncapped sector emissions reductions 486 EPA MAC Curves (2009)
Uncapped sector sequestration potential 1,027 EPA MAC Curves (2009)
Percent of offsets that are non-additionalb 40 Schneider (2007)
Social cost of carbonc 25 EPA Technical Support Document (2010)
a Emissions are reported in million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
b Equal to the quantity of non-additional offsets divided by total offset supply at a baseline equal
to the expected value of uncapped firm BAU emissions.
c Represents an estimate for the year 2016 and is reported in (year 2000) dollars per ton of CO2
equivalent.
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Table 3.4: Implied Parameter Values
Parameter description Parameter Value
Capped sector lower bound of marginal costsa cr 0
Uncapped sector lower bound of marginal costs cu 0
Capped sector upper bound of marginal costs cr 147
Uncapped sector upper bound of marginal costs cu 72
Capped sector average BAU emissionsb E(er0) 5, 071
Uncapped sector average BAU emissions E(eu0) 365
Capped sector lower bound of BAU emissions er0 5, 071
Uncapped sector lower bound of BAU emissions eu0 −563
Capped firms upper bound of BAU emissions er0 5, 071
Uncapped sector upper bound of BAU emissions eu0 1, 293
a Marginal costs are reported as (year 2000) dollars per ton of CO2
equivalent.
b Emissions are reported as million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
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3.3.2 Numerical Results
This section presents results from the numerical model. To compare the offsets
instruments, we calculate the welfare effect of imposing an emissions cap under
different assumptions on the set of instruments available to the policy maker. We
emphasize the welfare effects relative to a series of benchmark settings that we
consider in the next section.
To facilitate comparisons, we simulate the model without offsets as a
benchmark. Our emphasis is on qualitative, rather than quantitative, differences
across policies. The quantitative differences can vary depending on our
assumptions for marginal abatement costs and benefits and the heterogeneity
in uncapped firm BAU emissions. Note that our analysis abstracts from other
sources of emissions changes that may plague offsets markets, including leakage
and permanence.36
Benchmark Simulations
We first examine benchmark simulations that help facilitate comparisons of the
three offsets instruments. Table 3.5 presents simulation results for our benchmark
settings. The first setting represents a cap-and-trade program that does not
include offsets. Under this setting, the allocation of permits is endogenously
chosen to maximize welfare. Welfare - defined as emission reduction benefits
36While leakage and permanence may have relevant impacts on the welfare effects of offsets
programs, we do not focus on them in our paper. Previous literature suggests that liability and
insurance or buffering programs are superior instruments for handling leakage and permanence
[93].
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minus costs - is 10.8 billion dollars.37
37The implied emissions price from the case without offsets is equal to the social cost of carbon.
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Table 3.5: Welfare and Rents Under Benchmark Settings
No Offsets Full Informationa Imperfect Informationb
Permits Optimal No Offsets setting Optimal No Offsets setting Optimal
Baselines – Firm-specific Firm-specific Mean Optimal
Welfarec 10,800 +36 % +56 % +15 % +56 %
Costs 10,800 -36 % +56 % -62 % +56 %
Benefits 21,600 0 % +56 % -23 % +56 %
Cost per ton of
emissions 12.5 8.0 12.5 6.2 12.5
reductionsd
Capped Sector
Rentse 105,170 67,310 93,024 54,827 69,815
a Defined by the policy maker observing uncapped firm-specific BAU emissions. Under this
setting, baselines are set equal to BAU emissions so that the supply of non-additional offsets
and the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions equals zero.
b Defined by the policy maker observing the distribution of uncapped firm BAU emissions.
Under this setting, a common baseline is set for all uncapped firms.
c Reported in millions of dollars in the No offsets setting. Values in the Full Information and
Imperfect Information settings are reported relative to the No Offsets setting.
d Measured in dollars per ton of CO2 equivalent.
e Reported in millions of dollars and defined as the product of the capped sector permit
allocation and the equilibrium permit price.
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Next we simulate the model assuming that the policy maker has full
information on BAU emissions. Under this assumption, the policy maker
assigns baselines equal to BAU emissions of uncapped firms, bi = eiu0. In
these simulations, adverse selection is not present and only additional offsets
are awarded to the uncapped sector and supplied to capped firms. When
the allocation of permits remains at the no offsets optimum, including offsets
increases welfare by 36 percent. The welfare change is attributed to a reduction in
compliance costs, as cheaper reductions from the uncapped sector replace more
expensive reductions in the capped sector. When the cap is re-optimized when
offsets are included, the welfare change increases to 56 percent. This increase
represents the first-best allocation of emission reductions.
The next set of simulations assumes that the policy maker has imperfect
information on BAU emissions. These settings represent the numerical version
of our analytical model. With imperfect information, the policy maker assigns
a single baseline to each uncapped firm. We consider two benchmark cases in
the presence of imperfect information. First, we consider the case where the
allocation of permits equal the no offsets optimum and the baseline equals the
expected value of BAU emissions. This setting achieves a 15 percent increase
in welfare relative to the no offsets program, a value which is significantly
lower than the full information settings. This is because adverse selection is
present. Firms in areas A4 and A5 are supplying non-additional offsets, which
increases aggregate emissions and lowers the benefits from the program. Second,
we consider the case where the policy maker can select both the allocation
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of permits and the baseline. With both instruments, the policy maker can
achieve the first best outcome. The increase in welfare of 56 percent matches
the welfare change in the full information setting that allows the policy maker
to re-optimize the permit allocation. Comparing capped sector rents across the
settings, however, demonstrates the distributional consequence of the imperfect
information first-best outcome. Capped sector rents in the imperfect information
first-best outcome are 69.8 billion dollars compared to 105.2 billion dollars in the
no offsets case. While the first-best solution achieves a significant increase in
welfare, along with it comes a rent transfer equal to roughly 30 percent of rents
under the no offsets setting.
Instrument choice
In the analytical model, we consider one instrument at a time to isolate key
welfare effects. In the numerical model we consider the welfare implications of
allowing the regulator to choose the instruments simultaneously. This allows
us to determine whether some instruments may be coupled together to achieve
higher welfare gains relative to cases when instruments are optimized one by one.
Moreover, we determine whether some instruments welfare-dominate others by
restricting them one at a time.
Table 3.6 shows optimal instrument choices under different assumptions on
the policy maker instrument choice set. Without offsets, the optimal allocation
of permits is 4, 207 MMTCO2e.38 The remaining settings include offsets in the
38In this table we report the average cost of emissions reductions (total cost divided by total
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case when the regulator has imperfect information on BAU emissions. To achieve
the first best under imperfect information, the baseline is set equal to the upper
bound of BAU emissions (b = eu0) and the permit allocation is adjusted down to
account for the supply of non-additional offsets. The trade ratio and the limit are
not utilized to achieve the first best.
emissions reductions) equal to 12.5/tCO2e.
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Table 3.6: Instrument Choice
No Offsets First Best Second Best
a
Unrestricted Baseline Ratio Limit
Permits Optimal Optimal No offsets No offsets No offsets No offsetssetting setting setting setting
Valueb 4,207 2,793 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
Baseline – Optimal Optimal Optimal Mean Mean
Valueb – 1,293 -447 -229 365 365
Trade Ratio – Optimal Optimal Restricted Optimalc Optimal 1:1 ratio
Value – 1 0.67 1 1.78 1
Limit – Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Value – Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding
a Defined as fixing the permit allocation equal to 4,207 MMTCO2e.
b Measured in million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
c The restricted optimal setting is defined by the policy maker selecting the baseline, trade ratio and limit subject
to the constraint t ≥ 1.
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Next we simulate the model under four second-best settings that are
characterized by an exogenous permit allocation set equal to the No Offsets
optimum. First, we simulate the model when the baseline, trade ratio and
limit are selected simultaneously by the policy maker. We label this scenario
as Unrestricted. Importantly - and surprisingly - the policy maker finds it
optimal to couple a trade ratio less than one with a low baseline. This finding is
robust to different parameter assumptions, as confirmed in the sensitivity analysis
below.39 From the first-order condition of the capped firm problem, a trade
ratio less than one has the effect of increasing the offsets price. A higher offsets
price encourages a larger supply of additional offsets and a larger quantity of
under-credited emissions reductions. The policy maker simultaneously adjusts
the baseline down to reduce the supply of non-additional offsets. This increases
welfare through the non-additional offsets effect as greater emissions reductions
are achieved. Adjusting the baseline down, however, reduces the welfare gains
from the additional offsets effect as fewer uncapped firms find it profitable to opt
in. A trade ratio less than one counteracts this effect by boosting up the offsets
price. This leads to a welfare gain that is represented by the additional offsets
effect in Equation (3.17).
In practice, however, it is unlikely for a policy to adopt a trade ratio less
than one.40 In addition to the effects described above, a trade ratio less than
39This can be seen in Table 3.12 by focusing on the column labeled Unrestricted.
40We are not aware of an offsets program that uses a trade ratio less than one. A recent survey
of environmental offsets programs finds that there do not exist programs assigning a trade ratio
less than one [62].
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one allows capped firms to turn one offset into more than one fungible pollution
permit. If not coupled with another instrument that lowers emissions, this has
the effect of raising aggregate emissions.41 For this reason, we consider a setting
that allows the policy maker to select the three instruments simultaneously with
the constraint that the trade ratio cannot be below one, t ≥ 1. We label this policy
as “Baseline” since we find that in this setting, only the baseline is utilized. The
optimal baseline in this setting is equal to −229 MMTCO2e, a value that is larger
(e.g. more generous) than the one from the previous setting. This is because
the policy maker can no longer encourage the production of additional offsets by
selecting a trade ratio less than one. The optimal trade ratio of one implies that it
is not used as a method of reducing emissions. A ratio larger than one can reduce
emissions but it also reduces the incentive for uncapped firms to opt in and it
distorts the decision for uncapped firms to reduce emissions. While adjusting the
baseline down also discourages uncapped firms from opting in, it does not distort
the decision for uncapped firms to reduce emissions as it does not directly reduce
the offsets price. This difference is represented by the term in the additional offsets
effect appearing in Equation (3.17) that is absent in Equation (3.14).
To compare the efficacy of the trade ratio and the limit, we remove the baseline
from the policy maker’s choice set and assume that it is exogenously set to
equal the expected value of uncapped firm BAU emissions. In this setting, the
second-best trade ratio equals 1.78, requiring capped firms to buy 1.78 offsets to
41For example, the policy maker could lower the permit allocation to capped firms or create
under-credited emissions reductions with a lower baseline.
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account for one unit of emissions. The limit remains non-binding in this case,
demonstrating that on welfare grounds, the trade ratio is a superior instrument.
This is because the trade ratio and limit both discourage under-credited emissions
reductions and the supply of additional offsets through the same mechanism -
through a reduced offsets price. But the trade ratio can reduce emissions while
the limit cannot. In fact, there is no analog to the discounted offsets effect in the
limit welfare formula.
To determine whether the limit is binding under any circumstances, we restrict
the baseline and the trade ratio to be fixed and allow the policy maker to select a
limit that maximizes welfare. The limit does not bind in this case. This suggests
that the limit cannot improve welfare in the presence of adverse selection.42
Composition of Offsets and Emissions
Table 3.7 compares the quantity of additional and non-additional offsets and
the sources of emissions reductions for each of the simulation settings. In the
first-best outcome, the supply of non-additional offsets is significant. Out of the
total offset supply of 1, 414 MMTCO2e, 928 MMTCO2e are non-additional. These
42The result that the optimal policy suggests a non-binding limit begs the question of why offset
limits offsets exist at all. Some programs that have limits explicitly state in its design summary
that offsets are suppose to be “supplemental” to emission reductions taking place among capped
firms [74]. This preference for supplementary reductions may stem from three reasons: First, it
may be that policy makers are worried that not all offsets are additional, so that a limit restricts
the potential increase in emissions. Second, it may be an ethical concern. Constituents may feel
that polluters should not be able to depend on other uncapped firms to reduce emissions for them.
Third, uncertain abatement costs with increasing cap stringency over time with unlimited offset
quantities may keep permit prices below levels sufficient to induce investment in low-emission
technologies or curb demand for high emission products [42, 34]. We thank a referee for pointing
out this third possibility.
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offsets come from the first-best instrument choice of the baseline set high enough
to encourage all uncapped firms to opt in. At this baseline choice, every uncapped
firm earns some non-additional offsets since BAU emissions are below each firm’s
baseline.
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Table 3.7: Composition of Offsets and Emissions
No Offsets First Best Second BestUnrestricted Baseline Ratio Limit
Capped sector 864 864 684 699 650 450emissions reductionsa
Uncapped sector 0 486 237 217 171 211emissions reductions
Under-credited 0 0 120 81 24 30emissions reductions
Additional offsets 0 486 117 136 162 181
Non-additional offsets 0 928 4 29 233 233
Offset supply 0 1,414 121 165 395 414
Capped sector emissions 4,207 4,207 4,388 4,372 4,421 4,621
Uncapped sector emissions 365 -121 128 148 193 154
Total emissionsb 4,572 4,086 4,515 4,520 4,614 4,775
a Emission reductions, offsets and emissions quantities are measured in million metric tons of CO2
equivalent.
b Total emissions are defined as the sum of capped and uncapped sector emissions.
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In the Unrestricted policy, non-additional offsets are close to zero. This
is because the non-additional offsets effect dominates the additional offsets
effect at the second-best optimal policy. The efficient baseline choice is so low
in this setting that very few non-additional offsets are awarded to uncapped
firms. Surprisingly, total emissions are lower in the Unrestricted setting relative
to setting when offsets are not allowed. This is because the quantity of
under-credited emissions reductions equal to 120 MMTCO2e has the effect of
lowering aggregate emissions. This effect dominates the increase in emissions
from the supply of non-additional offsets and from a trade ratio less than one.
Under the Baseline policy, additional and non-additional offset supply are
both higher than they appear in the Unrestricted policy. The Baseline policy
sets a higher baseline to uncapped firms to encourage the supply of additional
offsets. This also raises the supply of non-additional offsets from 4 MMTCO2e to
29 MMTCO2e. under-credited emissions reductions fall to 81 MMTCO2e because
the price of offsets is not boosted by a trade ratio less than one.
The Ratio and Limit policies show a substantially larger supply of
non-additional offsets of 233 MMTCO2e. This is because neither of these
instruments are capable of reducing the supply of non-additional offsets. As




We now consider the welfare impacts – emission reduction benefits less
economic costs – of the different policies. Table 3.8 presents the welfare impacts
of the four second-best policies relative to a program that does not include offsets.
The Unrestricted policy achieves the greatest welfare gain that is 35 percent
greater than the welfare impact of a program without offsets. We see that under
this policy that emission reduction benefits are 7 percent greater than the no offsets
policy. This is because under-credited emissions reductions exceed the supply of
non-additional offsets and the extra emissions from a trade ratio less than one (see
Table 3.7).
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Table 3.8: Second-Best Welfare
No Offsets Second BestUnrestricted Baseline Ratio Limit
Welfarea 10,800 +35 % +34 % +26 % +15 %
Costs 10,800 -21 % -22 % -36 % -62 %
Benefits 21,600 +7 % +6 % -5 % -23 %
a Reported in millions of dollars in the No offsets setting. Values
in the Second Best settings are reported relative to the No Offsets
setting.
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The same effect holds true for the Baseline policy which achieves an increase in
benefits of 6 percent. The Baseline policy increases welfare by 34 percent, a value
that is slightly less than the Unrestricted policy. This small difference suggests
that the combination of the discounted offsets effect and the additional offsets
is small. The additional efficiency gains from encouraging greater participation
of uncapped firms through a higher offsets price just barely exceeds the welfare
losses from higher emissions.
The Ratio and Limit policies achieve an increase in welfare that is smaller
than the efficiency gains from the Unrestricted and Baseline policies. This result
is driven by the absence of the non-additional offsets effect in the trade ratio
and limit formulas. Since neither instrument can discourage the supply of
non-additional offsets, benefits dramatically fall under these settings by 5 percent
and 23 percent, respectively. The Ratio policy achieves a higher welfare gain
compared to the Limit policy because of the discounted offsets effect. This effect
increases benefits by effectively lowering emissions via requiring capped firms
to hold more than one offset to cover one unit of emissions. Even though the
trade ratio discourages the supply of additional offsets and achieves a smaller
cost reduction of 36 percent, the discounted offsets effect more than compensates
for this as the welfare gain under the Ratio policy is 11 percentage points higher
than the welfare gain under the Limit policy.
Distributional Concerns
We now examine the distributional consequences of the policies in Table 3.9.
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Moving from a program that does not include offsets to the first-best outcome, we
see a large reduction in capped sector rents from 105, 170 million dollars to 69, 815
million dollars. Under most of the second-best settings, however, the reduction in
rents is smaller.
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Table 3.9: Distributional Effects
No Offsets First Best Second BestUnrestricted Baseline Ratio Limit
Capped sector rentsa 105,170 69,815 83,334 85,046 79,183 54,827
Permit priceb 25.00 25.00 19.81 20.22 18.82 13.03
Welfare changec 6,075 – 2,331 2,421 3,227 4,455
Avoided transferd 35,335 – 13,519 15,231 9,368 -14,988
Welfare cost per unit
of avoided transfere 0.17 – 0.17 0.16 0.34 -0.30
a Reported in millions of dollars.
b Reported in dollars.
c Defined by subtracting the welfare in the current setting from the First-Best welfare. Reported
in millions of dollars.
d Defined by subtracting the capped sector rents in the First-Best setting from the current
setting. Reported in millions of dollars.
e Defined as the ratio of the welfare change and the avoided transfer.
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To evaluate the distributional formula (3.13), we calculate two terms: First,
we require the difference between first-best welfare and the welfare from the
particular policy. We denote this value in Table 3.9 as Welfare Change. The welfare
change is the largest when offsets are not included in the program (6, 075 million
dollars) since all of the cheaper reductions from uncapped firms are not realized.
The Unrestricted and Baseline policies achieve the lowest welfare loss of 2, 331
and 2, 421 million dollars, respectively. This is because these policies are able to
encourage uncapped firms to opt in and reduce emissions. Second, we compute
the avoided transfer of rents, which is defined as the quantity of capped sector
rents in a particular policy minus the capped sector rents under the first-best
solution. The avoided transfer is the largest under the no offsets setting (35, 335
million dollars). The avoided transfers are lower under the second-best settings
because the permit price is depressed from the existence of offsets.
The Baseline policy achieves a welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer of 0.16.
This value is lower than the marginal excess burden of a labor tax of 0.40 dollars
[60]. If the regulator had to choose among the policy options of sacrificing 0.16
dollars in welfare to avoid one dollar of transfers or allowing the rent transfer to
take place but compensate capped firms through revenues generated from a labor
tax, they should choose the former as it is less costly per dollar of transfers.
The welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer is substantially lower than the
marginal excess burden. This follows from the fact that the rent transfer is
significantly larger than the welfare gain stemming from the first-best mechanism.
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This result can be explained by illustrating the first-best mechanism using
Figure 3.1. The first-best requires moving the baseline b up to b = e so that all
projects opt in. There are two sources of rent transfer from this action. First,
projects that would have opted in without the first-best implemented now are
awarded a significantly larger quantity of non-additional offsets that they sell to
the capped sector. These projects are represented by areas A3, A4 and A5. Second,
projects that would not have opted in without the first-best mechanism now opt
in and sell non-additional offsets. These projects are represented by areas A1 and
A2. Therefore every eligible project sells a significant quantity of non-additional
offsets under the first-best outcome. The rent transfer occurs to counter-act the
emissions consequences of these offsets as the policy maker reduces the allocation
of permits by an amount that is equal to the new quantity of non-additional
offsets.
The welfare gain from the first-best mechanism comes from encouraging
projects that can cheaply reduce emissions that otherwise would not have opted
in. These projects appear in area A1. The welfare gain from the first-best
mechanism will be a function of the cost-effectiveness of these projects relative to
the most expensive abatement occurring in the capped sector. This welfare gain is
likely to be substantially less than the rent transfer associated with implementing
the first best because of two reasons. First, most projects that have cheap
mitigation costs would already opt in without the first-best implemented (areas
A3 and the left of A4). Second, the size of A1 is most likely a small fraction of
the universe of eligible projects (areas A1 − A5). Since this result may depend on
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policy design parameters that we use in our central case, in the next section we
investigate various alternative assumptions to test its sensitivity.
3.4 Further Analysis
3.4.1 Alternative Baselines
Thus far we have focused on a setting where a policy maker has access to all
three offsets instruments. In some emissions trading programs, however, it may
be the case that baselines are set independently from the choice of the trade ratio
or the limit. This feature motivated our consideration of treating the baseline as
exogenous to the policy maker under the Ratio and Limit policies. Under these
policies, however, we considered a baseline set to equal the expected value of BAU
emissions. Some baseline protocols could, in practice, call for higher or lower
baselines, depending on the stringency of the offset standard. To consider how
different baselines influence outcomes for welfare and rent transfers, we simulate
the model assuming alternative baselines. In particular we set the baseline equal
to 50 percent and 200 percent of the expected value of BAU emissions. The results
appear in Table 3.10. The Low Baseline and High Baseline settings are simulated
with a baseline set to equal 50 percent and 200 percent of the expected value of
BAU emissions, respectively. For the Low Baseline case, the optimal trade ratio
is now only 1.45. The policy maker does not need to set a stringent trade ratio in
this case because the baseline has already been set low. The same intuition applies
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to the high baseline case. Here we see a higher trade ratio of 2.69 to account for a
large supply of non-additional offsets.
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Table 3.10: Alternative Baselines
Low Baseline (b = 0.5E(e0u)) High Baseline (b = 2E(e0u))
Ratio Optimal 1:1 ratio Optimal 1:1 ratio
Value 1.45 1 2.69 1
Limit Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Value Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding 0
Offset supplya 304 331 571 0
Additional offsets 155 182 121 0
Non-Additional offsets 149 149 450 0
Under-credited 38 45 7 0
emissions reductions
Welfareb 13,980 13,491 12,920 10,800
Costs 7,209 5,494 6,565 10,800
Benefits 21,189 18,985 19,485 21,600
Capped sector rents 79,705 64,721 79,307 105,170
a Offset supplies and emission reductions are reported in million metric tons of CO2
equivalent.
b Welfare, costs, benefits and rents are reported in millions of dollars.
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In contrast to our results above, we find that it is optimal to place a limit of zero
in the High baseline case. For a high baseline, the efficiency losses from higher
emissions dominate the efficiency gains from including offsets in the program.43
Therefore the optimal limit of zero is equivalent to not allowing offsets into the
program. As long as marginal benefits from abatement exceed marginal costs, the
optimal policy is to set the offsets limit to zero.44
3.4.2 Transaction Costs
Several studies have documented that transaction costs associated with the
production of carbon offsets can be non-trivial [8, 47]. We evaluate the impact
of transaction costs on the efficacy of the instruments considered by adding a 5
dollar per ton of offsets produced.45 We assign transaction costs to offset projects
in line with an analysis of Waxman-Markey by the Congressional Budget Office
[71]. This value lies within a range of transaction costs estimated in previous
work.46
43The reverse holds true if the exogenous cap is very stringent. This is because under a stringent
cap (B?() < pa) allowing extra non-additional offsets into the program improves welfare (see
Table3.2).
44Our model does not include other market failures besides the emissions externality and the
information asymmetry. When additional failures exist, such as the adoption of new technology,
binding limits my be optimal as shown in [34].




(p f − t)(b − eiu) − ciu(eiu0 − eiu)
}
. (3.21)
46For example, Antinori and Sathaye compute transaction costs for 26 carbon offset projects
around the world [8]. Their survey includes a variety of offset project types, including forestry,
energy efficiency, fuel switching, fuel capture, and renewables. These projects operated between
1991 and 2005 and were verified and monitored through different offset protocols, including the
CDM, the Chicago Climate Exchange and Climate Trust. The authors find that transaction costs
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We simulate the model with a 5 dollar per ton transaction cost and calculate
the optimal set of instruments. Our results appear in Table 3.11. We see two
results emerge from the simulations. First, transaction costs do not play a role in
determining the relative efficacy of the three instruments. This result is illustrated
by comparing Table 3.6 to the top panel of Table 3.11. For example, under
the baseline policy, it is always optimal to set a stringent baseline but keep the
trade ratio equal to one. Second, the existence of transaction costs dramatically
reduces the welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer across all of the policies,
which is reported in the last row of Table 3.11. For the unrestricted and baseline
second-best policies, the cost is less than five cents per dollar of avoided transfer.
The reason that these values are significantly smaller than those we find in
a model without transaction costs stems from the fact that a transaction cost
essentially shifts the price curve in Figure 1 to the left, which reduces the area A1.
This is the mass of uncapped firms that bring efficiency gains from the first-best
mechanism. Since the efficiency gains will be less with higher transaction costs,
the sacrifice in welfare when moving to the second-best policies will be lower.
per ton of CO2 for the surveyed projects fall within the range of 0.03 per ton of CO2 and 4.05 per ton
of CO2 with an average of 0.36 per ton of CO2. Galik et al. estimate transaction costs for US-based
forest carbon offset projects [47]. The authors used a detailed spreadsheet model that includes
dis-aggregated forest types and 10 different regions. For all project types, transaction costs are
estimated to be less than 25 percent of median implementation costs, which the authors define as
the sum of production costs and transaction costs. We follow the CBOs approach by assigning a
5 dollar per ton of CO2 to all projects as this value represents a central value to those reported in
existing studies.
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Table 3.11: Transaction Costsa
First Best Second BestUnrestricted Baseline Ratio Limit
Baseline Optimal Optimal Optimal Mean Mean
Value 1,293 -563 -351 365 365
Ratio Optimal Optimal Restricted Optimal Optimal 1:1 ratio
Value 1 0.50 1 1.68 1
Limit Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
Value Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding Non-binding
Offset supplyb 1,352 91 100 323 365
Additional offsets 424 91 88 90 132
Non-Additional offsets 928 0 12 233 233
Under-credited 0 135 7 15 22
emissions reductions
Transaction costsc 6,761 453 501 1,617 1,820
Welfare 14,179 13,926 13,364 12,621 12,094
Costsd 14,848 8,461 9,693 6,829 4,242
Benefits 30,241 22,827 23,058 19,449 16,336
Capped sector rents 69,815 84,540 92,969 81,780 60,870
∆W/∆V – 0.02 0.04 0.13 -0.23
a The simulations presented in this table include a per ton of CO2 offset transaction cost of 5 dollars.
b Offset supplies and emission reductions are reported in million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
c Transaction costs, welfare, costs, benefits and rents are reported in millions of dollars.
d Costs are equal to mitigation costs plus transaction costs.
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3.4.3 Further Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.12 summarizes the sensitivity of the numerical results to a range
of values for relevant parameters. We vary the social cost of carbon, the
upper bound of the marginal cost of emissions reductions distributions for the
capped and uncapped sectors and the benchmark percentage of offsets that are
non-additional.47 Table 3.12 displays for different parameter values the optimal
instrument choices and the welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer (∆W/∆V).
47Adjusting down the upper bound of the marginal cost distribution for uncapped firms
represents allowing more offset types into the program, which could potentially include
international offsets.
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Table 3.12: Further Sensitivity Analysis




Permitsa 3,689 1,984 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689
Baseline – 1,293 -295 -162 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.82 1 1.52 1
∆W/∆V 0.23 – 0.16 0.16 0.22 1.07
10
Permits 4,725 3,362 4,725 4,725 4,725 4,725
Baseline – 1,293 -563 -345 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.54 1 3.28 1







Permits 4,334 2,920 4,334 4,334 4,334 4,334
Baseline – 1,293 -484 -263 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.65 1 1.92 1
∆W/∆V 0.17 – 0.22 0.19 0.47 -0.22
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Permits 4,032 2,695 4,032 4,032 4,032 4,032
Baseline – 1,293 -403 -190 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.69 1 1.64 1







Permits 4,207 3,112 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
Baseline – 1,101 -371 -152 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.68 1 1.63 1
∆W/∆V 0.16 – 0.17 0.14 0.54 -0.19
47
Permits 4,207 2,222 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
Baseline – 1,620 -465 -327 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.77 1 2.01 1







Permits 4,207 2,123 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
Baseline – 1,959 -583 -386 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.65 1 2.35 1
∆W/∆V 0.12 – 0.12 0.12 0.16 -0.69
20 %
Permits 4,207 3,302 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
Baseline – 784 -294 -154 365 365
Trade Ratio – 1 0.8 1 1.63 1
∆W/∆V 0.21 – 0.33 0.26 0.66 -0.21
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Two features of the model explain the relationship between the SCC and
optimal instrument choice. First, the higher the SCC, the lower the quantity
of allowances allocated to capped firms.48 Second, the optimal quantity
of allowances and the stringency of offsets instruments move in opposite
directions.49 The lower the quantity of allowances, the more lenient the optimal
offset policy becomes.50 This will generally be the case in the second-best settings
as well. When the quantity of allowances is low, emissions are low and permit
and offset prices are high. Therefore the policy may be getting too many emissions
reductions. In response the policy maker can relax the stringency on offset projects
by raising baselines or removing the non-unitary trade ratio. When the social cost
of carbon is low (SCC = 10), the optimal permit allocation without offsets is high
(A = 4, 725). In the Baseline Policy case, the baseline is set to −365. When the
social cost of carbon is high (SCC = 40), the optimal cap without offsets is low
(A = 3, 689). In the Baseline policy, the baseline is set to −162, which is much more
lenient than the case when the cap is high.
When the SCC is high, the welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer lies below
0.40 for all of the policies with the exception of the limit policy.51 The cap is more
stringent in this setting, leading to high equilibrium permit and offset prices. As
a consequence, the share of offsets that are non-additional is lower since more
48This is because we set the exogenous quantity of allowances to the point that equalizes
marginal abatement benefits and marginal abatement costs without offsets.
49The quantity of allowances are reported as Permits in Table 3.12.
50Recall that in the first-best policy prescription, the cap is lowered and baselines to uncapped
firms are made more generous.
51Recent estimates suggest that the social cost of carbon will rise to 45 dollars in the year 2050
under a three percent discount rate [39].
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projects find it profitable to opt in and reduce emissions. Therefore the welfare
cost of the second best policies is not large relative to the rent transfer.
The results appear to be insensitive to adjusting the upper bound of the
marginal cost of emissions reductions distribution for the capped and uncapped
sectors. Optimal instrument choices move in intuitive directions as we adjust the
bounds of the uncapped sector marginal cost distribution. A higher upper bound
for the uncapped sector marginal cost distribution encourages the policy maker
to relax the stringency of the offsets instruments in the second-best settings. A
higher upper bound for the capped sector marginal cost distribution suggests that
the policy maker sets more stringent instrument choices. This occurs as a response
to a less stringent exogenous permit allocation.
Our simulation results are sensitive on our assumption for the benchmark level
of non-additional offsets. This level is related to the heterogeneity in uncapped
project BAU emissions, where a greater amount of heterogeneity implies a larger
fraction of non-additional offsets. In this section we vary the parameter values
that set the level of heterogeneity to determine how the share of offsets that
are non-additional influence our results. In the fourth panel of Table 3.12 we
vary the benchmark share of non-additional offsets between two extreme cases:
20 percent and 60 percent. The 20 percent case represents a program that sets
stringent additionality standards while the 60 percent case more closely resembles
a program with relaxed standards.52
52There exist many types of offset standards for each project type, with some that have more
stringent application and verification requirements than others. (See [76] for an excellent survey
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Changing the benchmark percentage of offsets that are non-additional has a
significant impact on the welfare cost per unit of avoided transfer. When the
benchmark percentage is low, the cost is high because capped firm rents in the
first-best setting are not much lower than they are in the second-best settings.
This occurs because the baseline does not need to be adjusted up very much to
encourage all uncapped firms to opt in, requiring a smaller reduction in permits
to capped firms to account for the supply of non-additional offsets. Under either
benchmark percentage, however, the cost per unit of avoided transfer remains
below the marginal excess burden of 0.40.
of the most popular standards.) The Waxman-Markey bill did not explicitly state that type of
standard that would be used to set baselines and verify offsets, so it is uncertain how stringent the
offset policy would have been.
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CHAPTER 4
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BASELINE SETTING IN MARKETS FOR
CARBON OFFSETS
4.1 Introduction
Complementing cap-and-trade programs with carbon offsets supplied from
uncapped sectors is recognized as a way of achieving emissions reduction targets
at lower economic cost [26, 30, 81, 10, 118]. However, awarding offsets to projects
requires the setting of a baseline that reflects the project’s BAU emissions. Offsets
are counted based on documented emissions relative to baselines. If the offset
project managers have more information on the project’s BAU emissions than
the regulator that assigns the project baseline, then the program may attract
projects that have baselines above their BAU emissions. Managers opt in these
projects into the program and can claim offsets up to their baseline while not
reducing emissions [88, 87, 97, 45]. When these offsets are sold to firms regulated
under a cap-and-trade program, overall emissions in the economy can increase
[72, 50, 106, 122].
The issue at hand is one of crediting of emissions reductions. A program
may award a project with offsets that exceeds the project’s emissions reductions,
leading to the production of offsets that we define as over-credited offsets. But
the crediting system may also lead to emissions reductions that do not generate
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offsets. A project is under-credited with a quantity of offsets that is less than the
project’s emissions reductions. This happens when a project is assigned a baseline
below its BAU emissions. These projects lower emissions more than the quantity
of offsets they earn and can reduce aggregate emissions by the difference between
the project’s baseline and its predicted BAU emissions. We call the reduction
in aggregate emissions under-credited emissions reductions. While such reductions
have been identified as a source that can counter-act the emissions consequences
of over-credited offsets [106, 48, 49], little is known about the relative importance
of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions for different
levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices.
4.2 Analytical Framework of Carbon Offset Supply
We developed a framework of carbon offset supply within a cap-and-trade
program to measure the importance of under-credited emissions reductions and
over-credited offsets and to examine the overall emissions under different levels of
baseline stringency and carbon prices. A key feature of the framework is that that
there are information asymmetries between the regulator that assigns baselines
and project managers. Economists have long studied the challenges of designing
policies in markets with imperfect information [121, 33, 77, 111]. Closely related
to our work is a strand of economics literature that examines adverse selection
issues that arise in SO2 tradeable permit markets [90, 91], incentives to reduce
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emissions from deforestation [116], design payments for environmental services
[44] and sectoral crediting of voluntary emissions reductions [89]. Some of
these studies focus on the unintended effects of over-crediting and conclude
that there exists an undesirable trade-off between reductions in the compliance
costs of cap-and-trade programs and increases in aggregate emissions. Other
studies recognize the emissions benefits under-credited emissions reductions but
do not model the magnitude of these reductions relative to over-credited offsets
[107, 48, 49]. By modeling both of these effects, we find that incorporating offsets
into cap-and-trade programs can actually reduce the overall compliance costs
of theses programs while maintaining emissions caps, provided baselines are
set sufficiently stringent. We show that the emissions effects of under-credited
emissions reductions can fully compensate for the unintended increases in
emissions from over-credited offsets, especially when carbon prices have achieved
higher values.
The framework developed here assumed that whether a project generates
offsets depends on six variables: its BAU emissions, ui, its sequestration potential,
si, its marginal costs of mitigation, ci, its assigned baseline, bi, its per ton
transaction cost, ti and the per-ton price of offsets, p. Given these, each project
manager can calculate the profitability of reducing emissions sufficiently to
generate offsets, and the optimal level of offset supply. In Figure 4.1, we divide
approved projects into different categories based on project characteristics (see the
appendix for a derivation of Figure 4.1). Project i’s BAU emissions, ui, is shown




Figure 4.1: Opt In Decisions of Potential Projects.
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The manager of an approved project can either commence with the project
(i.e. opt in into the program) or decide not to start the project (i.e. does not
opt in). Approved projects that have either high marginal costs of mitigation
or relatively low baselines are not profitable enough for the manager to opt in.
These are designated by the purple and blue cross-hashed regions in Figure 4.1.
There are some projects that are profitable enough for the manager to opt in
and have its project perform mitigation but are under-credited because they are
assigned a baseline below their BAU emissions. These are projects that fall into
the green region and are characterized by marginal costs of mitigation that are
sufficiently below the offsets price less transaction costs. Managers of projects
that are assigned a baseline above the project’s BAU emissions opt in their project
and are over-credited. These projects fall into the red region of Figure 4.1 and
would have commenced without the program taking place. This is because these
projects have marginal costs of mitigation above the offsets price less transaction
costs. The orange region in Figure 4.1 includes projects that perform mitigation
but are over-credited. These projects would not have occurred in the absence
of the program, since their marginal costs of mitigation fall below the offsets
price less transaction costs. However, they are awarded a greater quantity of
offsets than the quantity of emissions reductions they provide. In this case, the
projects earn some offsets that correspond to mitigation and some that do not
correspond to mitigation (e.g. over-credited offsets). When regulated sectors
under a cap-and-trade program can use offsets to meet the cap, the supply of
over-credited offsets lead to overall emissions increases while under-credited
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emissions reductions lead to overall emissions reductions. While under-credited
emissions reductions are critically affected by the price of offsets, over-credited
offsets are not (see the appendix for an illustration of this effect).
4.3 Numerical Simulations
We coupled our framework with numerical simulations to yield some generic
insights applicable to future carbon offset programs. Although we attempt to
convey general conclusions, we commit our analysis to specific parameters in
simulating the model. Our central case values for the parameters that influence
offset supply decisions are based on United States offset supply data, although
they can easily be generalized to include international offsets (see the appendix for
a description of the data and model calibration). The simulations are calibrated
to represent emissions reductions targets and offset supply proposed under the
2009 Waxman-Markey legislation. This bill would have allowed regulated sources
to meet up to one billion tons of their compliance obligation with purchases of
domestic offsets. Our simulations quantify how large under-credited emissions
reductions are relative to over-credited offsets for different levels of baseline
stringency and carbon prices.
We discovered that for a range of parameter values, under-credited emissions
reductions exceed the supply of over-credited offsets if baselines are set stringent
enough. Figure 4.2 shows the composition of offsets and emissions changes
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for a range of baselines on the horizontal axis, expressed as a proportion of
predicted BAU emissions. A proportion less than one implies that every project’s
baseline is less than its predicted BAU emissions. The vertical axis measures offset
supply and emissions changes in terms of million metric tons of CO2 equivalent
(MMTCO2e).
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate Change in Emissions as a Function of Baseline Stringency
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The different curves show outcomes for the supply of over-credited offsets
(OCO), aggregate change in emissions (∆E), and under-credited emissions
reductions (UCER). The aggregate change in emissions is relative to a program
that does not include offsets. If the capped sector reduction target is high and
when baselines are set to be less than 60 percent predicted BAU emissions,
under-credited emissions reductions exceed the supply of over-credited offsets
(Figure 4.2 g,h,i). For this range of baselines, emissions decrease. A higher
reduction target yields a higher equilibrium offsets price, which encourages
greater participation by project developers as the marginal returns to mitigating
emissions is higher. Therefore it is more likely for managers of projects with
assigned baselines less than their BAU emissions to opt in. This increases the
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions while having no effect on the
supply of over-credited offsets. When the degree of uncertainty on BAU emissions
is low (Figure 4.2 2g), less stringent baselines are necessary for aggregate
emissions to fall. Low BAU emissions uncertainty implies that a project is more
likely to receive a baseline that matches its BAU emissions. This has the effect of
reducing the supply of over-credited offsets since there will be fewer projects that
have baselines above their BAU emissions.
If the degree of uncertainty for predicted BAU emissions is high, it is less likely
for the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions to exceed the supply of
over-credited offsets (Figure 4.2 c,f,i). A higher degree of uncertainty implies that
projects have more extreme predicted BAU emissions. A project that has predicted
BAU emissions that are substantially larger than its BAU emissions is more likely
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to receive a baseline that exceeds its BAU emissions. The manager of this project
will likely opt in and earn over-credited offsets. On the other hand, a project that
has predicted BAU emissions that are substantially lower than its BAU emissions
is more likely to receive a baseline so low that it its manager will no longer
find it profitable to opt in its project. In this case, the project does not generate
under-credited emissions reductions. When the capped sector reduction target is
low (Figure 4.2 c), this effect is amplified as project managers have a lower revenue
incentive to opt in their project and have it mitigate emissions. In this case, project
baselines must be very stringent – less than 35 percent of predicted BAU emissions
– for the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions to exceed the supply of
over-credited offsets. For a capped sector reduction target of 2, 000 MMTCO2e
and the benchmark level of uncertainty (Figure 4.2 e), the net effect on emissions
of creating an offsets market is zero when baselines equal 70 percent of predicted
BAU emissions.
Our analysis thus far suggests that the emissions consequences of
under-credited emissions reductions can potentially cancel the emissions
consequences from the supply of over-credited offsets if baselines are stringent.
Setting baselines low, however, may eliminate a significant supply of offsets
and lead to lost opportunities [114]. This could potentially reduce much
of the cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade programs. To
determine the relationship between baseline stringencies, offset supply and cost
savings, we simulate the model under three baseline protocols. We define
the protocol denoted by ‘Predicted BAU Emissions’ by setting baselines equal
156
to predicted BAU emissions. We call the the second protocol ‘Minimize
Supply of Over-Credited Offsets’. This protocol sets baselines to ensure that
there is no supply of over-credited offsets. The third protocol, ‘Maintain
Environmental Integrity’, adjusts baselines to the point where the aggregate
supply of over-credited offsets equals the quantity of under-credited emissions
reductions. Under this protocol, the effect of including offsets in the cap-and-trade
program has no net effect on emissions as the two sources of emissions changes
cancel.
Table 4.1 reports offsets supply and emissions consequences of including
offsets in the cap-and-trade program for three capped sector reduction targets.
Panels (a), (b) and (c) report estimates for a low (short run), medium and high
(long run) capped sector reduction target, respectively. In general, the higher the
reduction target, the higher the equilibrium price of permits and offsets. This
result is illustrated by comparing the equilibrium offset prices across the three
panels. When the capped sector reduction target is low, equilibrium prices range
from 7.66 to 11.69 dollars, while with a high capped sector reduction target,
equilibrium prices range from 75.86 to 85.85 dollars.
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Table 4.1: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset supply and emissions
(a) Capped Sector Reduction Target Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
= 500 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = u˜i bi = 0 bi = 0.46u˜i
Offset Price 7.66 11.69 10.57
Percentage of projects opting in 51 7 23
Total Offset Supply 202 86 127
Exact Offsets 58 86 109
Over-Credited Offsets 144 0 17
Under-Credited Emissions Reductions 4 27 17
Total Change in Emissions 140 −27 0
(b) Capped Sector Reduction Target Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
= 2, 000 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = u˜i bi = 0 bi = 0.70u˜i
Offsets Price 38.14 47.02 40.83
Percentage of projects opting in 66 30 57
Total Offset Supply 652 338 556
Exact Offsets 505 338 497
Over-Credited Offsets 147 0 59
Under-Credited Emissions Reductions 40 112 59
Total Change in Emissions 107 −112 0
(c) Capped Sector Reduction Target Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
= 3, 500 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = u˜i bi = 0 bi = 0.77u˜i
Offsets Price 75.86 85.85 78.43
Percentage of projects opting in 74 39 68
Total Offset Supply 817 436 728
Exact Offsets 672 436 653
Over-Credited Offsets 147 0 75
Under-Credited Emissions Reductions 61 152 75
Total Change in Emissions 86 −152 0
Carbon offset prices are reported in dollars per ton of CO2e. Offset supply, emissions
reductions and changes in emissions are reported in MMTCO2e.
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Table 4.1 highlights three key findings. First, setting baselines equal to
predicted BAU emissions leads to a substantial increase in emissions. For a low
capped sector reduction target (Table 4.1, Panel (a)), there are only 4 MMTCO2e
under-credited emissions reductions, compared to 144 MMTCO2e over-credited
offsets, leading to an aggregate increase in emissions of 140 MMTCO2e. Emissions
increase because projects with baselines above their BAU emissions opt in and
receive over-credited offsets, while projects with baselines below their BAU
emissions are not as likely to opt in and generate under-credited emissions
reductions. Second, baseline protocols that attempt to fully eliminate the supply
of over-credited offsets significantly reduce the supply of offsets. Across all
three capped sector reduction target scenarios, we find that the minimize supply
of over-credited offsets protocol has a much lower supply of offsets than the
predicted BAU emissions protocol. For a capped sector reduction target of 2, 000
MMTCO2e, total offset supply is about 50 percent less under the minimize supply
of over-credited offsets protocol. Third, the maintaining environmental integrity
baseline protocol does not significantly reduce the supply of offsets as long as
offset prices are high. For a capped sector reduction target of 3, 500 MMTCO2e,
total offset supply under the maintain environmental integrity protocol is 728
MMTCO2e, which is only ten percent less than total offset supply under the
predicted BAU emissions protocol. High offset prices encourage greater fraction
of projects with baselines set below their BAU emissions. Greater participation
by these projects increase the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions.
As a consequence, as the equilibrium offsets price increases, there is less need
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for setting stringent baselines to balance the supply of over-credited offsets and
the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. This feature is illustrated by
recognizing the required baseline stringencies for the different equilibrium offset
prices. While low offset prices require very stringent baselines (Table 4.1, Panel
(a), bi = 0.46ui), high offset prices provide room for leeway (Table 4.1, Panel (c),
bi = 0.77ui). Moving from a short-run cap of 500 MMTCO2e to a medium run cap
of 2, 000 MMTCO2e – which corresponds to moving from the year 2018 reduction
target to the year 2026 reduction target under Waxman-Markey – allows the policy
to relax baseline stringencies by 50 percent. This suggests that for a one dollar
increase in the equilibrium offsets price, baselines can be increased by between
one to two percent to maintain the environmental integrity of the program.
Table 4.2 translates offset supply and equilibrium prices from Table 4.2 into
cost savings estimates from including offsets in the cap-and-trade program. We
find that the protocol that minimizes the supply of over-credited offsets severely
reduces the cost savings from incorporating offsets into the program. For a capped
sector reduction target of 2, 000 MMTCO2e, cost savings are over 50 percent
less relative to the predicted BAU emissions protocol (Table 4.2, Panel (b)). In
contrast, the maintain environmental integrity protocol does not sacrifice much
cost savings as long as the capped sector reduction target is sufficiently high.
When the target is set to 3, 500 MMTCO2e, cost savings are only about 10 percent
less relative to the predicted BAU emissions protocol. This result stems from the
fact that more stringent reduction targets generate a supply of offsets that are only
slightly less under the maintain environmental integrity protocol (Table 4.1). The
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result suggests that the trade-off between environmental integrity and compliance
cost savings is insignificant under aggressive emissions reduction targets.
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Table 4.2: The cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade programs under
alternative baseline protocols
(a) Capped Sector Reduction Target No Offsets Predicted Minimize Supply of Maint. Env.
= 500 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Mitigation 500 272 413 373
Offset Supply 0 204 86 127
Capped Sector Mitigation Costs 3,538 1,048 2,420 1,969
Uncapped Sector Mitigation Costs 0 101 314 340
Uncapped Sector Transaction Costs 0 1,019 430 636
Total Compliance Costs 3,538 2,169 3,164 2,946
Cost Savings – 1,369 374 592
(b) Capped Sector Reduction Target No Offsets Predicted Minimize Supply of Maint. Env.
= 2, 000 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Mitigation 2,000 1,350 1,661 1,442
Offset Supply 0 650 339 557
Capped Sector Mitigation Costs 56,600 25,784 39,020 29,419
Uncapped Sector Mitigation Costs 0 7,172 6,034 7,524
Uncapped Sector Transaction Costs 0 3,249 1,697 2,785
Total Compliance Costs 56,600 36,206 46,751 39,728
Cost Savings – 20,394 9,849 16,872
(c) Capped Sector Reduction Target No Offsets Predicted Minimize Supply of Maint. Env.
= 3, 500 MMTCO2e BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Mitigation 3,500 2,678 3,031 2,769
Offset Supply 0 817 434 730
Capped Sector Mitigation Costs 173,338 101,488 130,022 108,499
Uncapped Sector Mitigation Costs 0 15,036 11,507 15,115
Uncapped Sector Transaction Costs 0 4,084 2,168 3,649
Total Compliance Costs 173,338 120,608 143,698 127,263
Cost Savings – 52,730 29,640 46,075
Capped and uncapped sector mitigation are reported in MMTCO2e. Costs and cost
savings estimates are reported in millions of (year 2000) dollars.
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4.4 Implications of the Framework for Instrument and Project
Choice in Carbon Offset Programs
Concerns about the impact of over-credited offsets on total emissions have led
to the development and use of other policy instruments such as trade ratios or
offset limits [74]. Under a trade ratio, regulated firms must forgo more than
one ton of offsets to account for one ton of their own emissions. Under a limit,
regulated firms are limited in the total amount of offsets they can use to meet the
cap. The framework developed here suggests that the use of these instruments,
however, is problematic. A trade ratio effectively lowers the offsets price and,
as a consequence, cannot affect the supply of over-credited offsets. At the same
time, a lower offsets price reduces the profitability of offsets projects. This
has the undesired effect of lowering the quantity of under-credited emissions
reductions as fewer managers of projects that perform mitigation opt in their
project. Similarly, the use of limits on the quantity of offsets use by the capped
sector cannot lower emissions because it will simply lower the equilibrium price
of offsets, and thus again reduce the participation of offsets projects and the
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions.
Our framework also serves as a guide to policy makers for determining
whether certain project types should be included and when different project types
are likely to lead to increases in aggregate emissions. We link our framework
to evidence from prior studies on BAU emissions uncertainty, marginal costs of
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mitigation, potential offset supply and transaction costs to provide prescriptions
on which offset project types policy makers may find desirable (see appendix).
For example, our framework suggests that projects that have low marginal
costs of mitigation, including HFC-23 destruction and N2O abatement, are
likely to dramatically lower compliance costs without jeopardizing environmental
integrity as they provide cheap mitigation and large quantities of under-credited
emissions reductions.
In addition to the significant cost reductions that offsets bring, recent
arguments for including them in cap-and-trade programs point to the importance
of their co-benefits. For example, offsets may be worthwhile for their ability to
encourage the development of adaptation and transition toward a low-carbon
world [32]. Other experience with carbon offsetting suggests that programs
can prevent biodiversity loss and serve as a payment for ecosystem services
projects [109, 57, 69]. The additional non-GHG mitigation benefits may be
valuable enough to warrant incorporating offsets in cap-and-trade programs even
when over-credited offsets exceed under-credited emissions reductions. Baselines
calculated here can be further relaxed to account for these additional co-benefits.
4.5 Methods
Our simulation model includes an uncapped sector that is comprised
of heterogeneous projects and a capped sector represented by a single
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cost-minimizing firm. We assign values for the mitigation cost parameters
based on estimates used in the EPA’s analysis of Waxman-Markey, including
the curvature of the uncapped sector marginal cost of mitigation function [37],
proposed emissions reduction targets for Waxman-Markey [36], and the predicted
costs of capped sector mitigation [36]. We calibrate the degree of uncertainty in
uncapped project BAU emissions based on a meta-analysis on the proportion of
historical offset supply that does not correspond to mitigation [105].
Offsets are supplied by projects in the uncapped sector. For each capped sector
reduction target that we consider, we assume that a quantity of emissions permits
is grandfathered to the regulated firms that equals regulated firm BAU emissions
minus the reduction target. While others have pointed to other allocation methods
for these types of systems [55], whether permits are grandfathered or auctioned
does not change our conclusions but instead influences the distribution of rents
among firms and the regulator. The capped sector complies with the program by
holding permits, reducing emissions through abatement or buying offsets. Permit
and offset prices are solved endogenously so that the demand for permits and
offsets by capped firms equals the supply of permits by the regulator and the
supply of offsets from projects, respectively. For full details see the appendix.
The Supply of Offsets
Project managers respond to an endogenous offsets price determined in
equilibrium and the baseline set by the regulator. The change in emissions
calculations are relative to a cap-and-trade program that prohibits a capped sector
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from using offsets for compliance.




{(p − ti)(bi − ei) − ci(ui − ei)} . (4.1)
Supply decisions by project managers are based on six variables: BAU emissions
(ui), sequestration potential (si), a marginal cost of mitigation (ci) an assigned
emissions baseline (bi), a per unit transaction cost (ti) and the price of offsets that
is common to all projects (p). The manager of project i knows with certainty
its project’s BAU emissions, while the regulator only knows predicted BAU
emissions, which equal project-specific BAU emissions plus a project-specific
emissions shock. Baselines are set as a function of predicted BAU emissions.
Ex-post emissions are assumed to be common knowledge that the policy maker
can perfectly observe. The emissions shocks are independently and identically
drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation equal
to the expected value of BAU emissions. This yields an expected quantity of
over-credited offsets equal to 30 percent of total offset supply when baselines are
set to equal predicted BAU emissions in an equilibrium with a carbon price of 25
dollars per ton of CO2. This value is consistent with survey data on the proportion
of total offset supply that is non-additional [105].
Each manager’s decision whether to opt in its project and whether to mitigate
is based on (4.1). Project managers compare the profits of the different decisions
and choose the combination that yields the highest profit. Managerial decisions
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yield offset supply and under-credited emissions reductions, which are used
to calculate the change in emissions. We assume that project managers face a
5 dollar per ton transactions cost when deciding to opt their project into the
program. We consider alternative assumptions about transaction costs and find
that higher costs generally reduce under-credited emissions reductions relative to
over-credited offsets.
We generate the supply of offsets and emissions effects with a simulation
calibrated to United States emissions and mitigation cost data. We exclude a
supply of international offsets in our benchmark simulations because of the high
level of uncertainty in existing estimates for this supply. Our sensitivity analysis,
however, includes scenarios that incorporate a supply of non-U.S. offsets. We
assume that there are 1, 000 potential domestic projects that are capable of GHG
mitigation. The distribution of marginal costs of mitigation is calibrated to
match EPA forecasts of mitigation cost curves for the United States forestry and
agriculture sector [37].
For each iteration of the simulation, we generate data by drawing from the
defined distributions of each characteristic for all of the 1, 000 projects. The
projects then make profit-maximizing decisions, which lead to a supply of offsets,
under-credited emissions reductions and emissions changes. We perform 2, 000
iterations of this procedure to obtain an expected value for each of the key outputs.
The Capped Sector
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Offsets are supplied to the capped sector that must comply with an emissions
reduction target. We model the capped sector as a representative firm, an
assumption that is consistent with prior literature [43, 42]. We calibrate the
abatement cost structure of the capped sector with processed simulation output
from the EPA’s analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill [36]. The capped sector
emissions reduction target translates into a fixed supply of emissions permits.
The capped sector must hold one emissions permit or one offset for every unit
of emissions that it does not mitigate. The permit and offset prices are determined
endogenously through the market-clearing condition that the supply and demand
for each commodity are equal. We consider a wide range of capped sector
emissions reduction targets, with a central case of a medium run target of 2, 000
MMTCO2e. This is the predicted required abatement for the year 2026 in the
Waxman-Markey bill.
Sensitivity Analysis
Given these assumptions, we vary the tightness of offset project baselines,
from 20 percent to 100 percent of predicted BAU emissions, and analyze the
pattern of offset supply and emissions changes stemming from the quantity
of under-credited emissions reductions and the supply of over-credited offsets.
Sensitivity analysis around the basic assumptions including the standard
deviation of BAU emissions shocks, the offset mitigation supply curve, the
correlation between key variables, systematic bias in predicting BAU emissions
and different measures of transaction costs is reported in the appendix. In each
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section of sensitivity analysis, we report the ratio of under-credited emissions
reductions to over-credited offsets, offset supplies for broad ranges of the
parameters and how different offset protocols affect the cost savings from
including offsets in cap-and-trade programs. Tables B.9 report key model
outputs for scenarios when a larger supply of offsets is allowed into the program,
which represents a setting with international offsets. In these simulations
we assume that the supply of mitigation function is multiplied by a constant
proportion. We consider a wide range of alternative scenarios, including 25
percent (expensive mitigation opportunities) and 400 percent (cheap mitigation
opportunities). Values above 100 percent represent cases where there are cheaper
mitigation opportunities, e.g. when the program incorporates international
offsets. When there are cheaper mitigation opportunities from offsets projects,
there will be a greater quantity of under-credited emissions reductions created,
implying that baselines can be made less stringent to insure the environmental
integrity of the program.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR DESIGNING EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR CARBON OFFSETS
WITH DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
A.1 Introduction
This appendix includes derivations of the key equations provided throughout the
paper, provides details on the calibration procedure used to simulate the model
and a model validation exercise. In Section A.2, we derive all of the relevant
equations and welfare formulas that require proof. In Section A.3, we explain and
provide documentation for the calibration procedure we use to set parameters
for the simulation model. Section A.4 includes a validation exercise where we
compare the predictions of our model to simulation results of Waxman-Markey as
reported by the EPA.
A.2 The Analytical Model
A.2.1 Deriving condition (3.3)
The Lagrangian of the capped firm problem defined by (3.1)-(3.2) is
L = paai+p f f i+ci(eir0−eir)+λ(ai+ai0+ f i−eir)+µe1eir+µe2(eir0−eir)+µa(ai+ai0)+µ f f i. (A.1)
170
The first-order conditions for the two choice variables are
pa + λ, (A.2)
p f + λ. (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) yields (3.3).
A.2.2 Derivation of the first-best instrument choice
To achieve the first best, the regulator chooses a reduction target and a baseline
to maximize (3.12) subject to (3.8)-(3.11). Differentiating (3.12) with respect to the
reduction target q and setting to zero yields
B′(·) = C′r(·). (A.4)
By the definition of a well-functioning permit market, we have that B′(·) = Cr(·) =














(pa−cu)(eu−α)dYudZu = 0. (A.5)










(p f − cu)(eu − α)dYudZu = 0. (A.6)
The condition requires that the baseline be adjusted to the point where there does
not exist a wedge between marginal costs of emissions reductions for the capped
1The proof of this appears in the next section of the appendix.
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and uncapped sectors. The condition is met when the regulator sets the baseline
equal to the upper bound of the unconstrained emissions distribution, b = eu0.
With this instrument choice, all uncapped firms opt in. Moreover, there is a
significant quantity of non-additional offsets, ENA. To achieve the first best, the
regulator increases the reduction target q from q∗ to q∗ + ENA,where q∗ would have
been the reduction target had all offsets been additional.
A.2.3 Proof of C′r(·) = pa














Assuming that the relationship between qr and pa is monotonic,2 we can invert
(A.8) to define the inverse function pa(qr) that appears in (A.7). Differentiating










2This is essentially putting restrictions on the distributions of BAU emissions and compliance
costs such that the supply of abatement is upward-sloping.
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A.2.4 Deriving Equation (3.14)























Substituting pa = C′r(·) and combining like terms gives
∂W
∂b













which can be expressed as
∂W
∂b














(pa − c)(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (A.14)
Expressing the first term as benefits minus costs gives
∂W
∂b














(pa − cu)(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (A.15)
Carrying the differential in the second term yields Equation (3.14).
173
A.2.5 Deriving Equation (3.16)
The Lagrangian of the capped firm problem defined by (3.1), (3.2) and (3.15) is
L = paai+ p f f i+ci(eir0−eir)+λ
(







r0−eir)+µa(ai+ai0)+µ f f i.
(A.16)
Assuming that the firm makes offsets and permit purchases, the first-order
conditions are





Combining (A.17) and (A.18) yields (3.16).
A.2.6 Deriving Equation (3.17)
Welfare with a trade ratio is
W = B
[













where f = ENA+qu−EUC is the supply of offsets. Differentiating (A.19) with respect


































































Evaluating at t = 1 yields Equation (3.17).
A.2.7 Deriving Equation (3.19)
The Lagrangian of the capped firm problem defined by (3.1), (3.2) and (3.18) is
L = paai+p f f i+ci(eir0−eir)+λ
(





r0−eir)+µa(ai+ai0)+µ f f i+β(L− f i),
(A.22)
where β is the Lagrange multiplier for the limit constraint. Assuming that the firm
makes offsets and permit purchases, the first-order conditions are
pa + λ, (A.23)
p f + λ − β. (A.24)
Combining (A.23) and (A.24) yields Equation (3.19).
A.2.8 Deriving Equation (3.20)














Substituting pa = C′r(·) and combining like terms yields
∂W
∂L









Substituting Equations (3.8) and (3.11) into Equation (A.26) gives
∂W
∂L









(pa − cu)(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (A.27)
Carrying the differential through the second term yields Equation (3.20).
A.3 The Numerical Model
I. Equations
The aggregate cost of emissions reductions function for the capped sector is







We assume that aggregate emissions reductions occur with the cheapest sources
first, so that the emission reduction target qr is achieved at least cost. The term cˆr
denotes the marginal cost of emission reduction necessary to achieve the desired







We assume that unconstrained emissions and marginal costs of emissions























To identify the upper bound of the marginal cost distributions, we differentiate





Equation (A.33) calibrates the upper bound of the marginal cost distribution by
using data on marginal costs of emissions reductions (C′), emissions reductions
(q) and average BAU emissions (E(er0)).
The aggregate cost of emissions reductions function for the uncapped sector is






cu(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (A.34)
We assume that aggregate emissions reductions occur with the cheapest sources
first, so that the emission reduction target qu is achieved at least cost. The term cˆu
denotes the marginal cost of emission reduction necessary to achieve the desired






(eu0 − α)dYudZu. (A.35)
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We assume that unconstrained emissions and marginal costs of emissions
reductions are uniformly distributed. Equation (A.35) can be solved for cˆu:
cˆu =
qu(cu − cu)
E(eu0) − α + cu. (A.36)






E(eu0) − α + qucu. (A.37)







E(eu0) − α. (A.38)
To identify the upper bound of the marginal cost distributions, we differentiate




(E(eu0) − α). (A.39)
Equation (A.39) calibrates the upper bound of the marginal cost distribution
by using data on marginal costs of emissions reductions (C′u(qu)), emissions
reductions (qu), uncapped sector BAU emissions (E(eu0)) and sequestration
potential (α).
II. Parameter Values
Table 2 summarizes estimates from the literature that are used to calibrate
parameters of the model. Emissions units are reported in million tons of CO2
equivalent and costs are reported in dollars. Unconstrained emissions from the
capped sector are obtained from the 2009 EPA Analysis of Waxman-Markey.
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Unconstrained emissions from the uncapped sector are obtained from EPA MAC
Curves data file [37]. We assume that the uncapped sector is comprised of
agriculture and forestry so that the sum of the two sources equal the value
provided in Table 2.3 Sequestration potential is obtained by evaluating the supply
of sequestration offsets at the highest price (211 dollars) reported in the EPA’s
analysis of domestic offsets potential [37].
Emission reduction values are used to calibrate the slopes of the marginal costs
curves for each sector. We evaluate the slope of the marginal abatement cost
schedules at 25 dollars. Capped sector emissions reductions are derived from the
EPA’s simulation of the Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) for the
year 2016, yielding an abatement quantity of 864 MTCO2e when the marginal cost
of abatement equals 25 dollars.4 Uncapped sector abatement at a carbon price
of 25 dollars is obtained from EPA Updated Forestry and Agriculture marginal
abatement cost curves [37]. We use the estimates from the first decade (2010-2020).
To calibrate the benchmark percentage of offsets that are non-additional, we
rely on survey data from the CDM.5 Table A.1 summarizes recent evidence of
non-additional offsets in the CDM.
3Other significant sources of domestic offsets come from capturing methane from landfills and
coal mines. The EPA forecasts that these types of offsets will comprise less than five percent of the
total offsets potential, with the remaining 95 percent attributed to forestry and agriculture [37].
4The program significantly expands its coverage in the year 2016 to include virtually all major
point sources of CO2.
5We use the percentage of non-additional offsets in the CDM as a proxy for the United States
market because it represents the largest and most transparent offsets program in existence and is
regarded as the benchmark for new offsets programs.
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Table A.1: The Supply of Non-additional Offsets Survey
Results
Statementa Percent in agreementb
1. Many CDM projects would have also been
implemented without registration in the CDM. 71 %
2. Carbon revenues are the icing on the cake,
but are not decisive for the investment decision. 86 %
3. Carbon revenues do not significantly increase
the profitability of CDM projects. 43 %
a Survey questions and results obtained from [105].
b CDM Project developers, designated operational entities, individuals
from business, research, governments, multilateral non-governmental
organizations participated in the survey.
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The questions in Table A.1 were asked to project developers and independent
auditors of offsets projects [105]. The responses indicate strong evidence of
non-additional offsets. For example, the survey results suggest that a majority
of credits issued come from projects that would have occurred without the CDM.
[105] combines these survey responses with evidence on other CDM projects and
concludes that about 40 percent of projects constituting 20 percent of total offset
supply are non-additional. Based on Table A.1 and these figures we select a
middle-ground estimate and set the percentage of offsets that are non-additional
equal to 40 percent. Since there is significant uncertainty on this parameter value,
we adjust the percent of non-additional offsets in the sensitivity analysis.
We measure the marginal benefits from emissions reductions with the social
cost of carbon.6 The benefits from reducing emissions can be calculated by
multiplying the Social Cost of Carbon by the quantity of reduced emissions. We
set the social cost of carbon equal to 25 dollars, reflecting marginal damages from
emissions between 2016-2017 at a discount rate of 3 percent [39].
We assume that there is a point mass on the unconstrained emissions
distribution for capped firms so that er0 = er0 = E(er0) = 5, 071.
7 To calibrate the
unconstrained emissions distribution for uncapped firms, we deploy an algorithm
6The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines the social cost of carbon
as “an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon
emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net
agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the
value of ecosystem services” [39].
7Unconstrained emissions heterogeneity among capped firms does not influence the results of
our analysis.
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that calculates the bounds of unconstrained emissions such that the bounds
generate the proportion of non-additional offsets relative to the total offset supply
to equal 40 percent given an exogenous carbon price of 25 dollars and a baseline
equal to the expected value of uncapped firm unconstrained emissions. The
algorithm uses an initial set of bounds to calculate the prevailing percentage of
non-additional offsets. If the percentage does not equal 40 percent, it updates the
bounds and continues this process until the percent equals 40 percent.
Table 3 shows implied parameter values. The implied parameter values reveal
a few points worth highlighting. First, the slope of the marginal abatement cost
curve in the capped sector is about twice as shallow as the slope in the uncapped
sector, which implies that a majority of abatement is expected to come from
capped firms. Second, the gains from allowing offsets will be significant given that
the upper bound of marginal costs is lower in the uncapped sector. The marginal
abatement cost of the capped sector is lower than that of the uncapped sector by
about 50 percent for each abatement quantity. Combining the two MAC curves,
however, reduces by the marginal cost of abatement by about 30 percent relative
to the case without offsets. This reduction in compliance costs compares to the
EPA’s analysis of compliance costs with and without offsets. The EPA calculates
that compliance costs are 27.2 percent lower with offsets [36].8 Moreover, our
model predicts similar cost savings per ton of offset supplied. At an equilibrium
permit price of 25 dollars, compliance costs fall by 14.78 dollars per offset. A
8The EPA simulation does not include a scenario without domestic offsets. To determine the
cost reduction from domestic offsets, we use simulation output of Scenario 7 - No International
Offsets to extrapolate how removing the domestic supply affects abatement costs.
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similar calculation using the EPA’s analysis achieves cost savings per offset of
13.30 dollars.
III. Equilibrium
The model equilibrium is defined by a price vector (pa, p f ) that satisfy the
following condition:
q = qr(pa) + qu(p f ) + ENA − EUC(p f ). (A.40)
We use the bisection method to search for the price vector that satisfies (A.40).
A.4 Model Validation
We validate the simulation model by comparing equilibrium prices and offset
quantities for different reduction targets to EPA analysis of the Waxman-Markey
bill that uses the IGEM [36]. IGEM is a deterministic, dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates banking and borrowing behavior of regulated firms.
the EPA assumes that all offsets supplied to the capped sector correspond to
mitigation by the capped sector so that there are no over-credited offsets supplied
and so that there is no quantity of under-credited reductions. Our model, in
contrast, includes supplies of over-credited offsets and has a positive quantity
of under-credited reductions. Furthermore, our model is static and does not
include banking or borrowing. Nevertheless we demonstrate in this section that
our model provides a good approximation to IGEM.
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We simulate our model for six different reduction targets that correspond to
reported abatement requirements in the bill between years 2018 and 2030. These
targets range from 461 MMTCO2e (year 2018) to 2, 850 MMTCO2e (year 2030)
and encompass the optimal reduction target without offsets that we consider in
the paper. The reduction targets requirements and simulation outputs appear in
Table A.2.
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Table A.2: Model validation
W-M Capped Sector Permit Equilibrium permit/offset price Offset supply
Reduction Target Allocation IGEM This Study IGEM This Study
461 (year 2018) 4,610 24.42 4.72 333 66
958 (year 2020) 4,113 26.93 14.97 357 208
1,306 (year 2022) 3,765 29.69 22.15 387 308
1,654 (year 2024) 3,417 32.73 29.33 412 408
2,032 (year 2026) 3,039 36.08 37.12 432 517
2,442 (year 2028) 2,629 39.78 45.58 444 635
2,850 (year 2030) 2,221 43.86 53.99 456 752
Results for the EPA IGEM model represent Scenario 7 – No international offsets. The capped
sector reduction target corresponds to the required abatement for a given year that is based on
business-as-usual emissions projections. Equilibrium prices are reported in (year 2000) dollars.
The capped sector reduction target, permit allocation and the offset supplies are reported in
MMTCO2e. The reported offset supplies do not include non-additional offsets. The permit allocation
is calculated by subtracting the capped sector reduction target from capped sector BAU emissions.
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Our model appears to fit the EPA IGEM simulations fairly well. A few
differences between modeling outputs and assumptions are worth noting. First,
the equilibrium prices are lower in the short run and higher in the long run in our
model. For a reduction target of 958 MMTCO2e, our model predicts a permit
price of 14.97 dollars while the IGEM model predicts a permit price of 26.93
dollars. This occurs because our model does not incorporate the possibility for
the capped sector to bank permits. The EPA predicts that the capped sector would
significantly bank permits early to use later in the program. This mechanism has
the effect of increasing the scarcity of permits in short-run compliance periods
(which raises permit and offset prices) while lowering the scarcity of permits
in long-run compliance periods (which lowers permit and offset prices). As a
result, the EPA analysis has a flatter trajectory of permit prices. Furthermore, the
EPA projects that capped firms would stop banking around 2026, corresponding
to the capped sector reduction target that shows a good model fit between our
model and the EPA model. In particular, with a capped sector reduction target of
2, 032, the equilibrium permit price predicted by the IGEM model is 36.08 dollars
compared to 37.12 dollars in our model. Second, we incorporate a supply of
over-credited offsets in our model while the EPA does not. For low capped sector
reduction targets, the equilibrium price of offsets will be low, which means that a
majority of the supply of offsets is over-credited. The large supply has the effect
of depressing the equilibrium price of offsets.
186
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BASELINE SETTING IN
MARKETS FOR CARBON OFFSETS
B.1 Introduction
The supporting information includes a detailed description of our analytical
framework that underpins the numerical model; definitions of the emissions
effects; a formal derivation of the equations that are illustrated in Figure 4.1; a
comprehensive description of how we calibrate the analytical model with values
from the literature; a description of the numerical model equilibrium and output;
model validation that compares benchmark simulation output to other studies in
the literature; a section on sensitivity analysis; and a section describing how our
sensitivity analysis links back to carbon offset project types.
B.2 Analytical Framework
Here we develop an analytical model to establish the behavior of the economic
agents in the model and to define how we calculate the supply of offsets,
the supply of over-credited offsets, the quantity of under-credited reductions,




Our simulation results are based on a unified analytical model that links a
capped sector with an uncapped sector through a market for carbon offsets.
The uncapped sector is comprised of heterogeneous projects. Managers of these
projects make profit-maximizing decisions to have their projects opt in to the
program by supplying offsets to the capped sector. The capped sector represented
by a single cost-minimizing firm. The sector complies with a cap-and-trade
program by abating its emissions and purchasing offsets from the uncapped
sector.
B.2.2 Capped Sector
The capped sector represents industries likely to be covered under a federal
greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade program. We base our representation on
the industries that would have been covered under the H.R. 2454 American Clean
Energy and Security Act, henceforth the Waxman-Markey bill, which include
coal-fired power plants, petroleum refineries, natural gas refineries, iron and steel
production, cement manufacture, among others. The capped sector is regulated
by a cap-and-trade program. We model the capped sector as a representative firm
that takes equilibrium prices as given. This is a standard assumption used to
evaluate compliance costs of cap-and-trade programs [43, 42]. In addition, this
approach mimics the outcome of a set of competitive firms [84, 9]. The capped
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sector is allocated a fixed quantity of emissions permits that are equal to capped
sector business-as-usual (BAU) emissions minus a reduction target denoted by q.




{TAC(q) + p f } subject to (B.1)
q + f ≥ q. (B.2)
The objective of the capped sector is to minimize total compliance costs (TC),
which equal the sum of total abatement costs TAC(·) and the cost of purchasing
offsets. The cost of purchasing offsets is the product of the number of offsets
purchased ( f ) and the equilibrium offsets price (p). The capped sector chooses
how much to abate (q) and how many offsets to buy to minimize total compliance
costs subject to meeting the reduction target, q + f ≥ q. Note that we do not
explicitly model the equilibrium permit price. This is because we represent the
capped sector as a single, perfectly competitive firm. The equilibrium outcome
from our model is identical to the equilibrium outcome from a set of perfectly
competitive firms that can trade permits [43, 42]. If we were to explicitly provide
a permit price, it would be equal to the marginal cost of abatement of the capped
sector in equilibrium [11]. The two conditions for an optimal solution imply that
TAC′(q∗) = p, (B.3)
or that the capped sector optimal abatement q∗ is where the marginal cost of
abatement, TAC′(·), equals the equilibrium offsets price. Therefore in equilibrium,
the permit and offset prices are identical. Distortions that we do not consider in
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our model, such as a trade ratio or a limit on the use of offsets, would put a wedge
between these prices.
We assume that TAC′(·) is invertible so that condition in B.3 can be solved for
q∗ as a function of p: q∗ = q∗(p). This function defines the equilibrium quantity of
abatement by the capped sector.
B.2.3 Uncapped Sector
We assume that there are n potential projects indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. Each
project is managed independently. In our model, managers are the decision
makers and are indexed by which project they control, i = 1, 2, ..., n. A manager
will decide what to do with its potential project based on four project-specific
characteristics and the equilibrium offsets price. The four characteristics include
the marginal costs of mitigation (ci), BAU emissions (ui), sequestration potential
(si) and an emissions baseline (bi). Marginal costs are constant and are drawn from
a cumulative distributional function Z(c) with support [c, c]. BAU emissions lie
within a support [u, u] where each ui is independently drawn from the cumulative
distribution function Y(u). Project i’s sequestration potential is drawn from a
cumulative distribution function X(s) that has a support [s, s], where s < 0 and
s < 0.
Manager i observes its project’s marginal cost of mitigation, BAU emissions
and sequestration potential. We assume that the policy maker measures BAU
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emissions u˜i of each project with uncertainty. Project i’s predicted BAU emissions,
denoted by u˜i, are equal to BAU emissions plus an emissions shock εi ∼ N(0, σ2):
u˜i = ui + εi. (B.4)
Each project receives a baseline, bi, that equals a proportion of predicted BAU
emissions:
bi = αu˜i. (B.5)
The proportion α can be less than, equal to, or greater than one. Managers make
opt-in and mitigation decisions for their projects based on the profit function
pii = max
si≤ei≤ui
{(p − ti)(bi − ei) − ci(ui − ei)} , (B.6)
where p is the price of offsets and ti is a project-specific transaction cost per offset
awarded. If pii ≥ 0, then manager i opts in its project to supply a quantity of offsets
equal to f ∗i = bi − e∗i , where e∗i solves 3.6. Note that e∗i can be positive or negative,
depending on the profitability of each action. A project that sequesters emissions
has e∗i = si < 0. A project that has ei set to BAU emissions has e
∗
i = ui > 0. This
implies that even if bi = 0, project i can supply a positive quantity of offsets. In
this case, potential offset supply from project i is equal to the absolute value of si.
Finally we assume that the policy maker perfectly measures ex-post emissions e∗i
for each project i.
The supply of offsets from project i, denoted by f si , is given by
f si =





Since each project has a negative sequestration potential si < 0, even if the project’s
assigned baseline is equal to zero, they can still mitigate emissions through
sequestration, e∗i = si < 0. The total supply of offsets, denoted by f , is defined




f si (p, bi, si, ui, ti). (B.8)
Since the decision of each manager is dependent on the equilibrium price of
offsets, we denote the supply of offsets as a function of this price: f s = f s(p).
B.2.4 Equilibrium
We define an equilibrium as an offset price that equates the demand for offsets
and the supply of offsets:
f ∗ = f s(p). (B.9)
Plugging this condition into the constraint (B.2) and recognizing that the
constraint will be binding at a capped sector problem optimal solution (q∗, f ∗),
we have
q∗(p) + f s(p) = q. (B.10)
In our simulation model we assign functional forms to the model’s equations
so that the functions q∗(·) and f s(·) satisfy sufficient conditions for a unique p
to satisfy equation (B.10). This price will define the equilibrium of our model.
Given the equilibrium price, we can calculate capped firm abatement, the supply
of offsets and emissions effects that we define in the next section.
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B.3 Emissions effects
With this framework, we derive the impact of allowing the capped sector to
use offsets for compliance on emissions. We define the impact relative to a
hypothetical program that does not permit the capped sector to use offsets. If
offsets are allowed to be used for compliance, aggregate emissions may increase
or decrease relative to this hypothetical. The change in emissions is dependent
on the relative magnitudes of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions
reductions. Next we define these concepts in the context of our model. First we
distinguish between two types of offsets: Exact and over-credited. Exact offsets
are offsets that correspond to emissions reductions. The supply of exact offsets
from project i, denoted by f Ei , is given by the difference between project i’s BAU
emissions and its emissions choice:
f Ei = ui − e∗i . (B.11)
The total supply of exact offsets, denoted by f E, is defined as the sum of exact




f Ei . (B.12)
Over-credited offsets are offsets that do not correspond to emissions reductions.
The supply of over-credited offsets from project i, denoted by f OCi , is given by
f OCi =





The total supply of over-credited offsets, denoted by FOC, is defined as the sum of




f OCi . (B.14)




bi − ui, if bi − ui < 0 and e∗i < u∗i
0 otherwise.
(B.15)
The total quantity of under-credited emissions reductions, denoted by R, is





The change in emissions relative to a program without offsets, ∆E, equals the total
supply of over-credited offsets plus the total quantity of under-credited emissions
reductions:
∆E = FOC + R. (B.17)
B.4 The Creation of Figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 is constructed by solving the problem of manager i in (B.6). If ci >
p − ti, then project i’s marginal cost of mitigation exceeds the net marginal return
of mitigation. Therefore the manager has its project perform no mitigation by
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selecting ei = ui. In this case, profits are
pii = (p − ti)(bi − ui). (B.18)
If bi < ui, indicated by the purple and blue cross-hashed regions in Figure 4.1, then
pii < 0. In this case, the manager of project i will not opt in its project and will not
have it perform mitigation. If bi > ui, indicated by red region in Figure 4.1, then
pii > 0. In this case, manager i will opt in its project but will not have it perform
mitigation.
Now consider a project that has ci < p − ti. For this project, the marginal cost
of mitigation is less than the marginal return of mitigation for project i. If bi > ui,
indicated by the orange region in Figure 4.1, then pii > 0. In this case, manager
i will opt in its project and will have it mitigate by selecting ei = si. If bi < ui,
represented by the blue and green regions, then the manager’s decision depends
on the sign of (3.6). The manager will opt in its project and have it mitigate
emissions if the returns exceed the costs. The necessary condition for manager
i to opt in its project is
(p − ti)(bi − si) − ci(ui − si) ≥ 0. (B.19)
The left-hand-side represents project i’s profit if its manager chooses ei = si, while
the right-hand-side represents project i’s profit if the manager does not opt it in.
Solving (B.19) for ci yields
ci ≤ (p − ti)(bi − si)ui − si . (B.20)
The non-linear curve in Figure 4.1 represents the case when (B.20) is binding.
Managers of projects with marginal costs above the curve do not find it profitable
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to opt in their project and mitigate emissions, represented by the blue region,
while those managers of projects with marginal costs below the curve achieve
positive net revenue from opting in and mitigating emissions, represented by the
green region.
B.5 The Effect of Project Characteristics and Market Conditions
on Potential Project Decisions
To better understand how project characteristics and market conditions influence
the decisions of project managers, we present altercations of Figure 4.1 under
different scenarios. First, we adjust offset supply potential of a potential project.
Second, we adjust baseline stringencies. Third, we present Figure 4.1 under
several different market conditions, where projects face different carbon prices
or transaction costs.
B.5.1 Offset Supply Potential
Figure B.1 displays versions of Figure 4.1 that illustrate different offset supply
potentials. In Figure B.1, we vary sequestration potential si of potential project
i, which maps directly into offset supply potential: a one unit increase in
sequestration potential increases offset supply potential by one unit. Moving from
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Panels (a) to (c) represents an increase in supply potential, where a hypothetical
project described in Panel (a) has a low supply potential. Projects with low supply
potential are less likely to opt in (illustrated by the relatively large blue region) and
are less likely to be under-credited (illustrated by the relatively small green region.
The remaining regions are unaffected. This finding suggests that project types that




Figure B.2 displays versions of Figure 4.1 that illustrate different baseline
stringencies. In Figure B.1, we vary the baseline assigned to project i, bi, from
a high (lenient) baseline in Panel (a) to more conservative, low baseline in Panel
(c). Several areas are influenced by the baseline choice. First, as baselines become
more stringent (moving from (a) to (c)), the red and orange areas representing
a project that is over-credited shrink. This is because a project that faces a
relatively low baseline is less likely to have BAU emissions that lie below its
baseline. Second, as baselines become more stringent, the purple and blue areas
representing a project that is not opted in grow. This is because a potential
project that faces a relatively low baseline has less of a profit incentive to be
opted in. Third, with a more stringent baseline, the green area representing a
project that opts in and that is under-credited may shrink or grow. This is due to
two effects at play. The first effect is that a lower baseline makes it more likely
that a potential project will be under-credited if it is opted in. This stretches the
green area horizontally as seen by moving from Panel (a) to Panel (c). The second
countervailing effect is that a lower baseline reduces the incentive for a project
with BAU emissions above its assigned baseline to be opted in, which has the
effect of reducing the relative green area and increasing the relative blue area in
the lower-right quadrant of Figure 4.1. in essence, a lower baseline makes it more
likely that a project opting in is under-credited, but it also discourages projects
from being opted in.
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(a) Low Offset Supply Potential
(b) Medium Offset Supply Potential
(c) High Offset Supply Potential
Figure B.1: The effect of offset supply potential on potential project
decisions
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Given that more conservative baselines reduce the over-credited areas and has
an ambiguous effect on the under-credited area, we recognize that a marginal
reduction of project baselines will likely increase the ratio of under-credited
emissions reductions to over-credited offsets. If, however, baselines are reduced
enough, the entire area of Figure 4.1 will become dominated by the blue and
purple regions as virtually no projects are opted in. Therefore this conclusion
is limited to the extent that some projects are still worth opting in.
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B.5.3 Net Carbon Price
Figure B.3 displays versions of Figure 4.1 that illustrate the effect of different
net carbon prices on project decisions. In Figure B.3, we vary the net carbon
price faced by project i, p − ti, from a low price in Panel (a) to high price in
Panel (c). These panels emerge from either equilibrium market prices for offsets
changing or from transaction costs to project i changing. Moving from (a) to
(c) represents an increase in the equilibrium offsets prices or a decrease in the
transaction cost faced by project i, or a combination of the two. Several areas are
influenced by the net carbon price. As the net carbon price increases, projects
are more likely to be opted in and to mitigate emissions. This is represented by
an expansion of the orange and green regions and a reduction of the red and
purple regions. As a consequence, a given project is more likely to opt in and
be under-credited. This effect illustrates one of our key results that as carbon
prices increase (or as transaction costs fall), less stringent baselines are necessary
to balance over-credited offsets with under-credited emissions reductions.
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(a) High (Lenient) Baseline
(b) Average Baseline
(c) Low (Conservative) Baseline
Figure B.2: The effect of baseline stringency on potential project
decisions
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(a) Low Carbon Price and/or High Transaction Costs
(b) Average Carbon Price and Average Transaction Costs
(c) High Carbon Price and/or Low Transaction Costs




The purpose of the numerical model is to yield generic insights that other
researchers may apply to a range of climate mitigation programs. Even though
our objective is to quantify general relationships, we choose a specific set of
parameter values to calibrate the model and assign commonly used functional
forms from the literature. Our central values represent emissions and mitigation
costs of capped and uncapped sectors in the United States. The analytical
equilibrium model is calibrated to observed emissions inventory data and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates of marginal mitigation costs
and sequestration potential [36, 37, 38].
B.6.1 Capped Sector
The capped sector marginal abatement cost function, TAC′(·) is assumed to be
increasing with a constant slope that matches processed simulation output of the
EPA analysis of the U.S. Waxman-Markey bill [38]. We use processed simulation
output from the Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) for the year
2016. We set the slope of the marginal abatement cost schedule equal to 2.83×10−8
$ /ton2, so that
TAC′(q) = 2.83 × 10−8q, (B.21)
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where q denotes capped sector abatement in tons of CO2 equivalent. This implies
that the demand for offsets is
q∗(p) =
p
2.83 × 10−8 . (B.22)
Integrating (B.21) and using the endpoint condition that TAC(0) = 0 yields a
capped sector total abatement cost (TAC) schedule
TAC(q) = 1.415 × 10−8q2, (B.23)
where total costs are denoted in dollars. We assume that capped sector
required abatement, denoted by q, is equal to 500, 2, 000 and 3, 500 representing
short, medium and long run targets that are specified in the Waxman-Markey
bill[36]. These are approximate reduction targets for years 2018, 2026 and 2034,
respectively[36]. To solve for total compliance costs when offsets are not allowed,
we substitute the reduction target into (B.23).
B.6.2 Uncapped Sector
We set the number of potential projects equal to n = 1, 000. This value insures
that our fitted marginal cost of mitigation schedule closely approximates EPA
marginal cost of mitigation data that we discuss below.
We calibrate the distribution of uncapped sector BAU emissions based on EPA
projections of total annual net BAU emissions for the year 2020 [37]. These are
defined as the sum of emissions and sequestration among offset sources, which
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sum to 365 MMTCO2e per year of the program. Total Sequestration Potential
is defined as the maximum quantity of sequestration that can occur among
offset sources. We obtain a value of −1, 027 MMTCO2e by subtracting the EPA
estimate of the supply of offsets at a carbon price of 211 dollars from Total Net
BAU emissions [37]. This value represents an upper bound on the quantity of
sequestration that can occur given marginal cost of mitigation estimates [37].
We assume that the distributions for BAU emissions, sequestration potential
and marginal costs of mitigation are uniform and independently distributed. Our
results are not sensitive to correlation between BAU emissions and sequestration
potential but are modestly sensitive to correlation between these variables and
marginal costs of mitigation. We provide simulation results for cases when there
is negative or positive correlation between these distributions. After we draw
BAU emissions and sequestration for each project, we assign marginal costs of
mitigation to individual projects so that the resulting mitigation supply function
approximates a polynomial fit of the points on the supply curves used in the
EPA Waxman-Markey analysis for the year 2020 [36]. These points are plotted
in Figure B.4 along with our resulting aggregate supply function.
We take the following steps to assign marginal costs of mitigation. First, we
calculate a fifth-order polynomial that fits the points used in the EPA analysis
[36]. These points appear in Table B.1 with the corresponding fitted polynomial.
206
Table B.1: EPA Offset Supply
Estimates








F(p) = 4.2 × 10−2p − 2.2 × 10−5p2+
1.5 × 10−6p3 − 2.9 × 10−9p4 + 2.0 × 10−12p5
Offset prices are reported in dollars
per ton of CO2 equivalent. Offset
supplies are reported as million
metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
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Next we discretize the fitted polynomial into 101 offset price-supply points
starting at the offset price of zero and ending at the offset price of 100. We then
define an error function ∆(p) that measures the point-wise difference between the
fitted polynomial and the supply of mitigation schedule from the 1, 000 projects
at equilibrium offsets price p:
∆(p) = F(p) −
n∑
i=1
f Ei (p). (B.24)
Project marginal costs of mitigation are assigned through the solution to







We use the simplex search method to solve B.25 numerically. The solution to (B.25)
yields an uncapped sector supply of mitigation function plotted in Figure B.4.
As the figure shows, our algorithm generates a distribution of marginal costs of
mitigation that yields an aggregate mitigation function that precisely fits the EPA
data.
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Figure B.4: Calibrated uncapped sector supply of mitigation
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The standard deviation of the BAU emissions shocks is set to equal the
expected value of BAU emissions. At this value the expected quantity of
over-credited offsets equals 30 percent of total offset supply when baselines are
set to equal predicted BAU emissions in an equilibrium with a carbon price
equal to 25 dollars per ton of CO2e. We base this calibration on evidence on a
meta-study on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the largest operating
carbon offsets market [105]. We have three reasons for using estimates from
the CDM. First, the CDM is the largest and most transparent carbon offsets
program in existence. Second, many other offsets protocols are based on the
CDM. Third, there does not exist a comprehensive analysis on the expected supply
of over-credited offsets or the uncertainty in predicted BAU emissions for U.S.
offset providers. The study estimates that the share of offset supply that are
non-additional, or those that do not correspond to mitigation, are about 20 percent
[105]. Our definition of over-credited offsets corresponds to how this study and
others define non-additional offsets [27]. We calibrate the model such that the
benchmark supply of over-credited offsets is 30 percent to account for the fact the
composition of domestic projects in a U.S.-based program may be different than
the composition of CDM projects (e.g. with the inclusion of U.S. forestry offsets).
Moreover, we consider a wide range for the values of the standard deviation of
the BAU emissions shocks in Figure 2 and a wider range in the sensitivity analysis
to account for the uncertainty for this parameter. Larger standard deviations
generally increase the share of over-credited offsets (see Table B.4).
We assign transaction costs to offset projects in line with an analysis of
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Waxman-Markey by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [71]. The CBO
adjusts the offsets supply schedule used by the EPA (in Figure B.4) by adding a 5
dollar per ton of CO2 transaction cost. This value lies within a range of transaction
costs estimated in previous work.
Antinori and Sathaye compute transaction costs for 26 carbon offset projects
around the world [8]. Their survey includes a variety of offset project types,
including forestry, energy efficiency, fuel switching, fuel capture, and renewables.
These projects operated between 1991 and 2005 and were verified and monitored
through different offset protocols, including the CDM, the Chicago Climate
Exchange and Climate Trust. The authors find that transaction costs per ton of
CO2 for the surveyed projects fall within the range of 0.03 per ton of CO2 and 4.05
per ton of CO2 with an average of 0.36 per ton of CO2. Galik et al. estimate
transaction costs for US-based forest carbon offset projects [47]. The authors
used a detailed spreadsheet model that includes dis-aggregated forest types and
10 different regions. For all project types, transaction costs are estimated to be
less than 25 percent of median implementation costs, which the authors define
as the sum of production costs and transaction costs. In our model, if projects
have transaction costs equal to 20 percent of implementation costs, the median
transaction cost per ton of CO2 is 12.25 dollars, a value that is significantly higher
than the range reported in Antinori and Sathaye.
We follow the CBO’s approach by assigning a 5 dollar per ton of CO2 to all
projects as this value represents a central value to those reported in research
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we summarize above. Since there is substantial variability in this value, we
perform sensitivity analysis across a wide range of values, including extreme
cases of no transaction costs and 10 dollars per ton. We also consider cases in the
sensitivity analysis where transaction costs equal a fixed percentage of a project’s
implementation costs, where implementation costs equal the sum of transaction
costs and mitigation costs. These cases imply that total mitigation costs and
transaction costs are positively correlated, a condition that is consistent with the
estimation results reported in Galik et al.
Our model’s calibrated parameter values appear in Table B.2.
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Table B.2: Parameter values
Parameter description Parameter Value
Lower Bound of BAU emissions u 0
Upper Bound of BAU emissions u 0.730
Lower Bound of Sequestration Potential s −2.054
Upper Bound of Sequestration Potential s 0
Standard Deviation of Emissions Shocks σ 0.353
Transaction costs t 5 $ / ton
Slope of Capped Sector MAC 2.83 × 10−8 $ / ton2
Capped Sector Reduction Targets q {500; 2, 000; 3, 500}
Emissions and sequestration parameters are reported as million
metric tons of CO2 equivalent. The capped sector reduction
targets approximately represent years 2018, 2026 and 2034 of the
Waxman-Markey bill according to EPA capped sector emissions
forecasts [36].
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B.7 Numerical Model Equilibrium and Output
Given a sample of BAU emissions shocks, we solve for model outputs by
computing a numerical equilibrium for the model. The numerical equilibrium
is obtained by solving for an offsets price p that satisfies B.10, which we state
again for ease of exposition:
q∗(p) + f s(p) = q. (B.26)
In B.26, q∗(p) represents the capped sector quantity of abatement, f s(p) denotes
the aggregate supply of offsets and q is the capped sector reduction target.
Substituting the calibrated functions for equilibrium capped sector abatement,
q∗(p), and the supply of offsets, f s(p), yields
p
2.83 × 10−8 +
n∑
i=1
f si (p, bi, si, ui, ti) = q. (B.27)
We use a trust-region reflective search algorithm to solve for the equilibrium
offsets price specified by B.26. This algorithm searches for an offsets price
that minimizes the distance between the sum of capped and uncapped sector
abatement and the capped sector reduction target. The equilibrium offsets price
is then fed into the equations for offset supply, emissions and compliance costs.
We repeat this process 2, 000 times by drawing 2, 000 different samples of BAU
emissions shocks and solving for equilibrium prices and quantities. We average
these results and report mean values for the relevant outputs.
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B.8 Model Validation
We validate the simulation model by comparing equilibrium prices and offset
quantities for different reduction targets to EPA analysis of the Waxman-Markey
bill that uses the IGEM [36]. IGEM is a deterministic, dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates banking and borrowing behavior of regulated firms.
the EPA assumes that all offsets supplied to the capped sector correspond to
mitigation by the capped sector so that there are no over-credited offsets supplied
and so that there is no quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. Our
model, in contrast, includes supplies of over-credited offsets and has a positive
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. Furthermore, our model is static
and does not include banking or borrowing. Nevertheless we demonstrate in this
section that our model provides a good approximation to IGEM.
We simulate our model for six different reduction targets that correspond
to reported abatement requirements in the bill between years 2015 and 2040.
These targets range from 301 MMTCO2e (year 2015) to 4, 460 MMTCO2e (year
2040) and encompass our three reduction targets that we consider in the paper.
The reduction targets requirements and simulation outputs appear in Table B.3.
We report simulation outputs for the case where transaction costs equal zero to
provide a more apples to apples comparison to the EPA simulation.
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Table B.3: Model validation
Capped Sector Equilibrium permit/offset price Offset supply
Reduction Target IGEM This Study IGEM This Study
301 (year 2015) 21.10 2.83 312 54
958 (year 2020) 26.93 15.24 357 293
1,828 (year 2025) 34.36 32.95 423 508
2,850 (year 2030) 43.86 57.26 456 633
3,663 (year 2035) 55.98 79.56 534 685
4,460 (year 2040) 71.44 101.61 610 725
Results for the EPA IGEM model represent Scenario 7 –
No international offsets [36]. The capped sector reduction
target corresponds to the required abatement for a given
year that is based on business-as-usual emissions projections.
Equilibrium prices are reported in (year 2000) dollars. The
capped sector reduction target and the offset supplies are
reported in MMTCO2e. The offset supplies provided do not
include over-credited offsets. The simulation results presented
in this table do not include transaction costs to provide an
apples to apples comparison between our model and IGEM.
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Equilibrium permit and offset prices are reported in (year 2000) dollars and the
capped sector reduction target and the offset supplies are reported in MMTCO2e.
For a proper comparison, we report offset supply output that does not include
over-credited offsets. Our model appears to fit the EPA IGEM simulations fairly
well. A few differences between modeling assumptions are worth noting. First,
the equilibrium prices are lower in the short run and higher in the long run in our
model. For a reduction target of 958 MMTCO2e, our model predicts a permit
price of 15.24 dollars while the IGEM model predicts a permit price of 26.93
dollars. This occurs because our model does not incorporate the possibility for
the capped sector to bank permits. The EPA predicts that the capped sector would
significantly bank permits early to use later in the program. This mechanism has
the effect of increasing the scarcity of permits in short-run compliance periods
(which raises permit and offset prices) while lowering the scarcity of permits
in long-run compliance periods (which lowers permit and offset prices). As a
result, the EPA analysis has a flatter trajectory of permit prices. Furthermore,
the EPA projects that capped firms would stop banking around 2025 and 2030,
corresponding to the capped sector reduction targets that show good model fits
between our model and the EPA model. In particular, with a capped sector
reduction target of 1, 828, the equilibrium permit price predicted by the IGEM
model is 34.36 dollars compared to 32.95 dollars in our model. Second, we
incorporate a supply of over-credited offsets in our model while the EPA does
not. For low capped sector reduction targets, the equilibrium price of offsets will
be low, which means that a majority of the supply of offsets is over-credited.
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The large supply has the effect of depressing the equilibrium price of offsets.
This effect is seen by recognizing that the supply of over-credited offsets is 145
MMCO2e, or about three times as large as the supply of exact offsets when the
reduction target is 301 MMTCO2e.
B.9 Sensitivity Analysis
We perform sensitivity analysis by examining the key results over a wide
range of parameter values. In particular, we vary the uncertainty in predicted
BAU emissions, the marginal cost of mitigation from uncapped projects, the
correlation between BAU emissions and sequestration potential, the correlation
between BAU emissions and marginal costs of mitigation, the correlation
between sequestration potential and marginal costs of mitigation, systemic bias
in estimating predicted BAU emissions, transaction costs, and transaction costs
as a proportion of total implementation costs. Tables B.4, B.7, B.10, B.13, B.16,
B.19, B.22 and B.25 report the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to
over-credited offsets for ranges of parameters. Tables B.5, B.8, B.11, B.14, B.17,
B.20, B.23 and B.26 report how offset supplies are sensitive to various parameters
across the different baseline protocols. These tables report offset supplies relative
to the benchmark model output. Tables B.6, B.9, B.12, B.15, B.18, B.21, B.24 and
B.27 report how cost savings of including offsets in cap-and-trade programs are
sensitive to various parameters across the different baseline protocols. These
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tables report offset supplies relative to the benchmark model output. The
following cases include parameters that are varied around our benchmark
assumptions where the capped sector reduction target equals 2, 000 MMTCO2e.
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B.9.1 Standard Deviation of Emissions Shocks
The ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets appears
to be sensitive to our assumption on the uncertainty in predicted BAU emissions
(see Table B.4). When the standard deviation of emissions shocks is high (σ =
2E[u]), the ratio falls below one when baselines set to equal 60 percent of predicted
BAU emissions. In contrast, when the standard deviation of emissions shocks is
low (σ = 0.5E[u]), the ratio lies above one when baselines are set to 80 percent of
predicted BAU emissions. Lower uncertainty requires less stringent baselines to
all projects as fewer projects earn over-credited offsets.
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Table B.4: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets:
Varying the standard deviation of emissions shocks
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Standard deviation of
emissions shocks (σ)
E[u] 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
0.5E[u] 201.95 29.19 6.06 1.31 0.35
0.75E[u] 84.44 13.04 2.87 0.81 0.33
1.5E[u] 19.17 2.90 0.89 0.39 0.22
2E[u] 9.27 1.48 0.52 0.27 0.17
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Total offset supply is not sacrificed when when the standard deviation of
emissions shocks is large (see Table B.5). When the standard deviation is two
times as large as it is in our benchmark model, total offset supply declines by
only about 10 percent under the maintain environmental integrity protocol, or
about 55 MMTCO2e. This result suggests that even when there is significant
uncertainty in BAU emissions, maintaining environmental integrity by adjusting
baselines down can still be achieved without sacrificing a significant supply of
offsets. Table B.6 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the standard deviation of emissions shocks.
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Table B.5: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the standard deviation of emissions shocks
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental





E[u] 505 338 497
0.5E[u] +9.11% +10.65% +9.66%
0.75E[u] +4.36% +5.03% +4.63%
1.5E[u] −8.12% −8.28% −9.05%
2E[u] −14.65% −13.31% −15.29%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental





E[u] 652 338 556
0.5E[u] −4.29% +10.69% +4.86%
0.75E[u] −2.45% +5.03% +2.70%
1.5E[u] +4.75% −8.28% −7.01%
2E[u] +10.89% −13.61% −10.43%
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Table B.6: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the standard deviation of emissions shocks
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental





E[u] 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
0.5E[u] −7.97% +10.19% +2.15%
0.75E[u] −3.95% +4.77% +1.27%
1.5E[u] +8.73% −7.68% −4.98%
2E[u] +17.92% −12.20% −6.94%
224
Increasing the standard deviation of emissions shocks increases the difference
in cost savings between the protocols. Cost savings increase by about 18 percent
under the predicted BAU emissions protocol while they fall by about 7 percent
under the maintain environmental integrity protocol when the standard deviation
is doubled to σ = 2E[u]. There are two effects that lead to the larger difference.
First, a larger standard deviation increases the quantity of over-credited offsets,
which has the effect of lowering compliance costs when offsets are allowed. This is
seen by the increase in compliance costs savings for the predicted BAU emissions
protocol as σ increases. Second, the quantity of under-credited emissions
reductions falls as σ increases, which requires setting more stringent baselines
to all projects. More stringent baselines crowd out the supply of over-credited
and exact offsets which increases compliance costs.
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B.9.2 Supply of Mitigation
We varied the supply of mitigation schedule between one quarter and four
times the size of our benchmark model to see how the ratio of under-credited
emissions reductions to over-credited offsets depends on the scale of mitigation
opportunities in the uncapped sector. Each case represents a scenario where
we scale the supply of mitigation schedule at every given offsets price by
the percentage denoted in Tables B.7 and B.8. Table B.7 reports the ratio of
under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets. The case where
we scale the supply of mitigation to 400 percent of the benchmark model
represents a program that would incorporate a significantly larger supply of
offsets, i.e. international offsets. A greater supply of offsets increases the ratio
of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets. Increasing the
supply of mitigation to 200 percent of the benchmark model increases the ratio
from 0.61 to 0.96 when baselines are set to 80 percent of predicted BAU emissions.
This effect can be explained by the fact that the average project has lower
mitigation costs when the scope of offset supply is more broad, which encourages
greater project participation to mitigate emissions. This has the effect of increasing
the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions.
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Table B.7: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying the supply of mitigation
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions






100% 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
25% 13.36 2.11 0.50 0.18 0.08
50% 24.96 3.99 0.96 0.34 0.16
200% 79.12 11.90 2.86 0.96 0.45
400% 117.19 17.89 4.20 1.41 0.63
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Across all protocols, increasing the supply of mitigation dramatically increases
exact and total offset supply (see Table B.8). Doubling the supply of mitigation
increases total offset supply by between 44 percent and 76 percent. Moreover,
increasing the supply of mitigation boosts offset supply relatively more under
the environmental integrity protocol than it does under then predicted BAU
emissions protocol. Quadrupling the supply of mitigation doubles total offset
supply under the predicted BAU emissions protocol while it increases offset
supply by 125 percent under the maintain environmental integrity protocol. This
is because increasing the supply of mitigation only increases the supply of exact
offsets while not affecting the supply of over-credited offsets. As a result, as
there become cheaper mitigation opportunities, the supplies under the different
protocols become relatively closer.
Table B.9 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the supply of mitigation. There are two
insights from Table B.9. First, as the supply of mitigation increases, the cost
savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade programs increases. Doubling the
supply of offsets increases the cost savings by roughly 50 percent across the three
protocols. This is because with a larger supply comes cheaper reductions for a
given offsets price. Second, as the supply of mitigation increases the difference
in cost savings between the protocols declines. This is because with a larger
supply of offsets, there will be cheaper mitigation opportunities. As a result, the
average project is more likely to be opted in even in the face of a baseline below
its BAU, creating more under-credited emissions reductions. Hence, baselines can
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be made less stringent to maintain environmental integrity, leading to increased
compliance cost savings.
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Table B.8: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the supply of mitigation
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






100% 505 338 497
25% −71.29% −72.49% −73.24%
50% −44.95% −47.04% −47.08%
200% +58.22% +76.33% +63.98%
400% +125.94% +140.53 +131.79%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






100% 652 338 556
25% −55.37% −72.49% −71.94%
50% −34.97% −47.04% −46.22%
200% +44.94% +76.33% +61.51%
400% +97.39% +140.53% +125.00%
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Table B.9: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
carbon offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the supply of mitigation
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






100% 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
25% −44.31% −71.53% −69.07%
50% −27.29% −45.55% −43.02%
200% +39.01% +70.23% +54.06%
400% +72.55% +154.38% +102.75%
Cost savings are relative to a program that does not allow offsets. These savings are
reported in millions of dollars for the benchmark model. The remaining cases are
reported relative to the benchmark case.
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B.9.3 Correlation Between BAU Emissions and Sequestration
Potential
We vary the correlation between BAU emissions and sequestration potential
from significantly negative correlation (ρu,s = −0.8) to significantly positive
correlation (ρu,s = 0.8). Tables B.10 and B.11 report the ratio of under-credited
emissions reductions to over-credited offsets and offset supplies for a this range
of correlation. The reported results suggest that the model output is insensitive to
the correlation between these two random variables. With a correlation of ρ = −0.8
and baselines set to equal 80 percent of predicted BAU emissions, the ratio of
under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets is 0.57. When the
correlation is ρ = 0.8, the ratio slightly rises to 0.63 (see Table B.10).
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Table B.10: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying the correlation between BAU emissions and sequestration
potential
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Correlation
coefficient (ρu,s)
0 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
−0.8 47.65 6.93 1.63 0.57 0.27
−0.4 46.94 7.12 1.71 0.58 0.27
0.4 46.02 7.32 1.77 0.62 0.29
0.8 45.60 7.28 1.83 0.63 0.30
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Table B.11: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the correlation between BAU emissions and
sequestration potential
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 505 338 497
−0.8 +0.59% +6.51% +0.60%
−0.4 +0.20% +2.96% +0.20%
0.4 −0.20% −2.96% −0.40%
0.8 −0.59% −6.21% −0.80%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 652 338 556
−0.8 +0.31% +6.51% −0.18%
−0.4 +0.15% +2.96% −0.18%
0.4 −0.31% −2.96% 0.00%
0.8 −0.61% −6.21% 0.00%
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Table B.12 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the correlation between BAU emissions and
sequestration potential. Again we see that the correlation between these two
variables have a negligible effect on the model outputs. Under the predicted
BAU emissions protocol, compliance costs savings range from an increase of 0.55
percent (ρu,s = −0.8) to a decrease of 0.37 percent (ρu,s = −0.8).
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Table B.12: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
carbon offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the correlation between BAU
emissions and sequestration potential
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
−0.8 +0.55% +5.19% −0.74%
−0.4 +0.46% +2.52% −0.79%
0.4 −0.21% −2.68% +0.07%
0.8 −0.37% −5.72% +0.46%
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B.9.4 Correlation Between BAU Emissions and Marginal Costs
of Mitigation
We vary the correlation between BAU emissions and marginal costs of mitigation
from highly negative correlation (ρu,c = −0.8) to highly positive correlation (ρu,c =
0.8). Tables B.13 and B.14 report the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions
to over-credited offsets and offset supplies for a this range of correlation.
With baselines set equal to predicted BAU emissions, a greater correlation
between BAU emissions and marginal costs of mitigation increases the relative
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. Increasing the correlation to
ρu,c = 0.8 from ρu,c = 0 increases the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions
to over-credited offsets from 0.24 to 0.32. A positive correlation between these two
variables implies that projects with high marginal mitigation costs have high BAU
emissions. Projects with high mitigation costs require a large mitigation potential
to opt in if their baseline is below their BAU emissions. These projects, however,
will have high mitigation potential because of the imposed correlation. As a result,
more projects with baselines below their BAU emissions opt in, leading to a higher
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions.
This effect, however, is dominated by a second effect when baselines are set
below predicted BAU emissions. Projects with high mitigation costs do not opt
in when baselines are set below predicted BAU emissions because the revenue
incentive is no longer great enough. At the same time, projects with low marginal
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costs that have small BAU emissions (due to the imposed correlation) are likely
to contribute fewer under-credited emissions reductions. This is because the
difference between the baselines and the BAU emissions of these projects is likely
to be small, since baselines are positively related to BAU emissions. In other
words, a project with low BAU emissions has a lower potential for contributing
under-credited emissions reductions. Since projects with low marginal costs are
those that opt in, projects that mitigate emissions will provide less under-credited
emissions reductions in this case.
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Table B.13: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying the correlation between BAU emissions and marginal
costs of mitigation
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Correlation
coefficient (ρu,c)
0 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
−0.8 1273.79 44.75 3.86 0.70 0.24
−0.4 185.18 18.34 2.66 0.65 0.25
0.4 10.75 2.94 1.03 0.59 0.28
0.8 2.89 1.43 0.78 0.51 0.32
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Table B.14: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the correlation between BAU emissions and
marginal costs of mitigation
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 505 338 497
−0.8 −11.49% −12.72% −10.66%
−0.4 −8.91% −3.55% −5.03%
0.4 +2.57% +0.89% +1.41%
0.8 +3.02% +1.98% +2.62%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 652 338 556
−0.8 −7.52% −12.72% −14.93%
−0.4 −6.29% −3.55% −7.73%
0.4 +0.46% +0.89% +4.50%
0.8 +3.22% +1.98% +10.61%
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Table B.15 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the correlation between BAU emissions
and marginal costs of mitigation. As the correlation between BAU emissions
and marginal costs of mitigation increases, cost savings from allowing offsets
dramatically falls across all three protocols. Under the maintain environmental
integrity protocol, increasing the correlation from ρu,c = 0 to ρu,c = 0.8 reduces
cost savings by about 27 percent. This is because projects with high mitigation
costs are more likely to opt in while those with low mitigation costs are less likely
to opt in when the correlation between BAU emissions and marginal costs of
mitigation is positive. Increasing a project’s BAU emissions raises its potential
revenue from opting in with all other characteristics held constant. Assuming
a positive correlation between BAU emissions and marginal costs of mitigation
essentially sets BAU emissions low for projects with low marginal costs and
sets BAU emissions high for projects with high marginal costs. Relative to our
benchmark model where these variables are independent, assigning a positive
correlation reduces the profit incentive for low marginal cost of mitigation projects
while raising the profit incentive for high marginal cost of mitigation projects.
As a result, we see that a positive correlation increases total mitigation costs of
projects that opt in, thereby reducing cost savings from including offsets in the
cap-and-trade program.
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Table B.15: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
carbon offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the correlation between BAU
emissions and marginal costs of mitigation
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
−0.8 +48.57% +42.64% +39.75%
−0.4 +33.21% +30.27% +27.91%
0.4 −9.97% −21.19% −5.70%
0.8 −30.32% −47.77% −26.76%
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B.9.5 Correlation Between Sequestration Potential and Marginal
Costs of Mitigation
We vary the correlation between sequestration potential and marginal costs
of mitigation from highly negative correlation (ρs,c = −0.8) to highly positive
correlation (ρs,c = 0.8). Tables B.16 and B.17 report the ratio of under-credited
emissions reductions to over-credited offsets and offset supplies for a this range
of correlation. The reported results suggest that the model is modestly sensitive
to the correlation between these two random variables. With a correlation of
ρs,c = −0.8 and baselines set to equal 80 percent of predicted BAU emissions, the
ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets is 0.92. When
the correlation is ρs,c = 0.8, the ratio falls to 0.50 (Table B.16). These results suggest
that the greater the correlation between sequestration potential and mitigation
costs, the fewer the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. A positive
correlation between these two variables implies that projects with low marginal
mitigation costs have a high sequestration potential. Projects with low mitigation
costs are likely to opt in regardless of their sequestration potential. On the other
hand, projects with high mitigation costs require a large mitigation potential to
opt in if their baseline is below their BAU emissions. These projects, however,
will have low mitigation potential because of the imposed correlation. As a result,
fewer projects with baselines below their BAU emissions opt in, leading to a lower
quantity of under-credited emissions reductions.
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The reason that a negative correlation causes the proportion of under-credited
emissions reductions to increase is opposite to the case of positive correlation.
Projects with high marginal costs of mitigation are more likely to opt in because
they are likely to have a large sequestration potential. As a result, among these
projects that are assigned a baseline below BAU emissions have a greater incentive
to opt in and contribute under-credited emissions reductions. This can be seen
in Table B.16. Increasing the correlation from ρs,c = 0 to ρs,c = 0.8 increases the
ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets from 1.86
to 2.78 when baselines are set to 60 percent of predicted BAU emissions. This
relationship is further established in Table B.17. For all three protocols, increasing
the correlation between sequestration potential and marginal mitigation costs
increases the quantity of offsets from projects mitigating emissions (panel (a)) and
total offset supply (panel (b)).
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Table B.16: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying the correlation between sequestration potential and
marginal costs of mitigation
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Correlation
coefficient (ρs,c)
0 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
−0.8 87.69 12.69 2.78 0.92 0.41
−0.4 71.71 10.44 2.49 0.84 0.38
0.4 42.55 6.74 1.60 0.56 0.26
0.8 39.92 6.07 1.48 0.50 0.23
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Table B.17: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the correlation between sequestration potential
and marginal costs of mitigation
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 505 338 497
−0.8 −4.95% −45.27% −7.85%
−0.4 −1.98% −30.47% −3.62%
0.4 +11.68% +20.41% +11.67%
0.8 +12.87% +27.81% +13.68%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 652 338 556
−0.8 −4.45% −45.27% −3.78%
−0.4 −1.69% −30.47% −1.98%
0.4 +8.90% +20.41% +9.35%
0.8 +9.97% +27.81% +9.71%
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Table B.18 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets
in cap-and-trade programs as we vary the correlation between sequestration
potential and marginal costs of mitigation. As the correlation sequestration
potential and marginal costs of mitigation increases, cost savings from allowing
offsets dramatically increases across all three protocols. Under the predicted BAU
emissions protocol, increasing the correlation from ρs,c = 0 to ρs,c = 0.8 increases
cost savings by about 50 percent. A positive correlation between sequestration
potential and marginal costs of mitigation implies that projects with low marginal
costs are likely to have very large, negative sequestration potential. The more
negative the sequestration potential, the larger the offsets supply potential. As
a consequence, assuming a positive correlation implies that very large projects
will provide cheap mitigation opportunities while smaller projects are more
expensive. Since the projects with low marginal costs of mitigation will opt in,
a greater quantity of cheap offsets will be supplied. As a result, the cost savings
from including offsets in cap-in-trade programs will be greater.
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Table B.18: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the correlation between sequestration
potential and marginal costs of mitigation
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




0 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
−0.8 −57.57% −66.43% −45.06%
−0.4 −46.07% −64.00% −39.82%
0.4 +29.90% +58.21% +28.45%
0.8 +50.11% +72.75% +58.70%
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B.9.6 Systematic Bias in Predicted BAU Emissions
The benchmark model does not incorporate systematic bias, which is defined as
the tendency to consistently over- or underestimate a true value. In this section
we investigate the role that systematic bias in estimating predicted BAU emissions
may play in the relative magnitude of under-credited emissions reductions. We
model systematic bias by augmenting the baseline B.5 with a bias parameter β:
bi = αβu˜i. (B.28)
When there is no bias in estimating predicted BAU emissions, β = 1 and we are
back to our benchmark model. When predicted BAU emissions are consistently
overestimated, β > 1. When predicted BAU emissions are consistently
underestimated, β < 1. In the tables below we report the bias relative to the no
bias case. For example, if β = 1.2, we represent this bias as +20 percent.
We find that systematic bias has a significant impact on relative quantity of
under-credited emissions reductions. When there is negative bias in predicting
BAU emissions, the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets increases. The ratio is about twice as large when the bias is −20 percent
compared to the benchmark setting of no bias (see Table B.19. When there is
positive bias, the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets decreases. The ratio is about half as large when the bias is +20 percent
compared to the benchmark setting of no bias (see Table B.19).
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Table B.19: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying systematic bias in predicted BAU emissions
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Systematic Bias
No bias 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
−20% 80.34 14.07 3.86 1.34 0.59
−10% 61.26 9.94 2.55 0.87 0.40
+10% 38.16 5.22 1.20 0.43 0.21
+20% 30.08 3.80 0.88 0.33 0.17
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Incorporating bias into the analysis shifts the reference point of the baseline.
When the bias is positive, the established baseline as a fraction of predicted BAU
emissions is not as stringent as in the settings when no bias is present. This effect is
quantified in Table B.20. When baselines are set equal to predicted BAU emissions,
total offset supply dramatically increases as the bias increases. This increase in
offset supply comes from a significant expansion of over-credited offsets. In fact,
the supply of exact offsets contracts as the bias increases (panel (a)).
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Table B.20: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying systematic bias in predicted BAU emissions
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Systematic
bias
No bias 505 338 497
−20% +0.79% 0.00% +1.21%
−10% +0.40% 0.00% +0.60%
+10% −0.99% 0.00% −1.81%
+20% −2.38% 0.00% −2.41%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Systematic
bias
No bias 652 338 556
−20% −9.05% 0.00% +0.72%
−10% −4.75% 0.00% 0.00%
+10% +3.99% 0.00% −3.60%
+20% +8.90% 0.00% −1.62%
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Table B.21 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the systematic bias in estimating predicted
BAU emissions. Cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade programs
only appears sensitive to systematic bias in the predicted BAU emissions protocol.
Increasing the bias to 20 percent increases cost savings by about 9 percent. This
is because a positive bias creates a larger supply of over-credited offsets when
baselines do not adjust. When baselines are adjusted in the minimize supply of
over-credited offsets and maintain environmental integrity protocols, cost savings
are do not dramatically change with different versions of bias. This is because
the baseline can be adjusted to account for any bias in estimating predicted
BAU emissions. Any positive bias can be account for by lowering the baseline.
Likewise, any negative bias can be account for by increasing the baseline.
253
Table B.21: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the systematic bias in estimating predicted
BAU emissions
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
BAU Emissions Over-Credited Offsets Integrity
Systematic
bias
No bias 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
−20% −11.33% 0.00% +0.14%
−10% −5.49% 0.00% 0.00%
+10% +5.74% 0.00% −5.23%
+20% +11.32% 0.00% −1.86%
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B.9.7 Transaction Costs
We vary the assumption of assigning a 5 dollar per ton of CO2e transaction cost to
each project by considering a wide range of alternative values. All project types,
including those that are over-credited and those that are under-credited, are less
likely to be opted in when transaction costs are higher since the marginal revenue
from supplying an offset is less. We find that higher transaction costs have a mild
effect on the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets
(see Table B.22). Increasing the transaction cost per ton of offsets from 5 dollars
per ton to 10 dollars per ton reduces the ratio from 0.28 to 0.24 when baselines
equal predicted BAU emissions.
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Table B.22: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying offset supply transaction costs
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Transaction cost
per ton of CO2e
5 46.10 7.12 1.70 0.61 0.28
0 51.43 7.70 1.90 0.65 0.31
2.5 48.65 7.33 1.80 0.61 0.29
7.5 45.81 6.89 1.64 0.59 0.27
10 43.76 6.56 1.59 0.54 0.24
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Larger transaction costs has the effect of reducing the supply of offsets and
lowering the efficiency of incorporating offsets in cap-and-trade programs. We
find that projects facing transaction costs are less likely to be opted in to the
program. More specifically, we find that projects that supply over-credited offsets
and those that generate under-credited emissions reductions are both less likely
to participate. The sacrifice in total offset supply by maintaining environmental
integrity does not change much when transaction costs are incorporated (see
Table B.23).
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Table B.23: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the offset supply transaction cost
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




5 505 338 497
0 +6.53% +5.62% +5.63%
2.5 +3.56% +3.25% +2.82%
7.5 −3.76% −2.96% −3.62%
10 −11.88% −6.51% −7.04%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




5 652 338 556
0 +5.06% +5.62% +4.14%
2.5 +2.61% +3.25% +1.62%
7.5 −3.22% −2.96% −4.14%
10 −9.36% −6.51% −6.30%
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Table B.24 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary the per ton of CO2 transaction cost. Increasing
transaction costs lowers cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade
programs. The effect, however, is mild. Doubling the per unit transaction cost
from 5 dollars per ton to 10 dollars per ton reduces cost savings by about three
billion dollars for each protocol, which is approximately a 15 percent reduction.
The reason that cost savings are not more sensitive to higher transaction costs
is primarily due to the equilibrium offsets price. In these sensitivity runs we
assume a medium run capped sector reduction target of 2, 000 MMTCO2e, which
creates an equilibrium offsets price of between 38 dollars and 47 dollars per ton.
Most projects that are opted in have marginal costs of mitigation well below the
equilibrium offsets price, which means that a 10 per ton transaction cost will not
discourage them from being opted in. If, however, equilibrium offsets prices are
much lower, e.g. 15 dollars per ton, doubling the transaction cost is likely to have
a very significant effect on compliance cost savings from offsets.
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Table B.24: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the per ton of CO2 transaction cost
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental




5 20, 394 9, 849 16, 872
0 +16.32% +16.86% +17.27%
2.5 +8.02% +8.85% +8.33%
7.5 −7.92% −8.51% −9.30%
10 −12.30% −17.07% −17.73%
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B.9.8 Transaction Costs as a Fraction of Total Implementation
Costs
In our benchmark model we assume that each project faces a fixed transaction
cost equal to 5 dollars per ton of CO2e independent of project characteristics.
In this section we relax this assumption by allowing transaction costs be a
function of total implementation costs. There is some evidence that projects with
low production costs have low per unit transaction costs[47]. Here we assume
that transaction costs are proportional to total implementation costs, which are
defined as transaction costs plus mitigation costs. Previous literature suggests
that transaction costs are under 25 percent of total implementation costs[8, 47].
Therefore we consider the range 0 to 20 percent.
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Table B.25: Ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited
offsets: Varying the fraction of implementation costs that are transaction
costs
Baseline relative to predicted BAU emissions





10% 56.08 8.33 2.09 0.74 0.36
0% 48.76 7.60 1.88 0.66 0.31
5% 50.76 7.56 1.82 0.65 0.30
15% 65.87 9.87 2.44 0.85 0.41
20% 67.73 10.53 2.55 0.91 0.44
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As the fraction of transaction costs increases, the ratio of under-credited
emissions reductions to over-credited offsets increases. The ratio increases from
1.88 when there are no transaction costs to 2.55 when transaction costs are 20
percent of total implementation costs with baselines set to 60 percent of predicted
BAU emissions. This is because the subset of projects that opt in and earn
only over-credited offsets are those that have remarkably high marginal costs
of mitigation. (If they had low marginal costs of mitigation, they would have
been opted in and performed mitigation.) These projects are disproportionally
burdened by increasing the fraction of total implementation costs that come from
transaction costs. As a result, fewer over-credited projects are likely to opt in as
the fraction increases. This effect is illustrated in Table B.26. Even though exact
offsets fall as transaction costs increase (panel (a)), total offsets supply falls much
more (panel (b)), suggesting that a significant quantity of over-credited offsets are
no longer supplied.
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Table B.26: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on offset
supply: Varying the fraction of implementation costs that are
transaction costs
(a) Exact Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






10% 518 343 506
0% +4.05% +4.08% +3.75%
5% +1.54% +2.33% +1.78%
15% −1.54% −1.75% −1.78%
20% −4.25% −4.96% −3.36%
(b) Total Offsets Supply
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






10% 640 343 557
0% +6.88% +4.08% +4.13%
5% +5.16% +2.33% +2.15%
15% −4.22% −1.75% −1.80%
20% −7.66% −4.96% −2.87%
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Table B.27 reports the sensitivity of cost savings from including offsets in
cap-and-trade programs as we vary fraction of implementation costs that are
transaction costs. Increasing the proportion of implementation costs that are
transaction costs lowers cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade
programs. The effect, however, is even more mild than the effect from increasing
a flat transaction cost to all projects (see Table B.24). Doubling the transaction
cost fraction of total implementation costs from 10 percent 20 percent reduces
cost savings by about 2.5 to 5 percent for the different protocols. Cost savings
are not very sensitive to increasing the fraction of total implementation costs
that are transaction costs because most projects that are opted in have very low
implementation costs to begin with. For example, if many projects have marginal
costs of mitigation of 5 per ton of CO2 or less, then their transaction cost per ton
will be under 1 dollar per ton of CO2 when the fraction is 20 percent, for a total
marginal implementation cost of less than 5 + 1 = 6 dollars per ton of CO2. This
increase in implementation costs is relatively small if the equilibrium offsets price
is high as it is under a medium run capped sector reduction target.
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Table B.27: The effect of alternative baseline protocols on cost savings from including
offsets in cap-and-trade programs: Varying the fraction of implementation costs that are
transaction costs
Predicted Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental






10% 20, 907 11, 064 17, 985
0% +13.69% +4.59% +7.79%
5% +6.43% +2.58% +3.17%
15% −4.84% −2.72% −1.92%
20% −8.25% −6.21% −3.41%
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B.10 Project Characteristics
In this section of the appendix we describe how the results from the sensitivity
analysis can provide guidance to policy makers as they consider which offset
project types to include in cap-and-trade programs. We characterize ten different
project types by four key parameters that we vary in the sensitivity analysis.
These project types are a relevant subset of the entire universe of offset project
types. We selected them based on their prominence and acceptance in existing
cap-and-trade programs.[71, 23, 1, 105] This analysis serves as a guide for policy
makers considering how to treat different project type with regards to baseline
stringency, discounting, and outright banning. Although U.S. federal legislation
did not specify guidelines on how to treat different project types and which project
types would be allowed in Waxman-Markey, we believe that the projects that we
consider are an accurate representation of what project types will be considered in
any future federal climate change mitigation program that has an offset provision.
Table B.28 summarizes the characteristics of the ten project types considered.
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Table B.28: Selected Offset Project Characteristics
Offset Project Type Program BAU Emissions Marginal Costs Offset Supply Trans. CostsUncertainty of Mitigation Potential Per Ton of CO2
Landfill methane
capture and




operations [23] RGGI Medium High Low High
Reduction in emissions
of SF6 in the electric
power sector [1] RGGI Low Low Low Low
Sequestration of
carbon due to
afforestation [8, 36] AB32 Medium Low High Low
Urban
afforestation [8, 24] AB32 High High Low Low
HFC-23
destruction[120] CDM Medium Low High High
N2O abatement [119] CDM Low Low High Medium
Renewable energy [8] CDM Medium Medium Medium Low
Energy efficiency [8, 24] RGGI Medium/High Medium Medium Medium
Avoided
deforestation [8, 24] REDD+ High Low High Medium/High
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Each project type is assigned a qualitative rating for the four key parameters.
Our ratings are based on empirical and survey-based studies that we reference
next to each project type. We assign a rating for BAU emissions uncertainty,
marginal costs of mitigation, offset supply potential and transaction costs.
The ratings are relative to the entire universe of offset project types. These
ratings, however, are averages and may not apply in all settings. For example,
studies have found that marginal costs of mitigation for sequestering carbon
from afforestation varies considerably across different regions within the United
States[47]. Therefore, we suggest that our results be augmented in a future study
with a more rigorous disaggregated and data-driven analysis that quantitatively
identifies these characteristics for relevant offset project types.
Our categorization system analyzed with our framework yields some
qualitative suggestions for policy makers as they consider including different
offset project types for cost containment purposes. First, several project types that
have low marginal costs of mitigation are likely to create more under-credited
emissions reductions than over-credited offsets awarded to them (see Table B.7
shows the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions and over-credited offsets
as we vary the supply (i.e. marginal cost) of mitigation curve, where a
larger supply corresponds to lower marginal costs). This is because potential
projects with low marginal costs of mitigation are more likely to opt in when
they are assigned a baseline below their BAU emissions, as illustrated with
the green area of Figure 1. These project types include HFC-23 destruction,
N2O abatement, avoided deforestation, and afforestation and SF6 reductions.
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This rating dimension makes these projects look desirable not only from an
environmental standpoint (as under-credited emissions reductions are more likely
to cancel over-credited offsets), but also because of economic concerns. Including
these projects in cap-and-trade programs can dramatically reduce compliance
costs as much cheaper mitigation opportunities are included under the cap (see
Table B.9).
While this result applies to all offset types, its significance is especially relevant
for HFC-23 projects. These project types of recently been banned in European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) for several reasons, including windfall
profits and perverse incentives. These projects, however, have been shown to
have exceptionally low marginal costs of mitigation.[120] Our framework predicts
that these projects are likely to opt in to an offsets program even when they are
assigned a baseline below their BAU emissions. As a consequence, they are likely
to generate large volumes of under-credited emissions reductions as long as they
are assigned baselines below their BAU emissions. This result may give policy
makers pause before they join the EUETS action of disallowing HFC-23 offsets
from being used for compliance.
Unfortunately, however, many of the projects that have low marginal costs of
mitigation and high offset supply potential also have substantial BAU emissions
uncertainty. Table B.4 suggests that as BAU emissions uncertainty increases,
there are relatively more over-credited offsets awarded and relatively fewer
under-credited emissions reductions created, having the effect of increasing
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aggregate emissions. Our framework confirms the standard convention of
discounting or banning the use of projects with highly uncertain BAU emissions.
Among the project types that have low marginal costs of mitigation, N2O
abatement and SF6 reductions appear to also have low BAU emissions
uncertainty, strengthening the argument for allowing these types of offsets to be
used by the capped sector in emissions trading programs.
To protect emissions caps from being busted and carbon markets from being
flooded with over-credited offsets, in the short run when equilibrium permit and
offset prices are low policy makers may wish to include projects with low BAU
emissions uncertainty or to set highly conservative baselines to all projects to
avoid awarding projects with too many over-credited offsets. In the long run,
however, when carbon prices are expected to be substantially higher as caps
are tightened, policy makers should consider relaxing baselines and including
potentially risky projects with medium or high BAU emissions uncertainty and
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